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Abstract
From 2000 to 2013, Israel had the second highest number of deaths from suicide attacks
and was on the list of countries that may experience increases in terrorism due to ongoing
conflicts. Suicide bombings present highly complex situations for counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency professionals. Using Freeman, Tucker, and Merton’s framework of 9
preattack phases as the primary theoretical construct, the purpose of this multiple case
study was to explore specific patterns that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for 6 successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Secondary, archival
data were acquired through a data use agreement with a private security organization in
Israel and a maximum variation sampling procedure was used to identify cases. These
data were subjected to Straus and Corbin’s open and axial coding procedures. Coded
data were analyzed using Merriam’s cross case analysis procedure. Findings indicated
that although the nine preattack phases emerged in both the successful and unsuccessful
attacks, they were more consistently present in the successful bombing cases. For the
successful attacks, general planning, financing, and operational preparation received the
most occurrences. The implications for positive social change are directed at
counterterrorist decision makers and operators as focusing on the early planning phases
of a terrorist attack will help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent
suicide attacks from occurring.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Suicide terrorism is the most aggressive form of terrorism in which attackers’ or
adversaries’ coercive actions may anger both the targeted community members as well as
other individuals (Pape, 2008). In this study, adversaries are individuals or organizational
members who use suicide terrorism tactics against civilians or government officials
(Martin, 2003). Pape (2008) reported that what distinguishes suicide terrorists from other
terrorists is that the attackers do not expect to survive their mission as they often use a
method of attack that requires them to die in order to succeed. Pape related that suicide
attackers may use methods such as car bombs, suicide vests, or flying airplanes into
buildings; for example, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), where 2,997
people died as a direct result of al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks (Miller & Smarick, 2011, para.
2).
Like the United States, the threat of terrorist attacks is a major national security
risk for many countries, such as Israel, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordon, and
Turkey (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2014). In Israel, since September 3,
2015, 40 people have been killed in terrorist attacks and 511 people, including four
Palestinians, have been injured (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016, para. 2). The
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) reported that there have been 155 stabbing
attacks, including 76 attempted attacks, 96 shootings, 45 vehicular ramming attacks, and
one bus bombing (para. 2). Hassan (2009) shared that the main motive for many suicide
bombing attacks in Israel is revenge for acts committed by Israelis. The IEP (2014)
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identified Israel, along with 12 other countries, as being at risk for increased terrorist
activity.
Using Medby and Glenn’s (2002) intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) modified intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (ModIPB) framework, and Freeman, Tucker, and Merten’s (2010) nine
preattack phases, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. The implications for positive
social change stemming from this multiple case study are directed at counterterrorist
decision makers and operators as focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist
attack will help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks
from occurring and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks. This knowledge and
action will save the lives of citizens, first responders, and law enforcement officials. In
Chapter 1, I include the background of the study, problem statement, purpose of the
study, research question, conceptual framework, nature of the study, definition of terms,
assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, significance of the study, and a
summary.
Background of the Study
Two main purposes of terrorism are to gain supporters and to coerce opponents
(Pape, 2008). Pape (2008) reported that terrorists often seek both outcomes as they want
to change the target state’s policies while obtaining support and recruits for their cause.
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The author discussed three forms of terrorism, which are as follows: (a) demonstrative,
(b) destructive, and (c) suicide terrorism. Pape described demonstrative terrorism as
political with the aim of gaining publicity to recruit more activists, gain attention to
grievances from others on the other side, and to gain attention from third parties who
might place pressure on the other side. The author noted that destructive terrorism is
more aggressive than demonstrative terrorism as the goal is to coerce opponents with
injury or death threats and obtain support for the cause. Pape noted that suicide terrorism
is the most aggressive form of terrorism as coercion is pursued that angers both target
community members and other individuals as well. With suicide terrorism, Pape shared
that the attackers do not expect to survive and often employ lethal methods of attack. The
author reported that suicide terrorism has occurred in numerous attacks, such as when the
Palestinians invade Israeli settlements on the West Bank with guns and grenades with the
goal of killing residents and few of these suicide attackers escape alive.
In comparison to other types of terror attacks, suicide attacks are fewer, but there
is a higher casualty rate (Wigle, 2010). Dolnik (2007) related that to achieve their goal,
terrorists study potential targets in order to understand community vulnerabilities and use
exploitable opportunities for attacks. Syed (2010) reported that Israel, Palestine, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are regions that have frequent suicide attacks.
Sterman and Gross (2016) reported that compared to 2014, the number of Israelis injured
by terrorism increased 284% in 2015 (para. 1). The authors noted this increase despite a
slight decrease in the number of terrorist attacks, from 1,793 in 2014 to 1,719 terrorist
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attacks in 2015 (para. 5). Sterman and Gross noted that 28 people were killed in terrorist
attacks in 2015 compared to 20 fatalities in 2014 (para. 3). The authors related that the
majority of the 2015 fatalities occurred in attacks in Southern West Bank and Jerusalem.
Sterman and Gross noted that people were also killed in Beersheba, Tel Aviv, and
Northern West Bank.
Recent attacks against Israelis are due to incitement of radical Islamist and
terrorists who have called on Palestinian youths to murder Jews (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2016). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) noted that terrorist
attacks have been concentrated in greater Jerusalem, but attacks have spread to other
locations in Israel, including Kiryat Gat, Tel Aviv, Afula, Gan Shmuel, and Raanana. In
addition, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs related that the attacks have been carried
out by young lone wolf terrorists who are mainly from East Jerusalem, while some are
from Judea and Samaria. Attacks have also been carried out by Israeli Arabs, Palestinians
who were in Israel illegally, women, and children. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
reported that suicide attackers were mostly motivated by the lies that were spread by the
Palestinian media that Israel threatened Al-Aqsa mosque, as well as youths being
frustrated, desperate, and angry.
Researchers have focused on resilience, acute stress, and psychological responses
in citizen’s after suicide attacks in Israel (Amital, Amital, Shohat, Soffer, & Bar-Dayan,
2012; Shalev, Tuval, Fenkiel-Fishman, Hadar, & Eth, 2006). While a few researchers
have focused on patterns in preattack terrorist activities using a range of global terrorist
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events (Fox, 2014; Freeman et al., 2010), there is a gap in the literature that specifically
explores specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases
that consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each successful or failed
suicide bombing cases in Israel. In this study, I addressed this gap by adding new
knowledge to the field. This multiple case study was needed as understanding the general
pattern of preparation before a suicide attack is useful in preventing subsequent attacks.
Problem Statement
Terrorism is a major national security problem for many countries (IEP, 2014).
The IEP (2014) noted that most terrorist-related deaths (66%) in 2013 were claimed by
four terrorist organizations, which are Islamic State (ISIS), Boko Haram, Taliban, and alQa’ida (p. 2). In asymmetric warfare, where the military power differs significantly
between two rivals, suicide bombings are often used as the smaller weaker group attacks
the stronger one (Saxton, 2016). The IEP reported that from 2000 to 2003, most suicide
attacks occurred in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (p. 34). The IEP found that 13
countries were at risk for an increase in terrorism, which includes Israel. In Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, from 2000 to 2013, the
United States had the highest number of deaths from suicide attacks with 3,042, with
2,996 deaths attributed to 9/11 (IEP, 2014, p. 35). The IEP found that Israel had the
second highest number of deaths with 841 or 17% of all fatalities (p. 35). In 2013, Israel
had 24 fatalities from terrorist attacks (p. 35). Israel was also on the list of countries that
may experience increases in terrorism due to ongoing conflicts.

6
Suicide bombings present highly complex situations for counterterrorism and
COIN professionals (Butterworth, Sholev, & Jenkins, 2012; Freeman et al., 2010;
Greenhill & Staniland, 2007; IEP, 2014; Kennedy, 2006; Landree et al., 2007; McCaul et
al., 2014; Medby & Glenn, 2002; Paul & Landree, 2008; Shaked, 2016; White, 2011).
One limitation is that studies have been conducted that examined global terrorist attacks
and mass school shootings (Freeman et al., 2010) and which of Freeman et al.’s (2010)
nine phases to focus operational resources on (Fox, 2014). However, research is lacking
on the specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each successful or failed
suicide bombing cases in Israel. By focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist
attack, decision makers and counterterrorist operators (CTOs) are better able to identify
essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from occurring (Fox, 2014). Paul and
Landree (2008) related that the more individuals involved in counterterrorism strategies
are able to understand adversary strategies, the better equipped they are to identify risks
and execute defensive strategies. The authors argued that any planning process involved
in an attack should be studied, which provides unique insights into various phases of the
attack such as selecting a target, selecting the mode of attack, choosing specific terrorist
operatives, and developing an operational plan. In addition, numerous constraints are
involved in any decision to focus counterterrorism and intelligence collection efforts such
as budgetary constraints, infrastructure, and capability (Fox, 2014). Thus, findings from
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this study may help CTOs narrow the field of options while filling the operational need to
detect terrorist attacks before they occur.
A second limitation is that past studies have not explored suicide attacks in Israel
through the conceptual lens of Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework,
Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack
phases. Using these conceptual frameworks, a multiple case study was needed that
explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases
that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each adversary success or
failure in Israel suicide bombing cases.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore specific patterns within
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases
in Israel. A multiple case study research design allows the researcher to explore
differences within and between cases, and the goal is to replicate findings across cases
(Baxter & Jack, 2008). Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et
al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases were used as
the conceptual frameworks of this study. Data were collected using a researcher-created
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, a researcher-created site data collection
worksheet, and a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Data
were managed with NVivo.
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Research Question
In this multiple case study, I addressed one central research question: What are
the specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful or
failed suicide bombing cases in Israel?
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework is used to show how the researcher’s study fits into
what is already known or the relationship to existing theory and research (Maxwell,
2005). In addition, the conceptual framework shows how the study contributes to the
field; specifically, the researcher’s intellectual goals (Maxwell, 2005). RockinsonSzapkiw and Knight (2012) related that the conceptual framework informs the research
questions and methodology and helps the researcher justify his or her research problem;
thus, showing why the study is important. Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic
framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
preattack phases served as the conceptual frameworks of this study. A brief overview of
the frameworks is provided in this section with a more detailed explanation provided in
Chapter 2. I organized this section in the following subsections: intelligence preparation
of the battlefield, modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and nine preattack
phases.
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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPB is an analytic framework that the United States military uses to collect,
organize, and process intelligence with respect to terror assaults in rural and urban areas
of operation (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) reported that IPB gives
commanders and their staff information on the conditions within their operational area,
such as areas of operation, interests, and battlespace that could affect the outcome of their
mission. The researchers noted that identified conditions include relevant characteristics
of the weather, terrain, population groups and subgroups, media, infrastructure, and
threats. In addition, Medby and Glenn related that IPB provides a method of collecting
information to describe and depict how each relevant characteristic influence the friendly
unit, enemy unit, and other groups in the operational area. Hence, commanders use IPB to
make timely and accurate decisions. The authors noted that IPB is an ongoing cyclical
process that involves four steps, which are as follows: (a) define the battlefield area, (b)
describe the battlefield’s effects, (c) evaluate the threat, and (d) develop enemy courses of
action (p. 13). I discuss these four steps in further detail in Chapter 2.
Modiﬁed Intelligence Preparation of the Battleﬁeld
The ModIPB basic framework is derived from the U.S. Army IPB (Landree et al.,
2007). Landree et al. (2007) reported that due to the abundance of information in the
public domain, being able to identify all the information that are essential to a potential
target and evaluating its possible value to terrorist planners is overwhelming. Therefore,
Landree et al. created the ModIPB to define the kinds of information most likely to be
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useful in planning and carry out attacks on certain targets. In the ModIPB, Landree et al.
identified four main categories of information where all possible relevant information
requirements are grouped: (a) approach avenues and ease of access (b) target features, (c)
security, and (d) threat analysis in relation to terrorist operations (p. 19). The researchers
noted that the first two categories pertain to IPB concerns with battlefield environment
and effects, which are the first two IPB steps. The third category is drawn from the third
IPB step, evaluate the threat. The fourth category is based on the threat evaluation and the
development of the enemy COAs, which are the third and fourth IPB steps. I discuss
these four categories in further detail in Chapter 2.
Nine Preattack Phases
Before a terrorist attack, individuals who are involved join a terrorist group; get
training; plan the attack; obtain finances, weapons, and other materials; and prepare or
rehearse for the final attack (Freeman et al., 2010). To incorporate these activities,
Freeman et al. (2010) created nine different phases. Freeman et al. shared that each of the
phases was created to be distinct as possible from the others; however, they recognized
that some of the phases may overlap or that it may be challenging to differentiate when
actual cases are coded. Freeman et al. nine preattack phases are as follows: (a)
networking and indoctrination, (b) terrorist training, (c), general planning, (d)
recruitment, (e) financing, (f) operational planning, (g) weapons procurement, (h)
logistical preparation, and (i) operational preparation (p. 77). I discuss these nine
preattack phases in further detail in Chapter 2.
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Nature of the Study
I used a multiple case study research design because it enabled me to delve into
the topic and explore specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I used a combination or
mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum variation sampling and purposeful
random sampling. Patton (2001) related that using more than one sampling strategy meets
multiple interests and needs. Using both maximum variation sampling and purposeful
random sampling, the six cases were chosen based on the study’s selection criteria. The
cases had as much variation as possible, such as the location, size of the attack, and
successful and failed attacks.
I first used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the
successful and failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the
35 suicide bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then
using purposeful random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide
attack cases from the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. The researcher-created
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, which was based on Freeman et al.’s (2010)
nine preattack phases, was used to collect archival data from the private intelligence
company’s database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I used a researchercreated site data collection worksheet to collect data at each site of the three successful
and three failed suicide bombing attack locations (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-
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created questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open source information or
public data that is written or on the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D).
Data were managed with NVivo. Coding categories that were used for the central
research question are Freeman et al. (2010) nine preattack phases. Data analysis for this
case study were conducted at two levels. The first stage was a within-case analysis or
single-case analysis in which each case was treated as a comprehensive case (see
Merriam, 2009, p. 204). For this study, each successful and each failed suicide bombing
attack case were analyzed separately. Level 1 analysis of the six cases included coding
and categorization of all data from the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection
worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researchercreated questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The second level of data analysis
involved a cross-case analysis. Yin (2009, 2014) and Merriam (2009) believed the second
level of data analysis is dependent on theory development or the development of
theoretical propositions that helps to focus on certain data and ignore other data. Coded
and categorized data were examined across all sources of data for the three successful
suicide bombing attack cases and the three failed suicide bombing attack cases to
determine themes and discrepancies. Therefore, the three successful suicide bombing
attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis. Then the three failed suicide
bombing attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis. I conducted the study in
accordance with Walden University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines. I
discuss the nature of the study in further detail in Chapter 3.
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Definition of Terms
Adversary: Individuals or organizational members who use suicide terrorism
tactics against civilians or government officials (Martin, 2003).
Adversary failure: In this study, adversary failure or failed attacks is when the
suicide attacker was not killed, no civilians were killed (Freeman et al., 2010), or the
suicide attacker was killed before any civilians could be killed.
Adversary success: In this study, adversary success or successful attacks includes
the death of the suicide attacker along with the death of at least one civilian victim
(Freeman et al., 2010).
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB): “IPB is an analytic process used
to organize and analyze information on terrain, weather, and the threat within a unit’s
area of operations and associated area of interest” (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p. xiv).
Command members and intelligence staff use the IPB four-step approach to predict how
an adversary will act within a certain area of operations (AO).
Lone wolf terrorism: Terrorist attacks that are carried out by individuals who
operate alone, who are not affiliated with an organized terrorist group or network, and
whose methods are created and directed by the individual without any direct outside
command or hierarchy (Spaaij, 2010).
Modiﬁed intelligence preparation of the battleﬁeld (ModIPB): The ModIPB is
derived from the IPB and is a way to define the kinds of information most likely to be
useful in planning and carry out attacks on certain targets (Landree et al., 2007).
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Nine preattack phases: Freeman et al. (2010) created the nine preattack phases to
depict the phases that occur before a terrorist attack. Freeman et al. nine preattack phases
are (a) networking and indoctrination, (b) terrorist training, (c), general planning, (d)
recruitment, (e) financing, (f) operational planning, (g) weapons procurement, (h)
logistical preparation, and (i) operational preparation.
Suicide attack: The aim is “to physically destroy an initial target, its primary use
is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare intended to affect a larger public
audience” (Atran, 2003, p. 1534).
Suicide terrorism: This is “the targeted use of self-destructing humans against
noncombatant-typically civilian populations to effect political change” (Atran, 2003, p.
1534).
Target selection: Target selection and reconnaissance is the phase where the
teams assigned by the adversary will be dispatched to the field to choose and learn about
the target (Drake, 1998). This is a phase in which the adversary is vulnerable to
identification and being stopped by counterterrorism experts in their plot to attack
(Drake, 1998).
Terrorism: This is defined as “a violent action, or threat of violent action, aimed
at intimidating and coercing a government or sections of the public, typically for
political, religious or ideological ends” (Alrajeh & Gill, 2015, p. 2).
Terrorist: An individual who seeks to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical
infrastructure and key resources within a country in order to threaten national security,
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cause mass casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence in
the national economic and political institutions (White House, 2003).
Assumptions
Assumptions made for this study were the following:
•

The researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created
questionnaire into suicide bombing events were appropriate to explore
specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases that
consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of the six
successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel.

•

The adversary was targeting only civilians within the target site and not the
property.

•

Within the case studies that were chosen based on the selection criteria, there
were no high-profile targets within the civilian population.

•

While the findings cannot be statistically generalized, the findings may be
analytically generalized (Yin, 2010). This is discussed further in the
limitations section.

•

The results of the study will lead to positive social change as understanding
the general pattern of preparation of suicide attackers before a suicide attack is
useful in preventing future attacks.
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Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this multiple case study included specific patterns within each of
Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary
planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel.
Only suicide attack cases that met the selection criteria were included in this study.
Therefore, using both maximum variation sampling and purposeful random sampling, the
six cases met the following selection criteria. One criterion was successful and failed
suicide attacks that occurred from 2000 to 2010 in Israel. The criteria for successful
attacks included the death of the suicide attacker along with the death of at least one
civilian victim. The criteria for failed attacks were that the suicide attacker was not killed,
no civilians were killed, or the suicide attacker was killed before any civilians could be
killed. The attack site for each of the case studies were a soft target, such as in urban
settings and civilian population. Soft targets can include commercial and private sectors
as well as other targets such as areas or events where the public attends, which are under
minimal security, such as schools and open public marketplaces. Soft targets exclude
military-related settings and bases, convoys, or checkpoints. The cases chosen had
sufficient data available so that I was able to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) nine
phases. The cases had as much variation as possible, such as the location, size of the
attack, and successful and failed attacks.
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Limitations
Factors that I considered in relation to the trustworthiness that arose from the
execution of this multiple case study include the type of study, the chosen case studies,
types of data sources, assumptions, and analysis of the results. There were several
limitations of this study. Even though I used different kinds of cases, one possible
limitation was generalizing the results since a maximum variation sampling and
purposeful random sampling of only six Israel suicide bombing cases were used and the
results of the study were limited to suicide attacks cases in Israel. Therefore, the results of
the study may not be generalizable to other forms of terrorist attacks or to terrorist attacks
in other countries as the majority of the cases were targeted towards locations in and
around Jerusalem. Yin (2012) related that a single or small set of cases cannot be
statistically generalized as that is not the aim of such studies. Instead, Yin noted that case
studies tend to generalize to other situations based on the basis of analytic claims. Yin
discussed a conceptual claim where researchers show how the findings from their study
have informed the relationship among a particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs,
or sequence of events. Yin related that the second step pertains to researchers applying
the same theoretical propositions to implicate other situations outside the completed case
study where similar concepts, constructs, or sequences might be relevant. Hence,
although the findings from this multiple case study cannot be statistically generalized,
they could have implications for other situations based on analytical claims.
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A second possible limitation was issues of missing or incomplete data on the
suicide bombing cases. However, this possible limitation was addressed by only
including cases that had sufficient data available from multiple sources so that I was able
to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) nine phases. A third limitation pertained to bias in
the selection of the suicide bombing cases. I am the chief executive officer (CEO) of the
private intelligence company in Israel where the case study data were obtained. I
addressed this limitation by obtaining the community partner’s cooperation and data use
agreement. I used purposeful random sampling in selecting the three successful and three
failed suicide attacks. I also used specific strategies such as reflexivity where I revealed
any experiences, biases, and values pertaining to the adversary planning process for each
adversary success or failure in the Israel suicide bombing cases.
A fourth limitation was the difference in timeframe for successful suicide attacks
and unsuccessful suicide attacks. As noted in Chapter 4, the successful attacks occurred
in 2001 and 2002, whereas the unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. The
differences in years might be attributed to counterterrorist decision makers and operators
having a better understanding of the nine preattack phases; thus, improving their
counterterrorism strategies. In additions, the timeframe differences between the
successful and unsuccessful attacks might also be attributed to environmental changes,
such as suicide attacks originating from the Gaza Strip or other Palestinian territories, but
a barrier or wall was built beginning in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, when
major rioting and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006 (Butterworth et al., 2012;
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Zonszein, 2014). Zonszein (2014) reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered it as
a measure to protect Israelis from Palestinian suicide bombers. Thus, future research
could focus on factors that may have affected the behavior of terrorists in the intervening
years that may explain the differences found in the successful versus unsuccessful cases.
A fifth limitation was related to the assumption that the adversary was targeting
only civilians and not the property. As such, the results only focused on the casualties and
did not discuss damages to property. Hence, future research could focus on the aftermath
of terror attacks to gain a better understanding of how to prepare against serious damages.
Significance of the Study
The biggest threat to peace in Israel and other countries is terrorism by entities
such as ISIS, Boko Haram, Hezbollah, Taliban, and al-Qa’ida (Fox, 2014; IEP, 2014).
Fox (2014) emphasized that the detection of terrorist attacks before they occur is critical,
but difficult when efforts are unfocused and misaligned. Determining the general
timeframe in which each preattack phases occur will provide a valuable warning to
intelligence analysts (Freeman et al., 2010). Freeman et al. (2010) argued that findings
could also assist counterterrorism decision makers in creating policies to arrest those
suspected of plotting an attack as soon as their activity is noticed.
The implications for positive social change stemming from this study are directed
at counterterrorist decision makers and operators as focusing on the early planning phases
of a terrorist attack will help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent
suicide attacks from occurring and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks. This
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knowledge and action will save the lives of citizens, first responders, and law
enforcement officials. Findings from this research study added further knowledge to the
public policy and administration literature on patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s
(2010) nine preattack phases prior to suicide attacks. Along with the public policy and
administration field, a wide array of other fields might be interested in the study’s
findings, to include the fields of criminal justice, public safety, and emergency
management. The findings from the study are also applicable to many public and private
agencies and organizations to include Israel’s Homeland Security; federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies; and intelligence centers.
Summary
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Data were
collected using a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, a
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and a researcher-created questionnaire
into suicide bombing events. Data analysis for this multiple case study were conducted at
two levels: (a) single-case or within-case analysis and (b) cross-case analysis. Findings
from this study added new knowledge to the field and increased further understanding of
the general pattern of preparation for suicide attackers before the attacks take place.
In Chapter 1, I included the background of the study, problem statement, purpose
of the study, research question, conceptual framework, nature of the study, definition of
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terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, significance of the study, and a
summary. In Chapter 2, I include the introduction, literature search strategy, conceptual
framework, background of terrorist attacks, suicide attackers, suicide attack, lone wolf
suicide attacks, lessons learned from terrorist attacks, counterterrorism operations and
methodologies, and a summary and conclusions. In Chapter 3, I include the introduction,
research design and rationale, role of the researcher, methodology, issues of
trustworthiness, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I include the setting, demographics, data
collection, data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter
5, I include the interpretation of findings, limitations of the study, recommendations,
implications, and a conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore specific patterns within
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases
in Israel. Terrorism is a rational tactic that is utilized by individuals or groups with
inferior military capabilities (Schweitzer, 2000). The intent of terrorism is to cause
destruction to life and property by terrorizing individuals and generating publicity of the
attack (Mazumdar, 2012). The IEP (2014) reported a 5-fold increase in the number of
terrorism-related deaths since 2000, increasing from 3,361 in 2000 to 17,958 in 2013 (p.
2). Hassan (2009) reported that the almost daily reports of deaths caused by suicide
attacks rarely explain what motivates the suicide attackers. Hassan related that the suicide
terrorism database in Flinders University in Australia, the most comprehensive database
in the world, contains information on suicide bombings in Palestine, Israel, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; countries which accounted for 90% of all suicide
attacks between 1981 and 2006 (para. 3). Hassan noted that analysis of data contained in
the database indicated that politics, more than religious fanaticism, led to suicide
terrorism. Hence, Hassan argued that religion may play a key role in recruiting and
motivating potential future suicide bombers; however, the driving force is mainly
attributed to politics, humiliation, revenge, retaliation, and altruism.
Terrorism, specifically suicide terrorism, offers a unique platform that is
challenging to interpret (Atran, 2006). Atran (2006) related that rarely are suicide attacks
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unmethodical or the targets unsystematically selected as individuals interested in carrying
out a suicide terrorist attack perform hours of preoperational surveillance, tactical
training, firearms and explosives training, as well as detailed planning of the clothing
they will wear for the attack. In addition to its strategic advantages, suicide bombing has
tactical advantages over more conventional terrorist attacks because it is very difficult to
detect and stop such attacks (Cronin, 2003). In addition, because the death of the
perpetrator is a desirable or acceptable outcome of the attack, more complex missions can
be attempted than would otherwise be the case if an escape route was needed (Paz, 2005).
Thus, Paz (2005) related that the most difficult aspect of any type of terror attack is the
escape, which is unnecessary in a suicide attack. With no need for an escape plan, route,
or means of transportation, terrorists can plan and execute missions that otherwise might
be too difficult. Furthermore, Paz noted that suicide terrorism allows for precision in the
location and timing of the attack and gives the bomber the option of selecting alternate
targets if the original target is heavily defended or inaccessible.
Part of the difficulty of organizing counterterrorism operations is the
unpredictable nature of suicide bombings, which allow bombers maximum accessibility
to high volume targets (Cronin, 2003). Cronin (2003) stated that attackers are intent on
hurting or killing; therefore, they are willing to kill themselves in the process. As a result,
decision makers and CTOs face many challenges in combating suicide terrorism (Fox,
2014). By focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist attack, decision makers and
CTOs are better able to identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from

24
occurring (Fox, 2014). In Chapter 2, I include the introduction, literature search strategy,
conceptual framework, background of terrorist attacks, suicide attackers, suicide attack,
lone wolf suicide attacks, lessons learned from terrorist attacks, counterterrorism
operations and methodologies, and a summary and conclusions.
Literature Search Strategy
Literature search strategies for this research included a comprehensive search in
Walden University Library databases to include ProQuest Criminal Justice, Thoreau
Multi-Database Search, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete,
Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism
Reference Center, LexisNexis Academic, and SAGE Premier. In addition, I conducted
searches through Google Scholar and relevant organizational websites such as the private
intelligence company’s website that I used in this study. Key search terms included
adversary planning, adversary strategy, suicide bombings, suicide attacks, and
exploitable opportunities. Additional articles were examined after I reviewed the
reference section from each article, book, dissertation, or thesis.
Conceptual Framework
By focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist attack, decision makers and
CTOs are better able to identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from
occurring (Fox, 2014). Paul and Landree (2008) related that the more individuals
involved in counterterrorism strategies are able to understand adversary strategies, the
better equipped they are to identify risks and execute defensive strategies. The authors
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argued that any planning process involved in an attack should be studied, which provides
unique insights into various phases of the attack such as selecting a target, selecting the
mode of attack, choosing specific terrorist operatives, and developing an operational plan.
Paul and Landree noted that these decisions do not need to be made in a particular order.
Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB
framework, and Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases served as the conceptual
frameworks of this study. This section is organized in the following subsections:
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, research application of intelligence preparation
of the battlefield, modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield, research application
of the modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield, nine preattack phases, and
research application of the nine preattack phases.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPB is an analytic framework that the United States military uses to collect,
organize, and process intelligence with respect to terror assaults in rural and urban areas
of operation (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) reported that IPB gives
commanders and their staff information on the conditions within their operational area,
such as areas of operation, interests, and battlespace that could affect the outcome of their
mission. The researchers noted that identified conditions include relevant characteristics
of the weather, terrain, population groups and subgroups, media, infrastructure, and
threats. In addition, Medby and Glenn related that IPB provides a method of collecting
information to describe and depict how each relevant characteristic influence the friendly

26
unit, enemy unit, and other groups in the operational area. Hence, commanders use IPB to
make timely and accurate decisions.
IPB is an ongoing cyclical process that involves four steps, which are as follows:
(a) define the battlefield area, (b) describe the battlefield’s effects, (c) evaluate the threat,
and (d) develop enemy courses of action (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p. 13). In regard to Step
1, define the battlefield area, Medby and Glenn (2002) reported that focus is placed on
battlefield areas and characteristics, which shape the commander’s mission. Attention is
also placed on obtaining the necessary intelligence to finish the IPB process in order to
support the military decision-making process. Hence, specific environment features or
activities within it, as well as the physical location that may influence friendly and enemy
courses of action (COAs) or the commander’s decisions, are identified for additional
analysis.
In Step 1, four tasks are normally conducted: (a) define the AO, (b) define the
area of interest (AOI), (c) define the battlespace, and (d) gather available intelligence and
identify intelligence gaps (Medby & Glenn, 2002, p. 14). For the first task, Medby and
Glenn (2002) noted that the AO is a geographical area that includes the above airspace,
which is assigned to a commander for military operations. The size of the AO depends on
the “mission, enemy terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METTTC)” (p. 14) and “the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)” (p. 14) that are used by
the unit. Most of the unit’s assets are deployed in the AO; thus, a lot of the intelligence
effort is placed on this area. In Step 1, in relation to the AOI, which is the second task,
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Medby and Glenn related that information and intelligence are obtained from a
geographical area in order to allow planning or successful conduct of the command’s
operation. The aim of the AOI delineation is to assist the command staff with predicting
the elements beyond the AO that might influence the mission. The authors recommended
that the AOI include combatant and noncombatant assets that could influence the friendly
operation. Medby and Glenn noted that systems used to influence the AOI and
battlespace goes beyond weaponry, such as civic affairs, public affairs, psychological
operations, and other assets.
In Step 1, the third task is defining the battlespace, which pertains to the
conceptual physical volume where the commander plans to win against the enemy
(Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) noted that the battlespace in
influenced by time, tempo, depth, and synchronization. The battlespace pertains to the
ability of the friendly unit to influence activities outside of the assigned AO; therefore, it
might be very different from the AOI. During the fourth task, while the limits of the AO,
AOI, and battlespace are determined, analysts begins to collect data on important aspects
of their area of responsibility (AOR), which includes a combination of the AO, AOI, and
the battlespace. Materials include maps, geographical surveys, demographic information,
threat order of battle (OB), personality profiles, and the area’s historical accounts of
activities. Using the information collected, analysts are able to identify important
information gaps and work with their commanders to develop relevant questions called

28
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) that guide the operation’s
intelligence collection.
In regard to Step 2, describe the battlefield’s effects, analysts show how the
weather, terrain, and other battlefield factors can affect friendly and enemy operations
within an AO, AOI, and battlespace (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002)
noted that the aim of this step is to allow commanders the ability to quickly choose and
exploit the terrain as well as other factors such as whether, politics, and economics, in
order to best support the friendly mission. The authors noted that two tasks are involved
in this step. The first task is identifying the military aspects of the operational area, such
as what is in the area that can affect the mission. Medby and Glenn shared that being able
to discern the military features of the terrain normally includes identifying how the relief,
structural, and vegetation features of the area serve or interfere with the military purpose.
Medby and Glenn noted that military purposes include “observation and fields of fire,
concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach,” (p. 18) which
are also called OCOKA factors. The terrain features are examined to establish how they
might be included in each of the OCOKA categories. The authors related that the second
task is describing how identified characteristics will affect a unit’s operation in the area.
The authors noted that after the military aspects are identified, they are used to illustrate
how military operations are affected.
In regard to Step 3, evaluate the threat, a profile of the enemy is developed
(Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) noted that using information that was
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obtained from national intelligence agencies and the unit’s intelligence assets, analysts
determine enemy composition, strength, tactics, goals, and vulnerabilities. The authors
related that despite the threat, an evaluation must include in-depth investigation of how it
affects the friendly unit and how it will successfully achieve the assigned mission. In
regard to Step 4, develop enemy courses of action, Medby and Glenn shared that this step
combines the first three steps of the process in order to portray how the enemy will use
terrain, whether, and current assets to obtain their goals within the chosen AO, AOI, or
battlespace. Thus, analysts create templates to depict predicted enemy behavior
throughout the AO. In addition, during this step, the authors noted that a consolidated list
of all possible adversary COAs should be created.
In summary, during the first three steps, information is compiled about certain
features of the operational area (Medby & Glenn, 2002). Medby and Glenn (2002) noted
that the information compiled during the first three steps are consolidated during the
fourth step and used to predict enemy COAs. The authors reported that the during each of
the four steps, questions are asked and answered that help with coordinating
reconnaissance and surveillance, managing intelligence-collection efforts, supplying
location and asset information for the targeting process, and integrating battle damage
assessment (BDA) into the execution of follow-on missions. When the operation has
started, it is imperative that the IPB process continues in order to obtain additional
situational development and COA assessment.
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Research Application of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Research is lacking on the application of Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic
framework to suicide attacks; however, authors have written scholarly papers on this
framework in relation to suicide attacks. On November 26, 2008, in Mumbai, India, 10
armed terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), used military assault-style tactics
to attack businesses, including restaurants and hotels (O’Rourke, 2010). O’Rourke (2010)
reported that the attackers targeted one of India’s economic and social hub where at least
172 people died, which generated a lot of media attention. The researcher noted that this
attack showed a significant shift in tactics using suicide bombers and the placement of
improvised explosive devices, which has important lessons for contemporary law
enforcement agencies. O’Rourke reviewed the emergent challenges for policing
organizations as a result of this attack.
The tactics used by terrorists have continuously evolved from the 1970s when
groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took people hostage and
made demands, thus, getting media coverage for their cause (O’Rourke, 2010). O’Rourke
(2010) reported that police response to terrorism continues to be determined by the
pattern where terrorists take hostages and use media to make terrorist demands to a
worldwide audience. However, law enforcement officers are now challenged with the rise
of suicide bombers as police officers are not able to isolate individuals or groups, and use
negotiation tactics to obtain a resolution. Instead, police officers now have to deal with
individuals or groups who place explosive devices on themselves or in places, denoting
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them without making any demands. Lia (2007) posited that if the loss of lives and the
atrocity committed are high, then there will be a lot of media coverage.
Terrorist or extremist groups need access to essential weaponry and they need to
have the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies in order to carry out
similar attacks like the one in Mumbai, India (Bennie & LeMiere, 2008; O’Rourke,
2010). Sullivan (2008) related that societal changes are resulting in new models to collect
and analyze intelligence that is needed for public policy and national security operations.
O’Rourke (2010) discussed the need for predictive analysis or warning intelligence,
which gives law enforcement agencies the ability to take action before a terrorist attack.
Sullivan and Wirtz (2008) reported that the IPB military model can be adapted into a new
approach called intelligence preparation for operations (IPO) and used by law
enforcement officials.
The IPO approach is a four-step process, which is as follows: (a) situational
recognition, (b) analysis, (c) divining course of action, and (d) rehearsals (O’Rourke,
2010, p. 50; Sullivan & Wirtz, 2008, p. 16). Sullivan and Wirtz shared that the first IPO
step is to define the operational space, which may include planned events or targets that
terrorists or criminal networks have identified. The second IPO step is to give basic
information about operational spaces that are known in an easy to use format called target
or response information folders that include information about the local populations,
terrain, whether, and historical information about infrastructure and cultural areas. The
third IPO step is identifying and evaluating threatening groups or people in relation to
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weapons that they may use, such as chemical weapons, small arms, and explosives; as
well as the tactics they may use in their planned activities, such as suicide bombing. In
the fourth IPO step, potential courses of action are created for opposing and friendly
units. The IPO model provides numerous scenarios; therefore, it can also be used to
bridge the divide between deliberate and emergency response planning (O’Rourke,
2010). O’Rourke (2010) noted that commanders are then able to create different
responses and assess their suitability
When discussing war with Iran, such as the use of limited air strike or full
invasion, proponents for war often overstate the benefits, such as a preventing a nuclear
disaster with Israel while concealing the costs, such as the number of fatality that would
occur among U.S. soldiers, airmen, and marines (Cummings & Cummings, 2012).
Cummings and Cummings (2012) described possible Iranian responses to American and
Israeli air strikes. The researchers used the Army’s IPB analytic tool to examine the
operational war environment with Iran and broadly described Iran’s terrain. In addition,
the researchers discussed how Iran’s military adopted asymmetric tactics to defeat their
enemies, such as the United States. The researchers discussed a course of action that is
available to Iran at sea, air, ground, in other countries, and the use of terrorism around the
world.
The United States could become involved in a secret war of terrorist attacks and
special counterterrorism operations outside of Iran and the Persian Gulf (White, 2011).
However, Byman (2013) argued that this kind of war is already taking place. According
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to Bryman, Iran is a major sponsor of terrorism that strikes Israel, U.S. Arab allies, and
U.S. citizens. The author discussed two blasts on November 19, 2013, that destroyed the
Iranian embassy in Lebanon and killed at least 20 people. Bryman argued that these
attacks are a reminder that Iran has a serious terrorism problem. Byman noted that the
increasing violence further destabilizes the Middle East and negatively affects U.S.
interests.
Predicting how Iran will use terrorism is more challenging than conventional
forms of warfare, which require weapons and vehicles (Cummings & Cummings, 2012).
Cummings and Cummings (2012) emphasized that terrorism requires a great deal of
planning such as 9/11, which required flight school training for at least eight individuals.
The authors discussed Iran’s terrorism courses of action and noted that Iran could
conduct cyber and terror attacks on Israel, the United States, Europe, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. The GCC includes six Middle Eastern countries,
which are as follows: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain,
and Oman (“Gulf,” 2015). Cummings and Cummings concluded that the biggest threat
for war with Iran is an out of control war.
Modiﬁed Intelligence Preparation of the Battleﬁeld
The ModIPB basic framework is derived from the U.S. Army IPB (Landree et al.,
2007). Landree et al. (2007) reported that due to the abundance of information in the
public domain, being able to identify all the information that are essential to a potential
target and evaluating its possible value to terrorist planners is overwhelming. Therefore,
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Landree et al. created the ModIPB as a way to define the kinds of information most likely
to be useful in planning and carry out attacks on certain targets. In the ModIPB, Landree
et al. identified four main categories of information where all possible relevant
information requirements are grouped: (a) approach avenues and ease of access (b) target
features, (c) security, and (d) threat analysis in relation to terrorist operations (p. 19). The
researchers noted that the first two categories pertain to IPB concerns with battlefield
environment and effects, which are the first two IPB steps. The third category is drawn
from the third IPB step, evaluate the threat. The fourth category is based on the threat
evaluation and the development of the enemy COAs, which are the third and fourth IPB
steps.
The first category, approach avenues and ease of access, include multiple
elements such as target location and surrounding terrain and buildings, such as maps,
blueprints, types of building construction, critical points, and OCOKA factors (Landree et
al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007) also noted that the first category includes available paths
to target, such as the exact paths to take, go or no-go areas due to barriers, obstructions,
or impassable terrains, restricted areas or limited access due to security restrictions, rules
or laws governing movement in target area, and traffic conditions in relation to vehicles
and pedestrians. The researchers related that well planned terrorist attacks require
planning about how attackers will reach the target such as the use of scenarios about how
attackers will be at a certain place at an exact time in order to carry out a coordinated
attack or multiple attacks, or an attack against a moving target. In addition, terrorists do
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not want to be identified; thus, planning includes the exact paths they will take. Terrorists
who plan overt attacks may be concerned about whether they will be seen, the presence
of physical obstacles, and time and place of the greatest risk where they may be seen by
security forces or pedestrians.
Features of the second category, target features, may overlap with those in the
first category, approach avenues and ease of access (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al.
(2007) noted that elements of target features include attack and target. The researchers
related that attack pertains to the possible locations from which to launch an attack and
possible times to launch an attack. Landree et al. reported that target includes the mobility
and variability of the target. If the target is mobile, the predictable path it takes is
considered. Target also includes important features and structure of the target, such as
technical details. The researcher shared that elements included in the third category,
security, include security forces, security measures, and other population groups that are
present. Landree et al. noted that security forces include the size and types of security
forces, such as armed and unarmed, plainclothes, canine, and mounted, along with their
jurisdiction. The researchers shared that security measures include specific
countermeasures as well as checkpoints use and function, and sensors such as cameras,
scanners, and other detection equipment. Other population groups include nonsecurity
force workers in the operations area. Landree et al. related that terrorists assess who these
workers are, when they may be present, and what they do in the operational area. The
researchers noted that terrorist planning also includes knowing whether nonsecurity
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workers have had training or have been given instructions that might increase their
contribution to security.
The fourth category, threat analysis in relation to terrorist operations, includes
threats posed by security forces and security measures, threats posed by employees of the
target, concentrations and heightened vigilance of citizens, and how weather affects
operation effectiveness (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007, p. 19) noted that the
elements in this category are assessed based on the information that was collected in the
first three categories. In addition, the researchers shared that the elements in this category
provide an estimate of how information may affect the terrorist attack operation from
terrorists’ perspectives, as they are the ones collecting the information.
Research Application of the Modiﬁed Intelligence Preparation of the Battleﬁeld
Obtaining information that is relevant to planning terrorist attacks from available
public sources is valuable to terrorist planners because it can normally be obtained at
lower cost, risk, and effort than more direct forms of gathering information such as
observation of a possible target (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007) developed
the ModIPB framework to guide assessments of available information that is used for
planning attacks on the U.S. air, rail, and sea transportation infrastructure. Even though
the study was conducted in 2007, it is very relevant and applicable to this research study.
The researchers applied the ModIPB framework in a red team information gathering
exercise. The red team served as substitutes for terrorists seeking information about each
of the potential six attack scenarios. The red team exercise represented the beginning of
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detailed operation planning and no information was assumed to have already been
collected. Information gathering for operational planning was conducted without travel to
the target site and through very low-risk or no-risk information gathering activities,
specifically, public source, off-site research. Using the ModIPB framework as a guide,
the researchers instructed the red team to obtain information to complete an operational
plan for each of the six scenarios.
The six scenarios were as follows: (a) a poison gas attack on the New York City
(NYC) subway at 42nd station street, (b) bomb in a passenger plane cargo hold at the Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX), (c) shipping a nuclear device in a cargo container
through Los Angeles, Long Beach (LA/LB), (d) Madrid-style bomb attack on commuter
train in the NYC East River tunnel, (e) man-portable air defense system (MANPADS)
attack on a flight bound into LAX, and (f) suicide boat rams a docked cruise ship at the
Port of Los Angeles (Landree et al., 2007). Landree et al. (2007) noted that the red team
exercise was subjected to three levels of validation: (a) a review by subject matter experts
(SMEs), (b) a review based on interviews conducted with transportation infrastructure
insiders, and (c) an assessment comparing the results obtained by a research and
development (RAND) expert who was tasked with the same exercise to those by the
team. Findings indicated that the ModIPB framework was beneficial in directing analyses
of publicly available information that would be needed to plan terrorist attacks across
numerous transportation infrastructure targets and attack methods. Thus, Landree et al.
found that the ModIPB was applicable to the problem of identifying information that
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might reveal vulnerabilities in those systems. In addition, the researchers found that when
this framework was applied, it became clear what types of information were relatively
hard versus relatively easy to find for the six scenarios. Landree et al. discussed two
implications in relation to the availability of information. First, the researchers related
that although the results indicated that a lot of information that are relevant to the
execution of a particular terrorist attack is available, much of the information is not
detailed enough to allow terrorists to carry out attacks with a high level of confidence that
the attacks will be successful. Second, information that are useful to terrorists can be
obtained from nonobvious sources, such as official and company websites, and
newspaper articles. However, the researchers noted that the information provided from
these sources does not create a threat to operational security.
Based on the findings, Landree et al. (2007) proposed two recommendations to
assist infrastructure owners increase security. First, the researchers recommended that
infrastructure owners conduct periodic reviews and revise procedures for operational and
information security in order to prevent security details from entering the public domain.
Second, Landree et al. recommended that owners and operators of transportation
businesses include information that can be obtained from easily accessible, off-site public
information sources in vulnerability assessments. For example, the researchers noted that
owners and operators of transportation businesses should assess the specific
vulnerabilities created by public knowledge of passenger travel information such as
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schedules, costs, and security procedures that passengers need in order to address them
through countermeasures.
Nine Preattack Phases
Before a terrorist attack, individuals who are involved join a terrorist group; get
training; plan the attack; obtain finances, weapons, and other materials; and prepare or
rehearse for the final attack (Freeman et al., 2010). To incorporate these activities,
Freeman et al. (2010) created nine different phases. Freeman et al. shared that each of the
phases was created to be distinct as possible from the others; however, they recognized
that some of the phases may overlap or that it may be challenging to differentiate when
actual cases are coded. Freeman et al. nine preattack phases are as follows (p. 77):
1. Networking and indoctrination: In this phase, cell members are introduced and
exposed to radical doctrine through various events, such as religious
instruction, meeting, cohabitation, and social activities.
2. Terrorist training: This phase often overlaps with phase one and include cell
members’ participation in organized terrorist activities.
3. General planning: In this phase, the decision to conduct a terrorist attack is
made as well as the choice of a general target area or target set, such as ships,
bars, U.S. citizens, and soldiers. In addition, general shopping for potential
targets is performed.
4. Recruitment: In this phase, senior terrorist elements select and activate cell
members for a certain terrorist operation. Similar to 9/11, it is assumed that

40
there is a senior element that helps with recruitment and personnel selection.
However, in the terrorist group that carried out the attacks on the London
mass transit system on July 7, 2005, also called 7 July attacks or 7/7 attacks,
this may not have been the case (Freeman et al., 2010; Ray, 2016).
Nevertheless, Freeman et al. noted that in groups like this, a recruitment and
selection process still occurs as preexisting groups of friends and
acquaintances go through the radicalization process that results in a group
committed to an attack.
5. Financing: In this phase, funds are collected and allocated for a certain
terrorist attack. For example, the money came before the decision to conduct
an attack was made when a cell within the al-Qa’ida network carried out the
attack on the U.S. Navy ship Cole on October 12, 2000 (Freeman et al., 2010;
Pearl & O’Rourke, 2001).
6. Operational planning: In this phase, the specific target is selected, detail
reconnaissance of the target is conducted, and specific operation planning
takes place such as the delivery and procurement methods.
7. Weapons procurement: In the phase, materials for the construction of
explosives or weapons that will be used in the attack is obtained or received,
such as accelerants, detonators, fertilizers, and rockets.
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8. Logistical preparation: In this phase, logistical actions are taken in order to
prepare for the terrorist attack, including safe house rental, vehicle and
document procurement, and electronics purchase.
9. Operational preparation: In this phase, physical preparations for the imminent
terrorist attack takes place, including explosive construction, vehicle
alteration, specific explosives training, and multimedia preparation and
creation.
In Table 1 below, I compare Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases,
Medby and Glenn’s (2002) IPB analytic framework, and Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB
framework. I also included al-Qa’ida’s (1988/2002) planning phases for comparison with
the three conceptual frameworks.
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Table 1
Conceptual Framework Comparisons
Planning
categories

Freeman et al.’s
(2010) nine
preattack
phases
Networking and
indoctrination

Medby and
Glenn’s (2002)
IPB framework

Landree et al.’s
(2007) ModIPB
framework

al-Qa’ida’s
(1988) planning
phases

Identify target
area

Target access

Target location
and
accessibility

Area details
(Phase 3)

Terror training

Identify target
Area specifics

Target
characteristics

Target area
population

Assess (Phase 4
and 5)

Planning and
recruitment

Evaluate the
threat

Onsite
operations

Building layout

Plan (Phase 6)

Financing

Threat
assessment

Transportation
to and from
target

Target intent

Mobilization
speed

Identify and
recruitment
(Phase 1 and 2)

Location
Target specifics
specifics (Phase
7)

Determine
enemy action

Target specifics
(Phase 8)

Weapon
procurement

Ammunition
and
communication
details

Final prep
(Phase 9)

Logistical and
physical prep

Target security
Personnel
details
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Research Application of the Nine Preattack Phases
To determine whether terrorist attacks follow an observable pattern in their
preattack activities, Freeman et al. (2010, p. 75) divided terrorists’ preattack activities
into nine phases: networking, training, general planning, attack-specific recruitment,
financing, operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical preparation, and
operational preparation. Using these nine phases, the researchers examined 21 terrorist
attack cases (e.g., 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 9/11, 2007 Fort Dix plot, and 2007
John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport plot) and two school attacks (1999
Columbine shooting and 2007 Virginia Tech shooting) that are not normally considered
terrorist attacks since there were no contributing political factors. For each case, the
researchers investigated whether there was evidence of when terrorists or attackers took
part in activities across the nine phases. The researchers noted that the cases were not
chosen randomly, thus, conclusions must be tentatively interpreted. Instead, Freeman et
al. related that the cases were chosen based on two criteria: (a) cases where the
researchers expected to obtain data on the different phases and (b) cases where the
researchers could obtain a lot of variation. Variations included big cases such as 9/11,
smaller attacks such as the LAX Millennium plot, al-Qa’ida attacks, attacks by other
groups, nonmaritime attacks, successful attacks, failed attacks, and cases that were
thwarted. By including different types of cases, the researchers were able to see if they fit
the larger overall pattern.
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Findings indicated that the nine phases fell into three stages (Freeman et al.,
2010). Freeman et al. (2010) related that Stage 1 included Phases 1 through 3, which are
planning, training, and networking. This stage takes place 1 year or more in advance of
the attacks. Stage 2 included Phases 4 and 5, which are recruitment and financing. This
stage takes place 6 months to 1 year in advance of an attack. Stage 3 includes Phases 6
through 9, which are operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical preparation,
and operational preparation. This stage takes place closest to the attack, normally within a
few months before the attack is carried out. The researchers noted that these three stages
are robust across types and scales of attacks and the researchers suggested that these
stages might be used as an indication of the timing of possible future attacks.
Decision makers and CTOs are faced with many challenging situations in
combating global terrorism (Fox, 2014). Seeking to add a new quantitative aspect to
Freeman et al.’s (2010) work, Fox (2014) examined the use of a hybrid multiattribute
decision-making approach, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and technique of order
preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), to rank order the nine phases of a
terrorist attack based on data from 21 different terrorist attacks. Thus, Fox used the AHP
and the TOPSIS to interpret the data into a better understanding of which terrorist attack
phases to focus intelligence collection. When AHP was the only decision-making
approach used, Fox found that terrorist training, networking, planning, and operational
prep made up over 65% of the ranking weights. On the other hand, when TOPSIS was
used, the top four ranked ordering were operational prep, recruitment, terrorist training,
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and terrorist networking, which accounted for over 76% of the ranking weights. Fox
noted that both the AHP and the TOPSIS identified planning as the most detectable
phase, followed by recruitment, financing, logistic prep, weapons procurement,
operational planning, terrorist training, operational prep, and networking, respectively.
Fox concluded that by having the correct focal point, decision makers and CTOs have
insight into options and connected events, which increases their ability to prevent attacks.
Background of Terrorist Attacks
While the evolution of U.S. national security policy began with the end of the
Cold War and the rise of radicalized terrorism, the first identified terrorist group dates
from 66 A.D. to 73 A.D., when a Jewish group called Sicarii tried to displace the Romans
and their Jewish supporters from the Judean Region (Harmon, Pratt, & Gorka, 2011).
Kramer and Pape (2005) related that modern-day tactics such as suicide bombings began
in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1981. This method was first implemented during a bombing attack
against the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2014) reported that on
April 18, 1983, an individual strapped with explosive devices drove a truck toward the
U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The suicide driver detonated a 2,000-pound bomb that killed 63
people, including 17 Americans and injured 120 individuals in the nearby perimeter. The
bombing was carried out by a previously unknown group, Islamic Jihad, known today as
Hezbollah, the Party of God. Friedman (1998) reported that 6 months later, on October
23, 1983, Hezbollah struck the building housing the U.S. Marine’s peacekeeping force in
Beirut using a suicide truck bomb. Friedman related that most of those killed were asleep
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in their bunks when the explosion occurred at 6:20 a.m. The researcher explained that the
incident killed 241 Americans and injured 81 individuals. Friedman noted that
approximately 2 minutes later, Hezbollah also struck the French barracks in Beirut,
killing 58 French soldiers. Ganor (2003) reported that the motive behind the embassy and
barracks attacks was to pressure the multinational peacekeeping force to leave Lebanon.
In the wake of these attacks, both the U.S. and France withdrew their forces from
Lebanon.
Even though there is Islamic teachings against suicide and the killing of innocent
people, terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State or ISIS or ISIL have used
Islamism, which is a political form of Islam, to substantiate their terrorist actions
(Constitutional Rights Foundation [CRF], 2016). In this study, the Islamic State will be
referred to as ISIS. The CRF (2016) reported that Osama bin Laden founded al-Qa’ida in
1988 and this terrorist group committed many terrorist acts, killing numerous men,
women, and children. The CRF related that al-Qa’ida was responsible for the 1998
terrorist attacks at U.S. embassies in the East African countries of Kenya and Tanzania,
which killed 12 Americans and approximately 250 Africans, many of whom were
Muslims (para. 2). In addition, the CRF noted that this group was also responsible for
9/11, where suicide attackers killed approximately 3,000 people (para. 2). In 2003, alQa’ida suicide terrorists killed 35 people, including 12 Americans, when they set off
bombs in three housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (CRF. 2016). Other terrorist
groups linked to al-Qa’ida were responsible for the 2005 subway bombings in London
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that killed 56 people and the 2008 shootings and bombings in Mumbai, India, which
killed over 160 people (CRF, 2016, para. 3). The CRF shared that in 2010, a bomber tried
to set off a car bomb in New York City’s Times Square.
ISIS has risen to power in the Middle East and has developed an ideology that is
more extreme and brutal than other terrorist groups (CRF, 2016). The CRF (2016) noted
that this group has seized territories in Iraq and Syria, driving many Syrians from their
homes. The CRF reported that another jihadist group, Boko Haran, organized a militant
rebellion against the Nigerian government. Boko Haram goal is to conquer Christiandominated areas in Southern Nigeria and instill an Islamist government for the whole
nation (CRF, 2016). This group targets Muslims and Christians in violent raids and
assaults (CRF, 2016). The CRF shared that Boko Haram received the world’s attention in
2014 when members of the group kidnapped 276 school girls from a government
secondary school in Chibok (para. 43). The majority of the girls were Christians and were
forced to convert to Islam. Only a few were rescued as many were sold into slavery,
forced into marriages, and brainwashed to become Boko Haram fighters (CRF, 2016).
The CRF related that Boko Haram was originally allies with al-Qa’ida, but in 2015, the
group announced its support for ISIS.
The events that occurred on 9/11 sparked an urgent need to understand whether
terrorist attacks follow an observable pattern in their preattack activities (Freeman et al.,
2010; Fox, 2014). With regard to terrorism in Israel, the ability of terror organizations to
successfully target civilian or nonmilitary objectives in Israel is achieved not through
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capture of land but by instilling fear in the civilian population (Dolnik, 2007). To achieve
its goal, terror organizations study potential targets to reveal community vulnerabilities
and exploit those vulnerabilities for terrorist attacks (Dolnik, 2007). Paul and Landree
(2008) related that even the most complex events such as terrorist acts have certain
patterns that can be studied and exploited to prevent future occurrences; therefore, by
understanding the processes by which the adversary plans and executes its attack,
counterterrorism professionals can allocate resources and countermeasures to effectively
thwart the adversary’s planning process or mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks.
Suicide Attackers
Understanding terrorists’ mental state may provide important insight that may be
used to create counterterrorism methodologies. Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014)
analyzed the characteristics of lone actors with regard to their behaviors prior to an attack
as well as their sociodemographic background. The researchers found that network
connectivity and ideologies did not reveal a uniform profile of the attacker; however,
there were interesting findings with regard to transience and social isolation. Findings
indicated that approximately half of the attackers had changed their address within 5
years before the attack. Findings also revealed that social isolation was a common trait
among attackers, where more than 52.9% were described as socially isolated and at least
37% of the attackers lived alone at the time of the planning or attack (p. 6). Findings from
the study contributed to an overall understanding of the very early adversary planning
phases and how attackers’ surroundings influenced their terrorist transformation.

49
A single profile of suicide bombers does not exist (Merari, 2000). Merari (2000)
profiled more than 50 identified radical Islamists who used suicide bombing and served
in Hezbollah, Amal, and secular Syrian organizations in Lebanon, as well as in Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Merari concluded that there is no single psychological or
demographic profile of suicide terrorists. The researcher related that as a group, suicide
attackers are rational and do not suffer from psychopathology. While no single profile of
suicide bombers exists, certain trends, descriptive statistics, and social factors are
nevertheless useful in developing an understanding of suicide bombers. Given the
complexity and ongoing difficulties of successfully identifying, profiling, and preventing
terror attacks, particularly suicide bombings, there is a need for scholars to examine
differences in the processes, preparation, and execution of both successful and
unsuccessful attacks, including terrorists’ motivation, resources, recruitment, and
planning activities. The response to such asymmetrical challenges is constantly being
reevaluated due to past ineffective practices in countering them. Terrorists learn from
each other’s successes and failures and adapt their tactics accordingly (Atran, 2006).
Atran (2006) related that historical successes and the difficulties inherent in preventing
suicide bombing incidents have led to much more imitation than innovation in the
evolution of suicide bombing tactics.
Understanding perpetrators of attacks and events that may have led to their
decision to execute an attack are crucial factors for preventing future attacks. Pape (2008)
created a database of all suicide bombing and attacks that took place around the world
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from 1980 to 2003, which was the first complete data created. The researcher found that
315 attacks were carried out and at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while
trying to kill others (p. 129). Pape excluded attacks that were authorized by a national
government. Pape found that the connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism or any other religion was small. The researcher found that the leading
suicide attackers were the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist-Leninist group whose
members were from Hindu families who were opposed to religion. Findings indicated
that the Tamil Tigers committed 76 of the 315 attacks, which was more than Hamas (p.
130). Pape related that what nearly all the suicide attackers had in common was a secular
and strategic goal of forcing modern democracies to withdraw their military forces from
territories that the terrorists believed to be their homeland. Thus, Pape explained that
religion was hardly the main cause of terrorist attacks; however, it was used as a tool to
recruit and used as to tool to obtain broader strategic objectives.
General patterns in the data supported Pape’s (2008) conclusions. First, findings
indicated that almost all of the suicide attacks occurred as part of organized campaigns
and not as isolated incidents. From the 315 separate attacks, 301 had roots traced to large,
coherent political or military campaigns (p. 130). Second, Pape found that democratic
states were vulnerable to suicide attacks, such as Israel, the United States, France, India,
Russia, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Pape found that for the past 2 decades, these countries
have been targets of nearly every suicide attack. Third, findings indicated that suicide
campaigns were directed toward a strategic objective, such as in Israel, where the
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sponsors of the terrorist campaigns have been terrorist group who tried to create or
maintain political self-determination by forcing a democratic power to withdraw from
their claimed territories. For example, Pape noted that Osama bin Laden’s objective was
to expel American troops from the Persian Gulf and to reduce Washington’s power and
influence in the region.
Suicide terrorists do not have considerable psychopathology and they are
similarly educated and have similar economic means as their surrounding populations
(Atran, 2003). While Pape (2008) concluded that suicide bombers may be from middleclass families and have secular educations, Atran (2003) noted that most individuals who
volunteer or are selected to carry out attacks regard religion as an important personal
value. Freeman et al. (2010) related that while terror organizational members in groups
such as al-Qa’ida and Hezbollah have carried out carefully planned attacks and
assassinations in efforts to make nonreligious political gains, religious motives have
frequently played a role in the decisions of suicide bombers. Atran reported that their
religious beliefs allow them to justify attacks as a battle against threats to Islam, claiming
that their actions are sanctioned by their Islamic religion. Atran related that the
importance of religion in the lives of suicide bombers indicate that suicide terrorism is
not one dimensional. Freeman et al. shared that modern strategic logic of suicide bombers
usually incorporates both secular and religious ideals.
Suicide terrorists have certain personality traits that may lead them to kill
themselves and murder others (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy (2006) related that those traits
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include antisocial behavior, authoritarian personality, dependency, narcissism, paranoia,
and detachment. The researcher related that other factors include extramarital pregnancy,
sterility, or a desire for revenge for prior perceived injustices perpetrated by government
entities or other rivaling groups. Kennedy cautioned that although the character traits may
be shared by individuals engaging in terrorist activities, they are also present in
individuals who do not engage in terrorist activities, which shows the complexity of
creating a psychological profile of terrorists. Due to the limitations of psychological
profiling, behavioral profiling is also used by military, police, and security personnel who
monitor critical infrastructure for evidence of terrorist activity and the presence of suicide
bombers (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy discussed suspicious activities that might be
precursors to a suicide attack; however, the researchers argued that the inability to create
a clear profile of a terrorist make counterterrorism and the prevention of suicide attacks
during the operational phase an especially difficult and complex task.
Suicide Attacks
In this section, I provide an overview of suicide attacks. I also discuss suicide
attacks in Israel. I organized this section in the following subsections: overview, suicide
attacks in Israel, target selection and execution, and after attack responses.
Overview
In many instances, suicide attackers are not irrational individuals, but instead are
driven by social and political motivations (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy (2006) asserted that
unconventional use of violence, including suicide terrorism, can be effectively used by
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individuals or groups because it allows them to maximize the number of casualties and
the emotional effect that such a seemingly desperate attack will have on a broader
audience (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy reported that from 1980 to 2003, only 3% of
terrorist incidents were attributed to suicide attacks, but such attacks were responsible for
48% of the casualties inflicted (p. 1). The researcher noted that suicide attack is a highly
potent tactic that is continually used due to its ability to force troop withdrawals and
obtain other goals in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the West Bank, Turkey, and
Spain (Kennedy, 2006). Bakken (2007) agreed with Kennedy and related that while
suicide terrorism is viewed by many as an insane act, it is a very deliberate and effective
tactic.
Suicide bombings present highly complex situations for counterterrorism and
COIN professionals. In asymmetric warfare, where the military power differs
significantly between two rivals, suicide bombings are often used as the smaller weaker
group attacks the stronger one (Saxton, 2016). Straoke (2007) discussed the use of
suicide bombing as a tactical means of asymmetric warfare in Iraq. The author related
that after the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, the primary strategic objective of the Iraqi
insurgent movement was to liberate Iraq from foreign occupation. Straoke reported that
two other objectives emerged: (a) to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq and (b) to
undermine the postinvasion political arrangements putting pressure on the Iraqi
government to resign. These two objectives led to a final objective, which was to free
Iraq from the United States and its agents. To accomplish their primary objectives, Iraqi
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insurgents used political and military tactics, with suicide bombing being the tactic most
widely used.
In addition to its strategic advantages, suicide bombing has tactical advantages
over more conventional terrorist attacks because it is very difficult to detect and stop
(Cronin, 2003). Cronin (2003) stated that suicide attackers are so intent on hurting or
killing that they are willing to kill themselves in the process. Paz (2005) related that since
the death of the perpetrator is desirable or is an acceptable outcome of the attack, more
complex missions can be attempted than would otherwise be the case if an escape route
was needed. Hence, the most difficult aspect of any type of terror attack is the escape,
which is unnecessary in a suicide attack (Paz, 2005). With no need for an escape plan,
route, or means of transportation, terrorists can plan and execute missions that otherwise
might be too difficult (Paz, 2005). In addition, Paz related that suicide attacks allow for
precision in the location and timing of the attack and gives the bomber the option of
selecting alternate targets if the original target is heavily defended or inaccessible.
Suicide Attacks in Israel
The global terrorism index (GTI) report includes a comprehensive summary of
key global trends and patterns in terrorism, from 2000 to 2013 (IEP, 2014). The IEP
(2014) created the GTI with data from the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) global terrorism database (GTD). The
IEP reported that the GTD is the most comprehensive dataset on terrorism activity
worldwide, with over 125,000 terrorist incidents categorized. According to the IEP, since
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2000, the number of deaths attributed to terrorism has increased 5-fold, from 3,361 in
2000 to 17,958 in 2013 (p. 2). However, the IEP noted that for 4 years, beginning in
2007, there was a modest decrease in terrorist deaths and a small decrease in the number
of countries experiencing greater than 50 deaths from terrorism each year (p. 2). The IEP
reported that the largest increase in terrorist activity can be attributed to the start of the
2011 Syrian Civil War.
Terrorism is a major national security problem for many countries (IEP, 2014).
The IEP (2014) noted that most terrorist-related deaths (66%) in 2013 are claimed by four
terrorist organizations, which are ISIS, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida (p. 2).
The IEP related that the recent rise of extreme violent groups such as ISIS in Syria and
Iraq and greater territorial ambitions in the Levant, which includes the countries of Syria,
Israel, Lebanon, Jordon, Palestine, and Southern Turkey, increases the risk of further
destabilization in the Middle East region. According to the IEP, al-Qa’ida members view
the West as allied to Israel and believe that this relationship is attributed to the poverty of
many Muslim countries. As a result, al-Qa’ida’s goal is to eradicate the Muslim world of
Western influence and implement an Islamic state under Sharia law. The IEP related that
the findings provided guidance in assessing the risk of future terrorist attacks in countries
where there are currently low levels of activity. The IEP claimed that when different
political, social, and violent indications are measured and compared, countries at risk of a
major increase in terrorism can be identified. The IEP found that 13 countries were at risk
for an increase in terrorism, which includes Israel. The other 12 countries identified were
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Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Iran,
Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.
From 2000 to 2013, 5% of all terrorist-related deaths have occurred in
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (IEP, 2014,
p. 35). OECD refers to a forum where governments from 23 democracies with market
economies and 70 nonmembers work together to foster economic growth, prosperity, and
sustainable development (United States Mission to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [USOECD], 2016). The IEP (2014) related that with the
exclusion of the United States, Israel and Turkey experienced the highest number of
deaths. In 2012, eight OECD countries experienced deadly terrorist attacks compared to
20 OECD countries that have had deadly terrorist attacks since 2000 (p. 3). The IEP
related that from 2000 to 2013, the rate of suicide attacks has increased, but the areas
where most of the attacks occurred have changed. From 2000 to 2003, most suicide
attacks occurred in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (p. 34). However, in 2003, a truce
started that led to the gradual decline of suicide attacks and in 2006, Hamas won a
majority in the Palestinian legislative election and condemned the use of suicide
bombing, which reduced this tactic. From 2008 to 2013, the IEP reported that in Israel,
both the political process and counterterrorism activities led to a considerable decease in
terrorist activities from Hamas, the al-Asqa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad. The IEP noted that with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, suicide bombing started and
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Iraq accounted for 43% of all suicide attack deaths in the last decade (p. 34). However,
the IEP related that proportionately, suicide attacks still remain low.
In OECD countries, from 2000 to 2013, the United States had the highest number
of deaths from suicide attacks with 3,042, with 2,996 deaths attributed to 9/11 (IEP,
2014, p. 35). The IEP (2014) found that Israel had the second highest number of deaths
with 841 or 17% of all fatalities (p. 35). In 2013, OECD countries with the highest
number of terrorist-related deaths were the United Kingdom (UK) with 131 deaths (88%
in Northern Ireland), Turkey had 50 fatalities, and Mexico had 40 fatalities (p. 35). In
2013, Israel had 24 fatalities from terrorist attacks (p. 35). Israel was also on the list of
countries that may experience increases in terrorism due to ongoing conflicts.
In 2008, two terrorists armed with suicide bombs arrived at an open public
marketplace in Dimona, which is small city in Israel (Amital et al., 2012). Amital (2012)
reported that two terrorists from the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades terrorist squad from the
Hebron Hamas organization carried suicide bombs to an open public marketplace. One of
the suicide attackers denoted his bomb, which inadvertently injured the second suicide
attacker and the bomb killed one woman and injured 48 people. The researchers shared
that this was the first suicide attack in Dimona. Amital et al. compared the differences in
emotions and disturbances in daily life activities 2 days after the suicide attack in Dimona
between the self-reported resilient and low-resilient population and Israel’s general
population. The researchers conducted telephone surveys with a random sample of 678
adults (428 Israeli residents and 250 Dimona residents; pp. 281–282). Findings indicated
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significantly higher prevalence of stress and fear and lower prevalence of joy among the
Dimona population compared to the general Israel population. The researchers also found
a significant higher prevalence of disturbances in daily life activities and changes in
leisure activity in the self-reported low-resilient Dimona population. In addition, findings
indicated a higher percentage of adverse emotional responses in the Dimona population at
the early phase after a terrorist attack compared to the general Israel population. The
researchers recommended that the differences found between the two populations should
be addressed by social services following terrorist incidents.
Following 9/11, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and widespread
anxiety have occurred among individuals who have been directly and indirectly exposed
to terrorist attacks (Shalev et al., 2006). Shalev et al. (2006) evaluated the effects of
continuous terror by examining the prevalence of PTSD, PTSD symptoms, and
symptoms of general distress in individuals who lived in two different suburbs in
Jerusalem, Israel, a directly exposed community and an indirectly exposed community.
During the 8 months before data collection, the directly exposed community experienced
higher rates of suicide attack while the indirectly exposed community did not.
Participants included 167 individuals who were indirectly exposed to terrorist acts and 89
individuals who were not indirectly exposed. Findings indicated similar PTSD prevalence
and similar levels of PTSD intensity and general distress in the two populations. Thus,
exposure to discrete events may not be a necessary mediator of terror threat. The
researchers also found equal exposure of men and women to terrorist incidents and equal
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prevalence of PTSD in both genders. In addition, the researchers found an unequal
distribution of PTSD symptoms, where 25% of the population was highly symptomatic
while others expressed low symptom levels (p. 672). Many of the participants met the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV) symptom criteria
without simultaneously reporting significant distress and impairment. Furthermore, the
researchers found that disruption of daily living significantly contributed to PTSD
symptoms.
Target Selection and Execution
It is important to understand the methods utilized for target selection by
adversaries. Berman and Laitin (2005) discussed adversaries’ selection of hard and soft
targets. According to the authors, soft targets have little or no military protection or
security. Berman and Laitin reported that soft targets can include commercial and private
sectors as well as other targets such as areas or events where the public attends, which are
under minimal security, such as nightclubs, schools, movie theaters, and malls. The
researchers noted that groups who are not part of a central terror organization, but are
loosely affiliated, are often unable to attack hard targets and as a result, tend to focus on
soft targets. On the other hand, Berman and Laitin related that hard targets have some
degree of military protection or security, making escape scenarios unlikely, and usually
requires the penetration of various layers of security by the adversary at the time of the
attack. The authors noted that there is a risk of being intercepted, often with potentially
lethal force. Hard targets can force attackers either to escalate the size and force used,
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identify a vulnerability that can be exploited, or risk failure. Hard targets include airports,
military bases, political organizations, and high-ranking politicians and heads of state,
such as presidents (Stewart, 2012). Berman and Laitin related that suicide attacks are
more likely used against well protected hard targets than against poorly defended soft
targets.
In 1993, approximately 10 years after the suicide attacks began in Lebanon,
Palestinian groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad began using suicide bombers
against Israeli targets in an attempt to disrupt talks for a potential peace process (Dodd,
2013). Dodd (2013) reported that many of these attacks were deliberately targeted to
cause the most damage to civilians. At least 742 civilians were killed and 4,899 were
wounded by suicide bombings in Israel and Palestinian territories (Dodd, 2013, para. 47).
Kaplan, Mintz, and Mishal (2006) noted that suicide bombings were the leading cause of
death from terrorism in Israel. Although terrorists often choose symbolic targets, they
target high trafficked areas when the opportunity arises (Ganor 2015). Ganor (2015)
argued that terrorists often select their targets based on their assessment of potential
attack consequences in terms of loss of life, injuries, economic, and other costs.
Due to the threat of suicide bombing in the United States and other countries,
Perry et al. (2013) created a method for predicting determinants of suicide bombing
attacks. Perry et al. examined suicide bombings in four Israeli cities: Jerusalem, Haifa,
Tel Aviv, and Netanya. The researchers focused on three terrorist groups: Hamas, alAsqa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In their aim to discover
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terrorist group target preferences in suicide terrorism, Perry et al. examined spatial
preference patterns; specifically, how terrorist groups develop target preferences and the
transferring of these preference patterns. In addition, the researchers examined
sociocultural, socioeconomic, demographic, and political aspects of the suicide attacks.
The researchers found several commonalities between previous suicide bombings, where
attacks were significantly correlated with Jewish holidays, when the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) conducted operations, and when political negotiations were taking place
among Israeli and Arab leaders. The researchers related that attacks following IDF
operations were more of a revenge tactic from terrorists due to an arrest or assassination
of a known terrorist. The researchers noted that attacks that have occurred when political
negotiations were taking place may be attributed to terrorist need for conflict, to prove
their presence, and remind Israelis that the war was not over just because negotiations
were taking place.
Findings also indicated that there were similarities among the suicide bombing
locations where suicide attackers targeted accessible crowds (Perry et al., 2013). Perry et
al. (2013) emphasized that groups were not randomly targeted and over one-third (36%)
of attacks were repeat strikes on locations that were previously attacked (p. 47). Thus,
past attack locations should be considered very high risk for future suicide attacks. Along
with places where people congregate, places that were well known were often attacked
such as main shopping areas, streets for shopping and entertainment, and iconic locations.
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After Attack Responses
Law enforcement response can also be an influential factor in how individuals or
groups choose their targets. Based on historical emergency responses, many individuals
who engage in terrorist activities consider precise timing, communication, and state or
federal responses (Everbridge Organization, 2014). The Everbridge Organization (2014)
evaluated the response of the Boston authorities to the 2013 Boston Bombings as
satisfactory. Their findings highlighted that law enforcement officials in the area
effectively conducted media briefings that relayed essential information between law
enforcement and Boston residents. These briefings included key information on the safety
measures to be taken by civilians such as staying in their homes and reporting anything
that may be classified as unusual. The Everbridge Organization reported that there was
unconditional cooperation among networks and sources that allowed everyone to be
informed as the incident progressed. The Everbridge Organization highlighted law
enforcement’s exceptional communication efforts, networking connections, and
execution plan used in the Boston Bombing response. Therefore, Boston law enforcement
used their extensive planning and preparation in their response to this emergency by
effectively executing the search for perpetrators. In addition, the Everbridge Organization
related that law enforcement demonstrated the importance of staying connected among
networks and authorities during the emergency, and maintaining strong communication
between networks and residents.
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Similarly, other researchers highlighted Boston first responders’ multidimensional
preparedness. Leonard, Cole, Howitt, and Heymann (2014) discussed Boston authorities’
strong execution in terms of their command and coordination as the attack was taking
place as well as the immediate aftermath of the attack. The researchers noted that the
level of response by the authorities, including constantly providing instructions and
updating citizens, helped to maintain a state of general composure. In addition, the
communication efforts expanded beyond the authorities and included the private sector.
Leonard et al. related that the private sector protocol among businesses allowed for
additional assistance to Boston residents. Furthermore, the researchers explained the
effectiveness of the established emergency plans that were implemented by the
authorities. Thus, effective emergency planning allowed for the best possible outcome
with the least amount of casualties and inefficiencies. Leonard et al. noted that a wellplanned level of response is crucial to minimizing damage in the event of a future attack.
Lone Wolf Suicide Attacks
Before an attack, it is often difficult to detect terrorists who operate without a
terrorist organizational support, network, or support from other people (Zierhoffer, 2014).
Zeirhoffer (2014) reported that research on lone offender terrorism is limited as focus has
been placed on terrorist organizations. The researcher noted that there is no profile that
would predict a lone offender terrorist attack. Spaaij (2010) defined lone wolf terrorism
as terrorist attacks that are carried out by individuals who operate alone, who are not
affiliated with an organized terrorist group or network, and whose methods are created
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and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy. Spaaij
analyzed the main features of lone wolf terrorism as well as the trends in 15 countries.
The researchers found that lone wolf terrorism accounted for 1.28% of all terrorist
incidents in the 15 countries (p. 866). Spaaij found that lone wolf terrorism is
comparatively prevalent in the United States, where it has significantly increased during
the past 3 decades. Unlike the United States, there was no significant increase in the other
14 countries, which were the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland,
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic, Portugal, Russia, Canada, and
Australia. The researcher noted that in the 15 countries, the number of casualties has been
limited and no evidence was found to indicate that the lethality of lone wolf terrorism is
on the rise. In addition, the researcher found no empirical evidence that lone wolf
terrorists are among the most likely individuals to use weapons of mass destruction.
It is difficult to monitor lone attackers because they are not tied to any
organization that is already under surveillance (Zierhoffer, 2014). Zierhoffer (2014)
related that lone wolf attackers do not need much for expenses and they have had much
success. Using Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, and Berglund (1999) threat assessment model,
Zierhoffer assessed the model’s value as a predictor of terrorism using three lone wolf
attackers: Theodore Kaczynski, Eric Rudolph, and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad
who was born as Carlos Bledsoe. The researcher noted that Kaczynski, known as the
Unabomber, was sentenced to life in prison for mailing 16 package or letter bombs that
killed three people and injured 23 others over 18 years (p. 54). Rudolph was sentenced to
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multiple life sentences without parole for killing two people and injuring more than 100
others in four separate bombing, including a pipe bomb at the 1996 Summer Olympics in
Atlanta (p. 55). Muhammad was convicted of capital murder, attempted capital murder,
and 10 weapons-related charges after shooting two soldiers outside of the Little Rock
Recruiting Station. Zierhoffer found that the 10 questions by Borum et al. in their threat
assessment model, when slightly modified to reflect behaviors that are consistent with
terrorism, expanded efforts to identify a lone wolf terrorist by focusing on thoughts and
behaviors that may be indicative of terrorist activity. Thus, the model not only focuses on
the demographics or characteristics of a potential terrorist, but also focuses on behaviors
that could indicate the movement of the individual toward achieving a goal. Zierhoffer
analysis of the threat assessment model also provided a foundation for further research
for a model that would prevent lone wolf terrorism.
President Obama expressed confidence in U.S. intelligence officials’ ability to
prevent large terrorist attacks; however, President Obama warned that it may be difficult
for officials to track and prevent lone wolf attacks like the one that occurred in Boston
(Easley, 2013). Deloughery, King, and Asal (2013) analyzed lone wolf terrorism in
relation to two related behaviors: (a) group-based terrorism and (b) violent hate crimes.
The researchers noted that assessments that compared lone wolf terrorism to other forms
of violence are sparse. Deloughery et al. examined the timing, locations, methods, targets,
and geographic distributions of lone wolf terrorist attacks, group-based terrorist attacks,
and violent hate crimes that took place between 1992 and 2010. Terrorism data were
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obtained from the GTD and hate crime data were obtained from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI’s) annual hate crime statistics files.
Findings indicated that lone wolf terrorism is not identical to group-based
terrorism or violent hate crimes; however, it does share some similarities with each
(Deloughery et al., 2013). Deloughery et al. (2013) found a moderate correlation between
year-to-year changes in lone wolf terrorism with group-based terrorism. However, no
correlation was found between year-to-year lone wolf terrorism and violent hate crimes.
Lone wolf terrorism was higher in less populous states such as New Mexico, Nebraska,
and Iowa than violent hate crimes and group-based terrorism. Approximately 50% of
lone wolf terrorist attacks were related to abortion compared to 17% of group-based
terrorist attacks (p. 1). In contrast, 6% of lone wolf terrorist attacks were directed at
businesses compared to 27% of group-based terrorist attacks (p. 1). Lone wolf terrorism
tends to occur in counties with larger populations, lower levels of home ownership, and
higher percentages of Caucasians, which is similar to group-based terrorism and violent
hate crimes. However, in contrast to group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes, lone
wolf terrorism is not more likely to take place in counties with a higher percentage of
residents living in urban environments, higher percentages of male residents between 15
and 24 years of age, or higher unemployment rates. The researchers found that the
location where lone wolf terrorism takes place tend to have more demographic
similarities with the location of violent hate crime offending than with group-based
terrorism.
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In Israel, the recent wave of terrorist attacks has been mostly stabbing and
shooting events that are normally carried out by individuals, who have been called lone
wolves (Shaked, 2016). Shaked (2016) reported that as of September 13, 2015, 30
individuals have been killed and approximately 350 individuals have been injured (para.
3). Shaked shared that the attacks involved 170 stabbings and attempted stabbings, as
well as 70 shootings and 30 vehicular ramming attacks (para. 3). Shaked related that the
current wave of terrorist attacks is different from previous periods of Palestinian uprising
as the attacks are unguided and unorganized, and are being carried out by lone wolf
terrorists as young as 13 to 15 years of age (para. 3). The author noted that most are from
East Jerusalem and other parts of Judea and Samaria. Shaked shared that these lone wolf
terrorists are not directed by any organization, but instead are inspired by intensive
incitement from the local media or social networks. The author noted that the attacks
were designed to be an expression of popular resistance; hence, the attackers used
weapons such as knives, scissors, and screwdrivers in most of the incidents. Most
attackers were killed at the scene by a soldier, law enforcement personnel, or a civilian
bystander.
Lone wolf terrorist attacks in Israel require a change in certain aspects of the
counterterrorism approach (Shaked, 2016). According to Shaked (2016), there is a lack of
intelligence to prevent such attacks; however, such attacks can be decreased or prevented
through the use of education, influence through social networks, and the identification of
possible attackers who mention their intentions on websites. Due to the difficulty in
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knowing when the next attack will take place, Shaked related that counterterrorism
actions involved increasing security personnel such as police officers, border police, and
military personnel at major junctions, crowded places, and near Jewish communities in
Judea and Samaria. Citizens have also been encouraged to learn easy ways to thwart an
attack and those who have license to carry weapons are encouraged to do so. Shaked
emphasized that the medical aspects of lone wolf terrorist attacks are different from past
suicide bombings. Therefore, the author argued that the right adjustments from medical
providers and domestic preparedness are needed to improve the medical response to the
injuries that have been inflicted in the attacks. Shaked further argued that the main cause
of death in penetrating trauma is hemorrhage; thus, first responders and medical
personnel should refresh their knowledge and skills in order to provide the best level of
care.
Lessons Learned From Terrorist Attacks
The strategic understanding of how a suicide attack is executed requires extensive
research and the ability to define and establish connections in the study of prior attacks.
Studying and understanding the outcomes of previous attacks allow CTOs the ability to
establish emergency plans for future attacks. For example, Boston authorities had
established an emergency plan that effectively minimized the damage done to the city
during the 2013 Boston Bombing (Everbridge Organization, 2014). Leonard et al. (2014)
analyzed how prior preparation and action contributed to the effectiveness of the response
of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, as well as aspects of the response that were not
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as effective. The researchers found that response organization leaders in Boston
performed detailed and meticulous planning each year for many events like the Boston
Marathon Bombing. In addition, Leonard et al. found that senior leaders showed effective
use of the spirit and core principles of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), which Congress mandated in 2002. NIMS is a systematic, proactive approach
that is used by department and agency leaders at all governmental levels as well as in
nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, with the goal of working
seamlessly to manage incidents that involve all threats and hazards (Federal Emergency
Management Agency [FEMA], 2016). The aim of this approach is to reduce the loss of
life, property, and environmental harm (FEMA, 2016). On the other hand, Leonard et al.
noted that while there were many positive dimensions of interorganizational collaboration
in the Boston response, there were also some difficulties, such as microcommand with
leadership and coordination at the street level when individuals and small teams from
various organizations came together and needed to operate together. Thus, more work
was needed with integrating NIMS into the practices and cultures of emergency response
agencies, especially at the tactical operational level.
Other lessons were learned from the Boston Marathon Bombing. McCaul et al.
(2014) examined Tsarnaev’s personal history, his interactions with federal agencies, his
radicalization, the 2011 threat assessment that was carried out by the FBI, and his 2012
travel to Russia. In addition, the researchers explored missed opportunities that could
have prevented the bombing. McCaul et al. found that there was not enough cooperation
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and information sharing between federal agencies and local law enforcement agencies.
The researchers also found that there was limited communication between federal
agencies. In addition, there were not enough resources available to properly screen
outbound travelers whom the federal agencies were interested in. McCaul et al. also
noted a failure to revise inaccurate or incomplete records that were held by different
agencies. First, the researchers recommended an increase in information sharing between
federal intelligence agencies and local law enforcement agencies as well as tribal law
enforcement agencies. Second, McCaul et al. recommended a revision of agreements on
task force officers (TFOs) in order to create more open and collaborative relationships.
Third, the researchers recommended an increase in the examination of international
travelers with a treasury enforcement communications system (TECS) alert on their name
as they leave the country.
The fourth recommendation was an improvement in the TECS alert notifications
and records; thus, ensuring that the FBI case agents on each assessment where a TECS
alert is placed on an individual also receives these notifications (McCaul et al., 2014). In
addition, each time a TECS alert was shared, McCaul et al. (2014) recommended the use
of a written detail record about when, how, and with whom this alert was communicated.
Fifth, the researchers recommended a review of the terrorist screening database (TSDB)
nominations as a more accurate and complete TSDB record for Tsarnaev might have
resulted in greater scrutiny when he returned to the United States. Sixth, the researchers
encouraged cooperation and assistance from the community as no one stepped forward
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based on the public appeal for information regarding the suspects. McCaul et al. noted
that 56% of the country had never heard of the “If you see something, say something”
campaign (p. 36). Thus, in preventing terrorist attacks, the researchers emphasized the
importance of ensuring that residents are alerting their local police or federal authorities
to suspicious behavior or other possible indicators. Seventh, McCaul et al. recommended
an end to the case closed mentality due to the concern that officials believed that the
attack could not have been prevented. The researchers claimed that this was the most
difficult problem to address, which requires a delicate balance with ensuring that
investigators and counterterrorism professionals are confident but appropriately critical.
Since the late 1960s, the two most successful strategies for ending terrorist groups
have been policing or the initiation of a political process (IEP, 2014). The IEP (2014)
related that the use of these strategies resulted in over 80% decrease of terrorist
organizations that stopped operation (p. 3). The IEP reported that 10% of terrorist groups
achieved their goals and 7% were eliminated through fully military engagement (p. 3).
Counterterrorism Operations and Methodologies
Due to the prevalence and frequency of terror acts, counterterrorism professionals
have analyzed previous attacks and developed counterterrorism strategies from their
findings. Butterworth et al. (2012) reported that public surface transportation is a main
target for terrorists throughout the world. The researchers related that the Mineta
Transportation Institute (MTI) database on terrorist and serious criminal attacks against
public surface transportation recorded 3,159 attacks against public surface transportation
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between January 1, 1970, and January 23, 2012, where 7,997 people were killed and
30,046 were injured (p. 1). Butterworth et al. noted that 47.4% of these attacks were
against buses, bus stations, and bus stops; accounting for 55% of the fatalities and 41% of
the injuries resulting from terrorist attacks during this period (p. 1). The researchers
examined 16 of the numerous attacks that were planned or carried out against the public
bus system in Israel, including the West Bank and Gaza, during the Second Intifada
where major rioting and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006. The researchers
underscored the important role of bus drivers in the prevention and mitigation process
and noted that the more successful attacks involved a lack of proper security protocols. In
addition, Butterworth et al. discussed the importance of additional security presence at
bus stops. There are similarities between Butterworth et al.’s, Medby and Glenn’s (2002),
and Baker’s (2005, 2006) methodologies in recognizing the intentions of attacks on
public transportation and they recommended appropriate damage prevention and
mitigation measures. Butterworth et al. noted that prevention and mitigation measures are
most effective when complex security tactics are used, which creates a deterrent effect.
Thus, Butterworth et al. noted that security efforts should not be routine or pattern
oriented, but unpredictable to stop terrorist actors.
In preventing terrorist attacks, it is important to gather accurate information to
prevent a future attack (Mazumdar, 2012). Mazumdar (2012) claimed that terrorism is a
law enforcement problem as well as an intelligence matter; therefore, the prevention of
terrorist acts requires complete coordination between law enforcement and intelligence
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officials. The researcher noted that human intelligence (HUMINT), who may be
informants or agents, is the single most significant source involved in thwarting a
potential attack due to the secrecy and anonymity elements found in terrorist groups or
lone wolf assailants. Mazumdar related that the resources available to terrorists for an
attack are very limited and very challenging to detect. Mazumdar postulated that it is vital
to know about terrorist groups’ capabilities to carry out its intentions so that law
enforcement and intelligence officials can effectively create an adverse environment for
terrorists.
Some terrorists’ motivation may be attributed to the military being employed to
suppress and prevent attacks. Counterterrorism is a principle of counterinsurgency
(COIN) operations, which refers to military action taken against guerillas or
revolutionaries and has mixed results in terms of long-term effectiveness (Greenhill &
Staniland, 2007). Greenhill and Staniland (2007) approached the challenges faced by
counterterrorism strategies by focusing on counterterrorism methodologies. The
researchers reported that COIN can frequently include practices that either prevent future
terrorism or cause it. Coercion tactics might yield a short-term victory, but the long-term
effects of the resentment and anger that resulted as a consequence of brutality and
suppression cannot be underestimated. In addition, the researchers argued that these
tactics can sometimes create a fertile ground for individuals who resort to terrorism.
Furthermore, Greenhill and Staniland noted that the mental state of those who live in this
environment and use suicide terrorism as a response to a much stronger opponent may be
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correlation with the tactics employed in the area. According to Greenhill and Staniland,
both COIN tactics and strategies involving combating terrorism involve a noticeably
sensitive process that may result in creating heightened extremist ideals among those
involved in the use of terrorist tactics rather than stopping them. Individuals conducting
counterterrorist activities should consider an underlying premise, namely the in-depth
study of the nature and results yielded by COIN operations as such detailed research is
indispensable for possibly preventing future incidents involving suicide terrorism.
Although Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework and Freeman et al.’s (2010)
nine preattack phases indicated a specific step-by-step framework that potential terrorists
use, Paul and Landree (2008) noted that there is no simple linear outline for planning a
terrorist attack. Paul and Landree related that groups and individuals involved in
terrorism activities focus on assessing avenues of approach and ease of access, target
features (e.g., location to launch attack, times to launch and window of opportunity, and
mobility of target), security (e.g., forces, security measures, and other population groups
present), and threats to the terrorist operation. However, Paul and Landree stated that the
needs of terrorist groups may differ from one another, thus, their strategies and
methodologies may vary. The authors argued that instead of establishing an assumed
pattern of attack, defenders control the attack planning process by protecting essential
information concerning the infrastructure or the target. This strategy allows the
individuals and governments combating terror attacks to gather a more concrete set of
parameters regarding what terrorists are likely to search for; hence, they are better able to
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identify targets that may be at risk and adjust their defenses accordingly (Paul & Landree,
2008). Consequently, Paul and Landree noted that controlling the flow of information
improves security and limits terror attacks.
Due to the tragic events of 9/11 and the increasing complexity and irregularity of
terrorist threats to national security, there have been a lot of research and development on
the application of advanced information technology to help in the analysis, anticipation,
and countering of these threats (Weinstein, Campbell, Delaney, & O’Leary, 2009).
Weinstein et al. (2009) counterterror social network analysis and intent recognition (CTSNAIR) work focused on the development of automated techniques and tools for
detecting and tracking of terrorist networks that often changes as well as recognizing
their capability and intent. Therefore, the CT-SNAIR system framework provide a means
to detect, model, and simulate security threats from multimedia data collected from the
Internet and adversary videos (Weinstein et al., 2009). Weinstein et al. noted that based
on minor leads to potential terrorist activity, analysts are able to build comprehensive
social networks to track targeted groups and threats. The researchers focused on the
development of automated recognition of terrorist capabilities and intent based on
consistent tasks that the adversary must complete for attack execution. Weinstein et al.
suggested that research should focus on the development of both real and simulated data
sets and algorithms to be used in recognition programs.
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Summary and Conclusions
The 9/11 suicide attacks illustrated the ingenuity that suicide terrorist groups
display in planning and executing their missions (Hoffman, 2002). According to Hoffman
(2002), security concern pertaining to the use of firearms and explosives led the 9/11
attackers to use household items that were not considered to be an on-board threat, such
as box cutters, while the planes were used as incendiary weapons. Therefore, Hoffman,
highlighted that the deadliest terrorist attack in history involved no guns or explosives.
Israel as one of the 13 countries that are at risk for increased terrorist activity
(IEP, 2004, p. 4). When examining suicide attacks, it is important to first identify and
understand the motivation of individual attackers and reasons for executing the suicide
mission (Pape, 2008). Second, Pape (2008) related that by understanding the terror
networks and the organization that identifies and recruits suicide attackers, CTOs can
identify factors that recruitment cells have used for the key player within the suicide
operation. Fox (2014) related that the most crucial element in law enforcement’s ability
to successfully stop and mitigate terror threats is to study adversary planning;
specifically, the phases the adversary must accomplish in order to successfully execute an
attack. Fox related that the recruitment of future suicide bombers is part of the early
planning phase, while Freeman et al.’s (2010) related that there are additional tasks in the
preattack phases that consistently emerge in the adversary planning process.
Therefore, there is a gap in the literature that focuses on the specific patterns
within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerge in
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the adversary planning process for each adversary success or failure in Israel suicide
bombing cases. In this multiple case study, I addressed this gap using Medby and Glenn’s
(2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and
Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases. By focusing on the early planning phases of
terrorist attacks, decision makers and CTOs are better able to identify essential
opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from occurring (Fox, 2014). In Chapter 2, I
included the introduction, literature search strategy, conceptual framework, background
of terrorist attacks, suicide attackers, suicide attack, lone wolf suicide attacks, lessons
learned from terrorist attacks, counterterrorism operations and methodologies, and a
summary and conclusions. In Chapter 3, I include the research design and rationale, role
of the researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I
include the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence of
trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 5, I include the interpretation of
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I first used
a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and failed
suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide bombing
cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then using purposeful
random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide attack cases from
the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. I collected data using a researcher-created
terrorist activity data collection worksheet (see Appendix B), a researcher-created site
data collection worksheet (see Appendix C), and a researcher-created questionnaire into
suicide bombing events (see Appendix D). NVivo was used to manage the data. Data
were analyzed using two stages of analysis in case study research: (a) within-case
analysis or single-case analysis and (b) cross-case analysis. The study was conducted in
accordance with Walden University’s IRB guidelines. The IRB approval number was 1118-16-0108044. In Chapter 3, I include the research design and rationale, role of the
researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and a summary.
Research Design and Rationale
In this section, I present the research question for this multiple case study. I also
discuss the multiple case study research design rationale. This section is organized in the
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following subsections: research question and multiple case study research design
rationale.
Research Question
In this multiple case study, I addressed one central research question: What are
the specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful or
failed suicide bombing cases in Israel?
Multiple Case Study Research Design Rationale
I chose a multiple case study research design because it enabled me to delve into
the topic and explore specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I considered all possible
research methodologies, which include mixed methods, quantitative, and qualitative
research methods (Mertens, 1998). I considered a mixed methods approach for this study;
however, I did not choose this method because it requires various views as a practical and
natural approach to research (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). A mixed methods
approach was not needed to answer this study’s central research question. Johnson
(2006b) noted that a quantitative design focuses on the relationship among variables
(Johnson, 2006b). A quantitative approach was considered, but it did not align with the
purpose of this study. Tellis (1997) reported that a qualitative approach allows for the
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development of a rich, complex, and holistic understanding of the research problem. In
this study, I applied a qualitative research method.
Five qualitative research designs were considered, which include case study,
phenomenology, narrative, grounded theory, and ethnography (Guetterman, 2015). A
multiple case study research design was chosen after an in-depth review of the five
qualitative designs. Yin (2009) defined a case study as an empirical inquiry about a
contemporary phenomenon, such as a case, that is set within its real-world context,
mainly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (p.
4). A multiple case study research design was selected because it allows the researcher to
explore differences within and between cases, and the goal is to replicate findings across
cases (see Baxter & Jack, 2008). Yin (2003) related that it is crucial that the cases are
selected carefully so that the researcher can predict similar results across cases. Stake
(1995) related that case studies are usually bounded by time and a set of activities.
In this multiple case study, data collection were bounded by three successful and
three failed Israel suicide bombing cases from 2000 to 2010. Yin (2014) noted that in a
case study, there are many more variables of interest than data points, and multiple
sources of evidence are used. Yin further related that data need to converge in a
triangulating fashion. In this study, six suicide bombing cases were used: (a) three
successful suicide bombing cases and (b) three failed suicide bombing cases from 2000 to
2010. I first used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the
successful and failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the
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35 suicide bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then
using purposeful random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide
attack cases from the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. I used a researchercreated terrorist activity data collection worksheet to collect archival data from the
private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I
used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect data at each site of the
three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack locations (see Appendix C). I
used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open
source information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases
(see Appendix D).
Role of the Researcher
The role of the case study researcher includes being a teacher, advocate,
evaluator, and biographer (Stake, 1995). Stake (1995) claimed that from a constructivist
perspective, the roles of interpreter and gatherer of interpretations are central. Stake
argued that the goal of research is to build clear and sophisticated realities that can
withstand skepticism. I served as a participant-observer during the data collection
process, using multiple sources in this multiple case study. Therefore, I was a key
instrument in the qualitative data collection process. I collected all data, which included
collecting data using the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet,
the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created
questionnaire into suicide bombing events. I transcribed the data, coded and analyzed the
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data, and interpreted the findings. Thus, I followed specific procedures for data collection
and analysis to ensure the trustworthiness of this study.
I am the CEO of the private intelligence company in Israel where the case study
data were obtained. I conducted an ethical research study that relied on the community
partner’s cooperation and data use agreement. Therefore, I obtained cooperation of the
board members and permission to use the suicide bombing attack data in the company’s
database. I informed the board members that my role is separate from that of the CEO as
the company is not sponsoring the study. While conducting the study, I used specific
strategies such as reflexivity where I revealed any experiences, biases, and values
pertaining to specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack
phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of the six
successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Lincoln and Guba (1985) noted that
a reflexive journal helps to prevent biases as the researcher makes regular entries during
the research process. In these entries, I recorded methodological decisions and the
reasons for them, the logistics of the study, and reflected on what was happening in terms
of my own values and interests. After the study is completed and approved, I will e-mail
a summary report of the research findings to the private intelligence company’s board
members. I will keep all data secure for at least 5 years per Walden University’s IRB
guidelines. After 5 years, I will properly destroy the data using techniques such as
shredding.
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Methodology
In this section, I discuss the methodology. Sufficient depth is provided so that
other researchers can replicate the study. This section is organized in the following
subsections: participant selection logic, instrumentation, procedures for recruitment,
participation, and data collection, and data analysis plan.
Participant Selection Logic
I used a combination or mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum
variation sampling and purposeful random sampling. Patton (2001) related that using
more than one sampling strategy meets multiple interests and needs. Patton reported that
maximum variation sampling is used to select a wide range of variation on dimensions of
interest. The purpose of maximum variation sampling is to discover or uncover central
themes, core elements, and shared dimensions that cut across a diverse sample while at
the same time offering the opportunity to document unique or diverse variations.
Flyvbjerg (2004) noted that maximum variation is used to obtain information about the
significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome, example, three to
four cases that are very different on one dimension, such as the location, size, form of
organization, and budget. Cohen and Crabtree (2006) shared that when using a maximum
variation sampling, the researcher selects a small number of cases that maximize the
diversity relevant to the research question.
On the other hand, purposeful random sampling adds credibility to a sample when
the potential purposeful sample is larger than what the researcher can handle (Patton,
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2001). Patton (2001) related that while purposeful random sampling is a type of random
sampling, a small sample size is used; therefore, the goal is credibility and not
representativeness or the ability to generalize. Patton further noted that purposeful
random sampling is used to prevent potential selection bias.
Using both maximum variation sampling and purposeful random sampling, the
six cases were chosen based on the study’s selection criteria. One criterion was successful
and failed suicide attacks that occurred from 2000 to 2010 in Israel. The criteria for
successful attacks included the death of the suicide attacker along with the death of at
least one civilian victim. The criteria for failed attacks were that the suicide attacker was
not killed, no civilians were killed, or the suicide attacker was killed before any civilians
could be killed. The attack site for each of the case studies was a soft target, such as in
urban settings and civilian population. Soft targets can include commercial and private
sectors as well as other targets such as areas or events where the public attends, which are
under minimal security, such as schools and open public marketplaces. Soft targets
exclude military-related settings and bases, convoys, or checkpoints. The cases chosen
had sufficient data available so that I was able to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010)
nine phases. Using archival data of suicide bombing attacks from the database of a
private intelligence company in Israel, three successful and three failed suicide attacks
from 2000 to 2010 were chosen using purposeful random sampling after meeting the
other selection criteria. The cases had as much variation as possible, such as the location,
size of the attack, and successful and failed attacks. Intentionally including cases of
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different types allowed me to analyze these cases using single-case analysis and crosscase analysis to see if they fit the larger, overall patterns.
Saturation is the point in data collection where the collection of new data does not
shed any further light on the issue under investigation (Glaser, Strauss, & Strutzel, 1968).
The TESOL International Association (2016) reported that case study research often
includes a single-case or multiple-cases, which often involves two to four cases. The
relationship between saturation and sample size was sufficient in this multiple case study
because I used purposeful random sampling to select six cases (three successful and three
failed suicide bombing attacks) in order to obtain the richest data possible. I used a
random number generator, such as the one provided by GraphPad Software (2016). The
richness of case studies is related to the amount of detail and contextualization that is
possible when only one or a small number of focal cases and issues are analyzed (TESOL
International Association, 2016). From 2000 to 2010, 35 suicide bombing attacks
occurred in Israel; hence, the six cases represented 17% of the attacks that occurred
during the 2000 to 2010 timeframe.
Instrumentation
A case study relies on multiple sources of evidence to present a rich picture of the
phenomenon under investigation (Yin, 2014). Case studies benefit from having multiple
sources of data, such as archival records, direct observation (e.g., physical environment),
and documents (Yin, 2012), all of which were used in this study. I first used a researchercreated case study selection worksheet to select the successful and failed suicide attack
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cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide bombing cases that took
place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then using purposeful random sampling, I
selected three successful and three failed suicide attack cases from the cases that met the
study’s selection criteria. The researcher-created terrorist activity data collection
worksheet, which was based on Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, was used
to collect archival data from the private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the
six cases (see Appendix B). I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to
collect data at each site of the three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack
locations (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide
bombing events to collect open source information or public data that was written or on
the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). Yin (2012) discussed the use and
importance of a case study protocol where a set of questions are addressed while
collecting the case study data in the field setting or at the researcher’s desk when
extracting information from archival sources. Yin related that questions in the protocol
are directed at the researcher and not at field participants. Therefore, the researchercreated terrorist activity data collection worksheet, researcher-created site data collection
worksheet, and the researcher-created questionnaire served as the case study protocol.
Archival data and documents. I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data
collection worksheet to collect archival data from a private intelligence company’s
database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I used a researcher-created
questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open source information or public
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data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). Yin (2012)
related that archival data, such as those stored in electronic records, libraries, and paper
files are a common source of evidence in case studies. Data can also be collected from
newspapers, television, and mass media. In addition, data can be obtained from records
that are maintained by public agencies, such as law enforcement or court records. Yin
warned that archival data or documents can be subjected to their own biases or
shortcomings, therefore, steps should be taken to counteract them. For example, with
mass media, Yin suggested that the researcher selects two different media that are
believed to have opposing orientations, which will allow a more balanced picture to
emerge.
Site data collection worksheet. I used a researcher-created site data collection
worksheet to collect data at each site of the three successful and three failed suicide
bombing attack locations (see Appendix C). Yin (2012) discussed direct observations in a
field setting and noted that such observations can focus on the physical environments,
real-world events, or human actions. Yin related that such observations are one of the
most distinctive features in doing case study research. According to the researcher, direct
observations can take place by using a formal observational instrument and then noting,
rating, or reporting the observational evidence under the categories specified by the
instrument. However, Yin also discussed the use of a case study protocol, which differs
from instruments used in surveys and interviews. Yin related that the protocol questions
serve as a mental framework for the researcher.
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The availability of data from the different sources creates an important
opportunity during case study data collection (Yin, 2012). Yin (2012) recommended that
the researcher constantly checks and rechecks the consistency of the findings from
different and similar sources. As a result, the researcher triangulates or establishes
converging lines of evidence, which make the findings robust.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
I completed the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural
Research human research protections training before beginning data collection (see
Appendix E). I also abided by all U.S. and Israel federal research regulations, which
included obtaining the community partner’s cooperation and data use agreement before
using the private intelligence company’s data. I wrote a letter to the board members of a
private intelligence company in Israel, describing the research project and asking
permission to use their suicide attack archival data for Israel from 2000 to 2010 and I also
sent them a data use agreement. A cooperation letter and signed data use agreement were
received from the board members, which were provided to Walden University IRB as
two of the supporting documents. The documents have been redacted to protect the
private intelligence company’s identity.
After receiving approval to conduct the study from Walden University IRB, I first
used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and
failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide
bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). From the case that
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met the study’s selection criteria, I used purposeful random sampling using a random
number generator to select three successful and three failed suicide attack cases. After
selecting the six cases, I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection
worksheet to collect archival data from the private intelligence company’s database in
Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I visited the site of each of the six suicide
bombing cases and I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect
data at each site (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide
bombing events to collect open source information or public data that was written or on
the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). All data were properly transcribed.
After the study is completed and approved, a summary report of the research
findings will be e-mailed to the private intelligence company’s board members. I will
keep hard copy data and any flash drives secure in a locked file cabinet and password
protected computer, and I will be the only one with access to the records. I will keep the
data for at least 5 years based on Walden University’s IRB guidelines.
Data Analysis Plan
Unlike qualitative studies, data analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing
process of applying inductive reasoning as opposed to the deductive reasoning (Mayring,
2000). The information from the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection
worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researchercreated questionnaire into suicide bombing events were all properly transcribed and data
were managed with NVivo. NVivo is a data management tool that is used to organize
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data (Jabbar, 2015). NVivo helps the researcher to index segments of text to particular
themes, link research notes to coding, carry out complex search and retrieve operations,
and helps the researcher in examining possible relationships between the themes (King,
2004). Jabbar (2015) noted that advantages of NVivo include the ability to collect and
archive almost any data type and connect to the researcher’s transcribed data, it searches
large data sets, and creates codes to identify patterns. Data were coded and analyzed. The
data analysis plan is discussed in further detail below and is organized in the following
areas: central research question categories for analysis and two stages of analysis and
discrepant cases.
Central research question categories for analysis. Coding by means of
categories is often used by researchers in qualitative studies to group consistent responses
and summarize significant ideas to identify themes and differences between the stories of
the participants (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Coding categories that were used for the
central research question were Freeman et al. (2010) nine preattack phases, which are as
follows (p. 77):
1. Networking and indoctrination: In this phase, cell members are introduced and
exposed to radical doctrine through various events, such as religious
instruction, meeting, cohabitation, and social activities.
2. Terrorist training: This phase often overlaps with phase one and include cell
members’ participation in organized terrorist activities.
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3. General planning: In this phase, the decision to conduct a terrorist attack is
made as well as the choice of a general target area or target set, such as ships,
bars, U.S. citizens, and soldiers. In addition, general shopping for potential
targets is performed.
4. Recruitment: In this phase, senior terrorist elements select and activate cell
members for a certain terrorist operation. Similar to 9/11, it is assumed that
there is a senior element that helps with recruitment and personnel selection.
However, in the terrorist group that carried out the attacks on the London
mass transit system on July 7, 2005, also called 7 July attacks or 7/7 attacks,
this may not have been the case (Freeman et al., 2010; Ray, 2016).
Nevertheless, Freeman et al. noted that in groups like this, a recruitment and
selection process still occurs as preexisting groups of friends and
acquaintances go through the radicalization process that results in a group
committed to an attack.
5. Financing: In this phase, funds are collected and allocated for a certain
terrorist attack. For example, the money came before the decision to conduct
an attack was made when a cell within the al-Qa’ida network carried out the
attack on the U.S. Navy ship Cole on October 12, 2000 (Freeman et al., 2010;
Pearl & O’Rourke, 2001).
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6. Operational planning: In this phase, the specific target is selected, detail
reconnaissance of the target is conducted, and specific operation planning
takes place such as the delivery and procurement methods.
7. Weapons procurement: In this phase, materials for the construction of
explosives or weapons that will be used in the attack is obtained or received,
such as accelerants, detonators, fertilizers, and rockets.
8. Logistical preparation: In this phase, logistical actions are taken in order to
prepare for the terrorist attack, including safe house rental, vehicle and
document procurement, and electronics purchase.
9. Operational preparation: In this phase, physical preparations for the imminent
terrorist attack takes place, including explosive construction, vehicle
alteration, specific explosives training, and multimedia preparation and
creation.
Two stages of analysis and discrepant cases. Based on Strauss and Corbin’s
(1998) coding process, the overall coding process started with open coding that involves
defining line by line the actions and events with data. I was then able to discover, name,
and categorize the phenomena according to properties and dimensions. The axial coding
process helped me to establish theoretical and conceptual connections in the multiple
sources of data. Finally, selective coding helped to systemically validate the relationships
by searching for and confirming examples in the presentation of the data.

93
More specifically, Merriam (2009) described two stages of analysis in case study
research. The first stage is a within-case analysis or single-case analysis in which each
case is treated as a comprehensive case (p. 204). For this study, each successful and each
failed suicide bombing attack case was analyzed separately. Level 1 analysis of the six
cases included coding and categorization of all data from the researcher-created terrorist
activity data collection worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection worksheet,
and the researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The coding process
followed Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) coding process, which included line-by-line
identification of free codes. Level 1 coding analysis continued with axial coding in which
common themes and patterns were condensed and categorized. All documents were
analyzed using content analysis, which involved a description of the purpose of the
documents, the organization and scope of the topics, and the use of the documents.
The second level of data analysis involved a cross-case analysis. Yin (2009, 2014)
and Merriam (2009) believed the second level of data analysis is dependent on theory
development or the development of theoretical propositions that helps to focus on certain
data and ignore other data. Coded and categorized data were examined across all sources
of data for the three successful suicide bombing attack cases and the three failed suicide
bombing attack cases to determine themes and discrepancies. Therefore, the three
successful suicide bombing attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis. Then
the three failed suicide bombing attack cases were analyzed using cross-case analysis.
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Identifying and analyzing discrepant cases is a key part of the logic of validity
testing in qualitative research. Instances that cannot be accounted for by a particular
interpretation or explanation can point to important defects in that account (Maxwell,
2013). Patton (2001) related that often during data analysis, qualitative researchers may
come across deviant cases that do not follow the main emerging patterns within their
studies, which can lead to issues of trustworthiness if researchers do not handle such
negative cases openly and honestly. Patton suggested that to increase trustworthiness,
qualitative researchers may include in their report alternative explanations of why certain
cases do not follow the main emerging patterns that surface in their studies. The constant
comparative method was used to identify emerging themes, which were the basis for the
findings of this study (see Merriam, 2009). I found no discrepant cases during data
analysis. Findings in this study were presented in relation to the central research question.
Issues of Trustworthiness
I organized this section in the following subsections: credibility, transferability,
dependability, confirmability, and ethical procedures. According to Jeanfreau and Jack
(2010), in quantitative studies, researchers often use reliability and validity when
evaluating threats to their research while trustworthiness is used in qualitative studies.
Trustworthiness pertains to how truthful the findings of the study are or the accuracy of
the researcher’s interpretation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Hence, researchers assess the
trustworthiness of their study through credibility, transferability, dependability, and
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confirmability (Cutcliffe & McKenna, 1999; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Rodgers, 2008;
Sandelowski, 1986; Streubert-Speziale, 2007).
Credibility
Credibility is the qualitative counterpart to internal validity and pertains to the
study’s findings being believable or truthful (Polit & Beck, 2006; Sandelowski, 1986;
Streubert-Speziale, 2007). Jeanfreau and Jack (2010) reported that strategies used to
establish credibility include the use of multiple sources of data or methods and having
repeated contact with participants, such as peer debriefing where questions are shared
about the research process, obtaining additional perspectives on analysis and
interpretation, and through the use of participant member checks in order to verify with
participants if the findings is a correct reflection of their experiences. In this study,
credibility was established by using triangulation where multiple data sources were used,
specifically, the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created
questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Yin (2012) related that the researcher
triangulates or establishes converging lines of evidence, which result in robust findings.
Transferability
Transferability is the qualitative counterpart to external validity and pertains to
the extent to which researchers can apply the findings of their study to other situations
(Byrne, 2001; Merriam, 2009; Streubert-Speziale, 2007). Merriam (2009) noted that
strategies to establish transferability include rich, thick description in reference to the
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setting, the participants, and the findings of the study. It is also the responsibility of the
qualitative researcher to describe the context of the study and its participants in detail so
that the possibility of replication exists. Bitsch (2005) also discussed the use of thick
description as well as purposeful sampling as strategies to establish transferability. To
ensure transferability, I provided a rich description of the context of the study and used a
combination or mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum variation sampling
and purposeful random sampling.
Dependability
Dependability is the qualitative counterpart to reliability. Shenton (2004)
recommended that the processes within the study should be reported in detail in order to
enable future researchers to repeat the work, but it does not necessarily mean that same
result will be obtained. In this study, dependability was established through the use of
audit trails, which pertains to a thorough collection of documentation about all aspects of
the research (see Rodgers, 2008). Documentation used in this study included detailed
transcriptions of the researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the
researcher-created site data collection worksheet, and the researcher-created
questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Therefore, the strategy of triangulation was
also used by comparing these multiple data sources.
Confirmability
Confirmability is the qualitative counterpart to objectivity. To establish
confirmability, Merriam (2009) recommended reflexivity, which is the process of
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reflecting critically on the self as a researcher in order to maintain the integrity of a
research study. Reflexivity pertains to researchers’ self-awareness and the strategies they
use to manage potentially biasing factors within the study (Jootun, McGhee, & Marland,
2009; Porter, 1993). Merriam (2009) shared that researchers need to explain their biases,
dispositions, and assumptions in relation to their investigation. Merriam also suggested
that this clarification of the researcher’s position allows the reader to better understand
how the researcher might have arrived at a particular interpretation of the data. In this
study, I used the strategy of reflexivity where I reflected on any biases that I may have
had about specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases
that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful
or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Lincoln and Guba (1985) noted that a reflexive
journal helps to prevent biases as the researcher makes regular entries during the research
process. In these entries, I recorded methodological decisions and the reasons for them,
the logistics of the study, and reflected on what was happening in terms of my own
values and interests.
Ethical Procedures
I completed the NIH Office of Extramural Research human research protections
training before beginning data collection (see Appendix E). I also abided by all U.S. and
Israel federal research regulations. I conducted the study in accordance with Walden
University’s IRB guidelines. Data collection began after IRB approval had been obtained.
I obtained the private intelligence company’s cooperation and data use agreement before
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using the company’s data in my study. I kept confidential all names associated with each
suicide bombing attack case, such as the names of the attackers, victims, families, first
responders, and law enforcement officials; therefore, no identifiable information were
used in any of my study’s reports. I only used data that specifically pertained to patterns
within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases. I kept confidential all
security measures and tools used to deter, detect, and mitigate suicide attacks.
All hard copy and electronic data will be kept secured in a locked file cabinet and
password protected computer in my personal home office for at least 5 years per Walden
University’s IRB guidelines. Only my supervising committee and Walden University
IRB had access to the data. After the study is completed and approved, a summary report
of the research findings will be e-mailed to the private intelligence company board
members. After 5 years, I will properly destroy the data using techniques such as
shredding.
Summary
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I first used
a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the successful and failed
suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the 35 suicide bombing
cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). Then using purposeful
random sampling, I selected three successful and three failed suicide attack cases from

99
the cases that met the study’s selection criteria. Data collection included a researchercreated terrorist activity data collection worksheet (see Appendix B), a researcher-created
site data collection worksheet (see Appendix C), and a researcher-created questionnaire
into suicide bombing events (see Appendix D). The information was transcribed and data
were managed with NVivo. Data were analyzed using two stages of analysis in case
study research: (a) within-case analysis or single-case analysis and (b) cross-case
analysis. The study was conducted in accordance with the parameters established by
Walden University’s IRB. I will keep all data secured in a locked file cabinet and
password protected computer.
In Chapter 3, I included the introduction, research design and rationale, role of the
researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and a summary. In Chapter 4, I
include the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence of
trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 5, I include the interpretation of
findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore specific patterns within
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases
in Israel. Three data sources were analyzed using within-case analysis or single-case
analysis and cross-case analysis to determine the similarities and differences in the three
successful and three unsuccessful attacks or bombing cases in Israel: (a) researchercreated terrorist activity data collection worksheet, (b) researcher-created site data
collection worksheet, and (c) researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing
events. The central research question explored the specific patterns within each of
Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary
planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel.
In Chapter 4, I include the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis, evidence
of trustworthiness, results, and a summary.
Setting
I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet, which was
based on Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, to collect archival data from a
private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I
used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events to collect open
source information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases
(see Appendix D). I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect
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data at each site of the three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack locations
(see Appendix C). Obtaining data from these three sources helped in triangulating or
establishing converging lines of evidence, which made the findings robust (see Yin,
2012). There were no personal or organizational conditions that influenced data
collection or interpretation of the study results.
Demographics
This section contains case information about the six attacks analyzed using
Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases. I used three successful attacks and three
unsuccessful attacks in this study. Tables 2 and 3 contains the information about the year
of attack, attack outcome, city of attack, bomber casualty, civilian casualty, and target
type. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the successful attacks occurred in 2001 and 2002,
whereas the unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. The differences in years
might be attributed to counterterrorist decision makers and operators having a better
understanding of the nine preattack phases; thus, improving their counterterrorism
strategies. In additions, the timeframe differences between the successful and
unsuccessful attacks might also be attributed to environmental changes, such as suicide
attacks originating from the Gaza Strip or other Palestinian territories, but a barrier or
wall was built beginning in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, when major rioting
and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006 (Butterworth et al., 2012; Zonszein, 2014).
Zonszein (2014) reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered it as a measure to
protect Israelis from Palestinian suicide bombers.
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Table 2
Breakdown of the Case Information of the Successful Attacks
Categories

Successful attack #1

Successful attack #2

Successful attack #3

Year of
attack

March 2, 2002, at 7
p.m.

August 9, 2001, at 2
p.m.

March 9, 2002, at
10:30 p.m.

Attack
outcome

Successful attack
targeting civilian
population in a
Jewish Orthodox
community
approximately 1
kilometer (km) from
center city Jerusalem

Successful attack
targeting civilian
population in a pizza
restaurant, Sbarro, in
center city Jerusalem

Successful attack
targeting civilian
population in a
popular café and bar,
called, Café Moment,
in the city of
Jerusalem, along the
outskirts of the center
part of the city

City of
attack

Jerusalem

Jerusalem

Jerusalem

Bomber
casualty

1 suicide bomber,
age 19

1 male suicide
bomber, age 22

1 male suicide
bomber

Civilian
causality

11 dead, 50 injured

15 dead, 130 injured

11 dead, 54 injured

Target type

Entrance to a Jewish
religious place of
study, Yeshiva, on a
Saturday night, after
the Sabbath

Entrance to a Jewish
religious place of
study, Yeshiva, on a
Saturday night, after
the Sabbath.

Café and bar
frequented by local
younger population
of the city
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Table 3
Breakdown of the Case Information of the Unsuccessful Attacks
Categories

Unsuccessful attack
#1

Unsuccessful attack
#2

Unsuccessful attack
#3

Year of
attack

July 23, 2005

July 17, 2006

March 21, 2006

Attack
outcome

Failed

Failed

The attack was foiled
by police after the
would-be suicide
bomber was arrested
by police following a
high-speed chase

City of
attack

Jerusalem/Central
Israel

Jerusalem/Central
Israel

It is believed that the
would-be suicide
bomber planning an
attack in Tel Aviv

Bomber
casualty

0 dead or injured

0 dead or injured

0 dead, 0 injured

Civilian
causality

0 dead or injured

0 dead or injured

0 dead, 0 injured

Target type

Suicide bombing
somewhere in Central
Israel

Suicide bombing
somewhere on Yafo
Street

While in police
custody, the would-be
suicide bomber
revealed that he was
planning on detonating
an explosive device at
a bus stop near the
Haifa-area checkpoint
junction
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Data Collection
I first used a researcher-created case study selection worksheet to select the
successful and failed suicide attack cases that met the study’s selection criteria from the
35 suicide bombing cases that took place from 2000 to 2010 (see Appendix A). From the
cases that met the study’s selection criteria, I used purposeful random sampling using a
random number generator to select three successful and three failed suicide attack cases.
After selecting the six cases, I used a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection
worksheet to collect archival data from the private intelligence company’s database in
Israel on the six cases (see Appendix B). I visited the site of each of the six suicide
bombing cases and I used a researcher-created site data collection worksheet to collect
data at each site (see Appendix C). I used a researcher-created questionnaire into suicide
bombing events to collect open source information or public data that was written or on
the Internet about the six cases (see Appendix D). I transcribed all of the data.
Data Analysis
I analyzed three data sources for this multiple case study research: (a) researchercreated terrorist activity data collection worksheet, (b) researcher-created site data
collection worksheet, and (c) researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing
events. Each data source was analyzed using a qualitative content analysis to search for
the most frequent occurrences found in each of the data. Specifically, I conducted singlecase analysis and cross-case analysis. Each data source file was also uploaded to NVivo,
which allowed for a more systematic organization and tabulation of the discovered
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themes from the analysis. I found no discrepant cases during data analysis. In the results
section, themes with the most number of occurrences were identified as the major themes
and the ones with fewer occurrences were the minor themes of the study.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
In this multiple case study, I assessed trustworthiness through credibility,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. I established credibility using
triangulation where multiple data sources were used, specifically, the researcher-created
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the researcher-created site data collection
worksheet, and the researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events. I
ensured transferability by providing a rich description of the context of the study and
used a combination or mixed purposeful sampling, which included maximum variation
sampling and purposeful random sampling. I established dependability through the use of
audit trails, thus, thoroughly collecting documentation about all aspects of the research. I
established confirmability through the strategy of reflexivity where I reflected on any
biases that I may have had about specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s nine
preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each of
the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. In these entries, I recorded
methodological decisions and the reasons for them, the logistics of the study, and
reflected on what was happening in terms of my own values and interests.
Results
I organize this section based on one central research question: What are the
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specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that
consistently emerge in the adversary planning process for each of the six successful or
failed suicide bombing cases in Israel? Based on the central research question analyzed
data, 13 major themes and 21 minor themes emerged for the successful attacks, whereas
seven major themes and 20 minor themes emerged for the unsuccessful attacks. This
section is organized in three sections: successful attacks, unsuccessful attacks, and crosscase analysis. I organized the successful attacks and unsuccessful attacks subsection by
the three data collection sources: (a) terrorist activity data collection worksheet, (b) site
data collection worksheet, and (c) questionnaire into suicide bombing events. Major
themes and minor themes are discussed and include descriptive narrative data related to
the themes in block quotation format or in quotation marks. In presenting the results,
verbatim information from the data collection sources were used, thus, the use of
quotations. Under each data collection source, I used quotation marks when the
information being quoted was less than 40 words; thus, the information was incorporated
into the text and enclosed with double quotation marks. I used the block quotation format
when the quotation consisted of 40 or more words; thus, displaying it in a freestanding
block of text without the quotation marks. Citing these sources was not necessary as the
quotations were presented under the corresponding data collection source.
Successful Attacks
Terrorist activity data collection worksheet. The first data source was the
terrorist activity data collection worksheet, which was used to collect archival data from a
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private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the cases. From the content analysis,
all nine framework categories were present in the successful attacks. The categories with
the most number of occurrences were general planning, financing, and operational
preparation of the attack. There were nine major themes and nine minor themes. Table 4
contains the breakdown of the themes and number of occurrences for each framework
category.
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Table 4
Results Breakdown from the Terrorist Activity Data Collection Worksheet of the
Successful Attacks
Framework categories
1. Networking and indoctrination

2. Terrorist training

3. General planning

4. Recruitment

5. Financing
6. Operational Planning

7. Weapons procurement

8. Logistical preparation

9. Operational preparation

Themes
Hamas group or organization
**Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade
affiliated with the Hamas
organization
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,
affiliated with the Fatah
organization
No special training conducted for
the attack
Very well trained and prepared
for the attack
Complete coordination, followed
as planned (time of attack,
disguise, transportation, etc.)
Coming from a refugee camp
Volunteered for the suicide
bombing
Coming from one neighborhood;
easier recruitment
Funded by large organizations
Scouting of attack site
Targeting a large number of
people for high casualty rate at a
specific time and location
Suspects disguised themselves
Using of explosive devices with
other sharp metal objects to
impose the most damage
Created by the group’s chief
bombmaker
Using an improvised explosive
device
Using a disguise, appropriate to
the target demographics and
location
Forming a cell within the local
target area
Thorough research and planning
of target site, led by the handlers

No. of occurrences
2

1

2
1
3

1
1
1
3
2
1

1
2

2
1
2

1
3
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Networking and indoctrination. The first category was the networking and
indoctrination of the three successful attacks. The category had one major theme where
two attacks were carried out by the Hamas group or organization and one minor theme,
where one attack was carried out by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the
Fatah organization.
Major Theme 1: Hamas group or organization. The first major theme was the
finding that two of the successful attacks were by the Hamas group or organization, one
of which was by the Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade, also affiliated with the Hamas
organization. Suicide attack 2 (SA2) was performed by the Hamas group. The suicide
bombers acted as the handlers of one another, where each had their respective professions
as well at the time of the attack.
The bomber, who was 22 at the time of the attack, was from the West Bank town
of Aqabah. He was the son of a successful restaurant owner and from a
landowning family. His Hamas hander led him to the site the day of the bombing.
The bomber volunteered for the suicide bombing and was paired up with another
person who acted as his handler, a Palestinian woman from the West Bank town
of Nabi Salih. At the time of the attack, she was a 20-year-old part-time student at
Birzeit University and a part time journalist.
Suicide attack 3 (SA3) was arranged by the Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade, an
arm of the Hamas group. The group targeted a popular café and planned the attack at a
time when the most crowd was present.
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On March 9, 2002, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in the Café
Moment, a popular café and bar, killing 11 people and wounding 54. The attack
was planned and carried out by the Silwan cell, a branch of Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam
Brigade, the militant arm of Hamas. On the night of the attack, two Silwan cell
members, picked up the bomber and drove him to the café at 10 p.m. They arrived
at 10:29 p.m. The bomber then walked into the café through the garden.
Normally, he would have had to talk to a bouncer to get in, but the bouncer was in
the bathroom. The bouncer then came out of the bathroom and approached him.
Upon confrontation by the security guard, bomber then detonated the bomb at
10:30 p.m.
Minor Theme 1: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization.
A minor theme with only one occurrence was the successful attack claimed by the alAqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization. Suicide attack 1 (SA1) was
by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is the military wing of the Fatah organization. The
attack was in response to the previous security operations in their refugee camp. “The
network utilized for the attack was affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is
considered the military wing of the Fatah organization of the West Bank. The network
was based in the Deheisheh refugee camp of Bethlehem.”
Terrorist training. The second category was the terrorist training of the attackers.
From the content analysis of the worksheet, one major theme emerged, that no special
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training was conducted for the attack, and one minor theme emerged, which was very
well trained and prepared for the attack.
Major Theme 2: No special training conducted for the attack. The second major
theme was that two of the three attacks had no special training conducted. SA2 and SA3
had no special training performed or identified. However, it was reported that both the
handler and bomber met with each other a day before the attack. “No special training was
used in this attack; however, the handler and bomber met the day prior to the attack in the
neighboring city of Ramallah, and the handler took the bomber to the scene.”
Minor Theme 2: Very well trained and prepared for the attack. The one minor
theme was the successful attack’s excellent training and preparation. SA1 was very well
planned by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. It was described that the suspects carefully
strategized the attack to the point of disguising as one of the local religious Jews in order
to move and operate more swiftly.
The training was done in the refugee camps next to Jerusalem, which enables ease
of access to the targeted city at the time of the execution of the attack. Suicide
bomber had been prepared to the extent of dressing like a religious Jew and
thereby was able to operate easier in this environment.
General Planning. The third category was the general planning of the attackers.
Based on the content analysis, findings indicated that the successful attacks had complete
coordination and the plans were followed as intended, such as the time of attack,
disguise, and transportation; thus, one major theme emerged in this phase.
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Major Theme 3: Complete coordination, followed as planned (time of attack,
disguise, transportation, etc.). The third major theme of the study was the full
coordination of the attack groups in fully executing their plans. All three attacks
embodied the said characteristic. SA1 was well planned and well-coordinated. The attack
was successful because it was executed according to the planned time, location, and
crowd number. In addition, the bomber even prepared a disguise to avoid from being
suspected among the crowd members.
Well planned target based on time of attack, location of the attack, with a
choreographed attack to coincide with the ending of religious classes at the end of
the Jewish Sabbath. Time of the attack was well planned as well as disguise the
bomber wore to include a Jewish skullcap.
SA2 was also well executed; the plan was completed with an efficient escape
vehicle. Another factor for success was the fact that the handler personally went to the
site to count the number of people at the planned time of attack. By doing so, both the
handler and bomber were prepared for the actual attack.
Planning included a taxi driver most likely chosen for ease to escape as well as a
vehicle often used in center city due to traffic congestion. The handler shared that
prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many people went in and
out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant would be when
attacked.
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Lastly, SA3 was implemented as planned. The members of the cell were
permanent residents of Israel which allowed them to freely access and travel the targeted
area in Jerusalem. As residents, they were skilled and had enough knowledge on how to
move around the target area.
The attack was carried out by the Silwan cell. Silwan is an Arab neighborhood
located in East Jerusalem on the outskirts of the old city. The members of the cell
had permanent resident status in Israel, which allowed them to travel in Israel
without suspicion. The Silwan cell received orders from Hamas in Ramallah to
locate and suicide bomb a target in crowded area in Jerusalem.
Recruitment. The fourth category was the recruitment process of the attack
groups. From the content analysis, there were three minor themes that emerged, each
having one occurrence: (a) coming from a refugee camp, (b) volunteered for the suicide
bombing, and (c) coming from one neighborhood; easier recruitment.
Minor Theme 3: Coming from a refugee camp. The first minor theme of the
category was the attackers coming from a refugee camp. SA1 was a response to the
security attacks and operations conducted near Bethlehem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs
highlighted that the bomber was directly from the refugee camp and committed the act to
condemn the treatments received at the refugee camp. “The bomber was from a refugee
camp near Bethlehem. According to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade spokesman. This
operation is a response to the Israeli crimes committed in our heroic refugee camps. We
selected a refugee to launch this response.”
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Minor Theme 4: Volunteered for the suicide bombing. The second minor theme in
this category was the attackers volunteered for the suicide bombing. SA2 had a volunteer
bomber paired with a handler to execute the attack. In addition, the volunteer bomber was
also a part-time student and a part-time journalist,
Bomber volunteered for the suicide bombing and was paired up with handler to
act as his handler, a Palestinian woman from the West Bank town of Nabi Salih.
At the time of the attack, she was a 20-year-old part time student at Birzeit
University and a part time journalist.
Minor Theme 5: Coming from one neighborhood; easier recruitment. The third
minor theme in this category was that the attackers came from one neighborhood
implying an easier recruitment. SA3 had cell members coming from the same residential
area or neighborhood. This became an advantage to the success of the attack as the eight
members of the cell were able to plan and recruit accordingly to prepare for the possible
security barriers on the day and time of the attack.
The attack was carried out by the Izz ad-Din-al-Qassam Brigade, the militant arm
of Hamas. The Silwan cell was directly responsible for the attack. Total members
of the cell were eight. All cell members were residents of the same neighborhood,
thereby making recruitment locally and enabling a safe means for indoctrination
in mitigating security forces interdiction.
Financing. The fifth category was the financing of the attackers. All three attacks
were reported to be funded by large organizations, which was the fourth major theme of

115
the study. SA1 was funded by the Fatah organization, with a reported budget of $50,000
per month. “The entire operation was financed under a fund of $50,000 per month to
conduct such attacks by the Fatah organization.” On the other hand, SA2 was funded by
the Hamas group. The reported amounts were $500 and $117,000, respectively. It was
shared that “Hamas paid $500 for the bomb itself and $117,000 for the operation by the
bomber.” SA3 was reportedly funded by the Arab Bank in cooperation with the Hamas
group. It was also indicated that the entire operation was under the support and direction
of Hamas Ramallah.
The Arab Bank was later sued for allegations of working with Hamas in financing
the attack. The Silwan cell received orders from Hamas in Ramallah to locate and
suicide bomb a target in crowded area in Jerusalem. The entire operation was
under the command and direction of Hamas Ramallah.
Operational Planning. The sixth category was the operational planning of the
attacks. In two of the three attacks, the suicide bombers scouted the attack site prior to the
actual implementation. From the content analysis, there was one major theme, scouting of
attack site, and two minor themes, targeting a large number of people to obtain a high
number of casualties at a specific time and location, and suspects disguised themselves.
Major Theme 5: Scouting of attack site. The fifth major theme of the study was
the scouting of the attack site by the attackers prior to the execution of their plans, which
was performed in two of the three successful attacks. SA2 was executed as planned,
having the handler scout the target area by counting the number people within the vicinity
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of the restaurant at the time of their attack. The scouting of the handler allowed for them
to strategically plan for the attack on the following day.
Hamas paid the bombmaker $500 for an explosive device hidden in a guitar case.
The handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how
many people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the
restaurant would be when attacked. On the day of the attack, she met the bomber
for the first time in Ramallah, where they disguised themselves as tourists before
traveling to Jerusalem by taxi. Once in Jerusalem, she led the bomber to the target
location.
On the day of the attack, both took a taxi from the West Bank city of
Ramallah to Jerusalem. Prior to leaving the West Bank, the two had disguised
themselves as tourists to blend in once they got to Jerusalem. Handler left the site
to go back to Ramallah through the Damascus gate of the Old City, and at 2 p.m.,
the bomber detonated the device.
SA3 was performed with the instructions of Hamas to search for a specific attack
site that would give them an ease of access without encountering any security hindrances
or barriers that would not go along with their plans. The bomber was able to get inside
the target site without being seen by the bouncer and by the time the bouncer noticed the
suspicious act of the bomber, the explosive was detonated.
Weeks before the bombing, cell leadership were given instructions from Hamas to
scout for an attack site. The eight-member cell was in place inside Jerusalem as
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the neighborhood they lived in was a part of the city, thereby easing targeting and
reconnaissance operations. On the night of the attack, the Silwan cell members
assigned to act as handlers for the bomber, picked up and drove the bomber to the
café at 10 p.m. They arrived at 10:29 p.m. Bomber then walked into the café
through the garden. Normally, he would have had to talk to a bouncer to get in,
but he was in the bathroom. The bouncer then came out of the bathroom and
approached him due to his suspicious behavior and upon confrontation, the
bomber detonated the bomb at 10:30 p.m.
Minor Theme 6: Targeting a large number of casualties at a specific time and
location. The first minor theme of this phase was the plan of targeting a large number of
casualties at a specific time and location. Only one successful attack practiced this theme.
SA1 was planned by targeting a large number of casualties gathered outside of an
institution following a celebration. It was reported that the attack was very precise,
detonating the bomb at the exact time after the classes have ended and individuals were
starting to gather for their free time. The attack later struck the students coming from the
Yeshiva.
On March 2, 2002, a large group of Haredi Orthodox Jews had gathered outside
of a Yeshiva in the Beit Yisrael neighborhood following a bar mitzvah
celebration. At approximately 7 p.m., the suicide bomber detonated a bomb in a
car outside of the Yeshiva killing 11 and wounding more than 50 people. The
bomber had been recruited by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade to carry out this
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attack. This attack would later be known as the Beit Yisrael Massacre. The
bomber struck at the precise moment to exact a large number of casualties, just as
classes on religious thought at the religious school had ended and students and
others filled the small neighborhood streets to enjoy a few hours of free time.
Minor Theme 7: Suspects disguised themselves. The second minor theme of this
phase was the plan of disguising the suspects. There was only one successful attack
related to this theme. For the SA2, the scouting of the handler became useful as their
group was able to prepare a disguise to act swiftly on the day of the attack. The handler
and the bomber disguised themselves as tourists to stay unnoticed and be credulous as
they executed their plan.
Hamas paid bombmaker $500 for an explosive device hidden in a guitar case. The
handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many
people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant
would be when attacked. On the day of the attack, she met the bomber for the first
time in Ramallah, where they disguised themselves as tourists before traveling to
Jerusalem by taxi. Once in Jerusalem, she led bomber to the target location.
On the day of the attack, both took a taxi from the West Bank city of
Ramallah to Jerusalem. Prior to leaving the West Bank, the two had disguised
themselves as tourists to blend in once they got to Jerusalem. The handler left the
site to go back to Ramallah through the Damascus gate of the Old City and at 2
p.m. the bomber detonated the device.
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Weapons procurement. The seventh category of the framework was the weapons
procurement which had two major themes and one minor theme. Two of the three attacks
used explosives devices with other sharp metal objects and employed their groups’ chief
bombmaker. In one attack, the attacker used an improvised explosive device.
Major Theme 6: Using of explosive devices with other sharp metal objects to
impose the most damage. SA2 and SA3 employed explosives hidden by the attackers or
bombers, where the explosives were mixed with metal objects to perpetrate the most
damage and destruction to their attack sites. “The device in this attack was explosives
hidden in a guitar case containing nails, nuts, and bolts to inflict the most damage. It was
constructed by Hamas’s chief bombmaker at the time.”
Major Theme 7: Created by the group’s chief bombmaker. SA2 and SA3 also
utilized weapons or explosives that were assembled by Hamas’s primary bombmakers
during the time of the attacks. “The device in this attack was explosives hidden in a guitar
case containing nails, nuts, and bolts to inflict the most damage. It was constructed by
Hamas’s chief bombmaker at the time.”
Minor Theme 8: Using an improvised explosive device. SA1 involved an
improvised explosive device strapped to the chest of the bomber at the time of the attack.
The improvised explosive device was detonated as the attacker stayed beside a group of
mothers with babies at the school institution’s entrance.
Weapon was an improved explosive device with the bomber being the delivery
mechanism of the explosive device. Law enforcement shared that the large device
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was strapped to the chest of the bomber who detonated himself as he stood next to
a group of mothers with baby strollers near the school’s guesthouse entrance.
Logistical preparation. The eighth category of Freeman et al.’s (2010) framework
was the logistical preparation. From the analysis, one major theme and one minor theme
were obtained. In two of the three attacks, the attackers reportedly used disguises that
were appropriate to their target demographics and location. In another attack, attackers
formed a cell within their local target area for easier mobility.
Major Theme 8: Using a disguise, appropriate to the target demographics and
location. In SA1, the bomber used a realistic disguise to perform the plans strategically
without being suspected by the authorities. Furthermore, the bomber wore the explosive
device to cover the large volumes of explosives to be used for the attack.
Logistics included a disguise of the bomber as well as the age of the bomber was
indicative of a teen taking part in the religious classes after the Sabbath or as one
of the party goers to the bar mitzva taking place at the same time. A hostel is also
at the same location which tends to host guests of a teenager age bracket. The
explosive device was worn on the bomber in an effort to hide and conceal the
large amounts of explosives until detonation.
In SA2, the attacker had a guitar case containing the explosives as well as the
metal objects used to ensure that the destruction and result would be in the group’s favor.
Bombmaker was paid $500 for the bomb itself and $117,000 for his troubles. The
device he built was 5 to 10 kilograms (kg) of explosives hidden inside a guitar
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case filled with nails, bolts, and nuts. In addition, the handler and bomber dressed
as tourists with a guitar case to disguise the explosive device.
Minor theme 9: Forming a cell within the local target area. To ease the logistical
operations, SA3 employed a local cell which allowed them to freely move around the city
in planning and executing their attack.
Ease to conduct logistics was because of the cell being locally based and having
received orders from outside of Israel, in Ramallah. This enabled logistics to be
conducted within Jerusalem, utilizing Israeli licensed vehicles, Israeli citizens,
and free movement to all parts of the city.
Operational preparation. The final and ninth category of the framework was
operational preparation which included all three successful attacks’ thorough research
and planning of target sites, led by the handlers. SA1 had a handler who led and guided
the bomber to the target site during the attack. The handler assisted in evading security
from the refugee camp to the target site, and the knowledge of the handler paved the way
to target a location that was congested at a certain time, perfect for their aim and purpose.
Thorough understanding by the adversary cell included the ability to bypass
security leaving the refugee camp and entering Israel to arrive at the target site in
Jerusalem. This required a handler that took the bomber from the refugee camp to
the target site prior to the attack hour. In addition, taking into account that the
attack was planned at this particular time and the exact location required
operational planning that included identifying the events taking place in such a
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congested target site and understanding the population of which the bomber must
operate.
SA2 was also effective because of the handler’s scouting of the target site prior to
the actual day of attack. The handler personally visited the site, and observed and counted
the number of individuals to obtain a visual of the site.
His Hamas hander led him to the site the day of the bombing. The handler shared
that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many people went in
and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant would be when
attacked.
Finally, SA3 also had handlers or leaders who guided the bombers in moving
around the city. It was reported that the handlers led the bombers to the target site at a
precise time or when the café was busy and crowded.
Members of the Silwan cell held residency in Israel allowing them to move about
freely. On the night of the attack, the cell handlers picked up and drove the
bomber to the café at 10 p.m. They arrived at 10:30 p.m. The drive time to the
location was timed for an attack when the café was at full capacity.
Site data collection worksheet. The second data source was the site data
collection worksheet. The site data collection worksheet differs from the terrorist activity
data collection worksheet and questionnaire into suicide bombing events as I visited the
site of each of the suicide bombing cases and I used the worksheet to collect data at each
site. From the analysis of the second data source, only the categories of networking and
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indoctrination; and general planning emerged. There were one major theme and one
minor theme. Table 5 contains the breakdown of the results from the content analysis of
the site data collection worksheet of the successful attacks.
Table 5
Results Breakdown from the Site Data Collection Worksheet of the Successful Attacks
Framework categories
1. Networking and
indoctrination

3. General planning

Themes
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,
affiliated with the Fatah
organization, to condemn
the treatment in refugee
camps
Targeting a site with a
probability of a high
number of casualties at a
certain time

No. of occurrences
1

3

Networking and indoctrination. The first category was the networking and
indoctrination of the attacks. From the analysis, the data only indicated one attack
networking plan. It was found that one successful attack was by the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization, to condemn the treatment in refugee
camps, which was the only minor theme for successful attacks using the site data
collection worksheet. The responsibility for SA1 was claimed by the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade. The main motive of the group was to condemn the treatment in the refugee
camps, in addition, another goal was to target the Israeli Jews and ultra-Orthodox. “The
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility and claimed their motive was because of
treatment in the refugee camps. Furthermore, their goal was to kill Israeli Jews and the
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ultra-Orthodox were chosen because they are exempt from military service.”
General planning. The third category was the general planning of the three
successful attacks. All three attacks reported to target a site with a probability of a high
number of causalities, at a certain time, which was the main theme for successful attacks
using the site data collection worksheet. SA1 was generally planned to target the Israeli
Jews. In particular, the attackers wanted to cause distress to the Israeli Jews by timing the
attack after a bar mitzvah celebration. The attackers aimed to cause suffering to the large
groups of families in the neighborhood.
The site was a synagogue located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood. The site
was chosen to specifically attack Israeli Jews at a time when the high
concentration of religious Jews was guaranteed as a target based on events taking
place, ease of access, disguise capabilities, and lack of security.
The attack occurred during a bar mitzvah celebration and at the end of the
Sabbath, which results in large amounts of younger targets for the attack.
This is a religious neighborhood and Saturday evening does not have any
shopping districts open, but rather large groups of teens who are congregating
with their peers after spending most of the day in prayer and with family.
SA2 also related to access to the location and the large number of people as it was
a tourist spot. It was reported that selecting commercial area decreased the chance of
suspecting an attack, thus, making the attackers more confident about the success of their
plan.
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The site was chosen because it was easily accessible, the location would be
crowded, the site was located in a commercial district, and no one would really
expect or see the attack coming, thus increasing the likelihood of success.
The bomber and his handler took a cab from Ramallah directly to
Jerusalem. At the time, this would have been a very direct and quick route to take
to the site.
The site was located in the Downtown Triangle district in Jerusalem. The
district is heavily visited by both locals and tourists. There are many small shops
located within the vicinity of the site. Located 20 meters (m) Northeast from the
Ha-Pa’amon mall. There is a hospital located approximately 110 m Northeast of
the site. The closest religious site is the Tiferet Yisrael Synagogue, located
approximately 250 m Northwest of the location.
Finally, SA3 was also planned with the target being the destruction of a popular
and crowded location. With the high probability of affecting a large number of people as
well as an effect to the government, the attack was planned and executed accordingly.
The site was a popular location, which increased the chances of casualties. In
addition, it was located within 100 m of Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, residence.
It was located on Azza Street, the major thoroughfare for the Rehavia
neighborhood. The street had other cafés and shops near the site.
Unlike most places, the café was open late Friday night into the early
morning of Saturday, which made it a popular location.
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Questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The third data source was the
questionnaire into suicide bombing events, which was used to collect open source
information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases. In this
data source, I found themes for eight of the nine categories, but data was lacking on the
second category, terrorist training. There were four major themes and 11 minor themes.
Table 6 contains the breakdown of the results from the questionnaire of the successful
attacks.
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Table 6
Results Breakdown from the Questionnaire of the Successful Attack
Framework categories
1. Networking and
indoctrination

3. General planning

4. Recruitment

5. Financing
6. Operational planning

7. Weapons procurement

8. Logistical preparation
9. Operational preparation

Themes
Military wing of the Fatah
organization
Hamas organization is
response to the assassinations
of their two leaders
Targeting a site with the
probability of a high number
of casualties at a certain time
(number of causalities,
accessibility, time)
Knowledge in entering or
accessing the country of target
Bomber was recruited by the
Hamas organization
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,
affiliated with the Fatah
organization in retaliation of
the operations in the refugee
camp
Volunteered for the attack
Funded by large organizations
Using a car to the attack site;
with the assistance of a
handler
Assembled from camp and
transported to target site
Using of explosive devices
with other sharp metal objects
to impose the most damage
Created by a group’s chief
bombmaker
Bomb was hidden in a guitar
case; Using a disguise
Finding a location with
minimal security and barriers
Finding a crowded location

No. of occurrences
1
1

3

2
2
1

1
2
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
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Networking and indoctrination. Under the first category, two minor themes
emerged, each receiving just one occurrence respectively. From the questionnaire, it was
discovered that the two groups involved were the military wing of the Fatah organization
(Minor Theme 1) and the Hamas organization is response to the assassinations of their
two leaders (Minor Theme 2). SA1 was an attack systematically organized and
subsidized by the military section of the Fatah organization from the Bethlehem region.
“This attack was organized and funded by the military wing of the Fatah organization
who is well structured and funded in the Bethlehem region.” SA2 was a response by the
Hamas organization to the slayings of their two leaders, which occurred 10 days before
the bombing. “Hamas, who carried out the attack, stated that the bombing was a response
to the assassinations of two Hamas leaders that occurred 10 days prior to the bombing.
General planning. The third category was the general planning of the three
successful attacks, where all three attacks targeted sites with the probability of a high
number of casualties at a certain time (number of causalities, accessibility, and time).
This is the first major theme in the questionnaire into suicide bombing events of the
successful attacks. SA1 was planned with the target of disturbing the ultra-Orthodox
neighborhood, which was known to be jammed and unsecured; which was a perfect
location for the attack. Furthermore, the target site is popular for tourists and religious
families with minimal causalities from the Muslim community.
The site was picked because it was located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood.
The attack resulted in a large amount of casualties in that it is congested, lacked
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security, and was located along the corridor that leads to the Palestinian
territories.
Site is known for tourists as well as local religious civilians for a place to
view ultra-Orthodox living in Jerusalem as well as for religious families who
travel to the neighborhood for shopping and studying.
The site was picked to specifically target Israeli Orthodox Jews with
minimal casualties to the Muslim community in the city.
It was just after 7 p.m. at the end of Shabbat, people would be
congregating for a bar mitzvah in the target location. The end of the Sabbath was
at the time of the attack and this led to an increase in civilians outside.
Similarly, SA2 was another target site that was chosen because of its accessibility
and the number of probable causalities resulting from the attack. The target site was
based on the careful scouting of the handler; thus, choosing a site with a large number of
tourists allowed them to work and move without being suspected with acting
suspiciously.
The target site was selected because it was easily accessible, it was located in a
commercial district, meaning there would be people at the location, and it would
be unsuspected and catch people off guard, increasing the chances of success.
This site was located at the corner of Jaffa Road and King George Street in
the Downtown Triangle district. This location guarantees there would be lots of
people in the restaurant or its vicinity. Also, the site is very accessible on foot, by
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bus, and by car, both taxis and private vehicles. The Downtown district receives
lots of tourists, which made it easier for the bomber and his handler to approach
the site without appearing suspicious. The decision to bomb this particular site
was based on scouting done by the handler prior to the attack. The location was
chosen because it would be crowded when they attacked.
The time of the attack was based on when they believed the restaurant
would be crowded.
Finally, SA3 was another terror aggression planned with the aim of affecting the
government and destroying several commercial establishments. In addition, the group has
always had the aim of negatively affecting and bombing the most crowded areas in
Jerusalem.
It was a popular area for recreation and located 100 m from Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon’s residence. The site was a very popular café that would turn into a bar at
night. It was also open late even on the Sabbath.
The attack was carried out by the Silwan cell. Silwan is a Palestinian
neighborhood located in East Jerusalem on the outskirts of the old city. The
members of the cell had permanent resident status in Israel, which allowed them
to travel in Israel without suspicion. The Silwan cell received orders from Hamas
in Ramallah to locate and suicide bomb a crowded area in Jerusalem.
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A popular late-night hangout for younger people. It is suspected that the
location was chosen because of its proximity to the then Prime Minister’s
Residence and because it was a popular location.
Recruitment. The fourth category was the recruitment made by the three
successful attacks. From the content analysis, two major themes and two minor themes
emerged. It was then discovered that the recruitments centered on the knowledge in
entering or accessing the country of target and mainly by the Hamas organization.
Major Theme 2: Knowledge in entering or accessing the country of target. SA1
had a bomber who was recruited from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The bomber had a
direct and easy access entering Israel. “Bomber was recruited from within the al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade as he was known and active against security forces and was chosen
because he had access to entering into Israel.” SA3 was similar to SA1 where the
bombers had easy access to travel to and from Israel. Having Israeli cards allowed the
attackers to travel and search for the most ideal location for their target.
Hamas instructed the bombers to find a crowded location to bomb. The bombers
were residents of East Jerusalem and had Israeli ID cards, allowing them to travel
in and out of Israel. The attack was organized by the Silwan cell who were taking
instructions from Hamas.
Major Theme 3: Bomber was recruited by the Hamas organization. SA2 was a
terror aggression claimed by the Hamas organization in response to the killings of their

132
two leaders. It was reported that Hamas has been responsible for many bombings and
attacks before the August 9, 2001 attack.
Hamas claimed the bombing was a response to the assassination of two Hamas
leaders. The bombing happened during the Second Intifada, September 28, 2000
through February 8, 2005. Hamas, who carried out this attack, was responsible for
many bombing prior to and after this attack.
SA3 again was instructed and funded by the Hamas organization, with recruits
who had direct access to and from Israel.
Hamas instructed attackers to find a crowded location to bomb. The bomber was a
resident of East Jerusalem and had Israeli ID cards, which allowed them to travel
in and out of Israel. The attack was organized by the Silwan cell who took
instructions from Hamas.
Minor Theme 3: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the Fatah organization
in retaliation of the operations in the refugee camp. SA1 was performed by the al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade, associated with the Fatah organization to address the Israeli security
acts in the refugee camp.
The claim by the Fatah organization spokesman was that the attack was in
retaliation for the recent Israeli security operations in the refugee camp.
The bomber came from the refugee camp, Daheisha, right outside the
Palestinian city of Bethlehem. This is a violent refugee camp, known for many
attacks in Israel and within the refugee camp against security forces.
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Minor Theme 4: Volunteered for the attack. SA2 had bomber who volunteered for
the attack; and both bomber and handler was matched only on the day of the attack.
“Bomber volunteered for the attack and was paired up with his handler on the day of the
attack.”
Financing. The fifth category was the financing of the successful attacks. From
the content analysis, the fourth major theme was discovered, which was that the attacks
were funded by large organizations. SA1 was funded by the military wing of the Fatah
organization called as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. More specifically, it was reported
that Yasser Arafat was the major financier of the group.
This attack was organized and funded by the military wing of the Fatah
organization who is well structured and funded in the Bethlehem region.
The al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade is the militant arm of the Palestinian
Authority. It was discovered after the attack that they had been receiving funding
directly from Yasser Arafat.
SA2 was funded by the Hamas organization. The bomber was paid $500 and
Hamas also provided other materials, resources, and transportation for the attack.
Hamas paid bombmaker $500 for an explosive device hidden in a guitar case. The
handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many
people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant
would be when attacked. On the day of the attack, she met the bomber for the first
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time in Ramallah, where they disguised themselves as tourists before traveling to
Jerusalem by taxi. Once in Jerusalem, she led the bomber to the target location.
Operational planning. The sixth category was the operational planning, which
had one minor theme, which was using a car that was going to the attack site, with the
assistance of a handler. Thus, with SA1, the attacker used a car that was going to the
target location, with the presence of a handler, and security disruptions were also
mitigated. The operational planning was effective, having the bomber arrive using a car
and at the same time, ensuring that the bomb was detonated at the right time.
Bomber took a car to the site with the assistance of a handler who guided the
bomber into the target location and assisted in exploiting the security checkpoints
leaving Bethlehem region.
The neighborhood had been attacked 3 times before. In this case, the
bomber arrived in a car and detonated the bomb when approaching the crowded
target.
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was the process of weapon
procurement of the successful attacks. These three different attacks also had three
different methods of weapons procurements. The three minor themes were assembled
from camp and transported to target site, using of explosive devices with other sharp
metal objects to impose the most damage, and created by a group’s chief bombmaker.
Minor Theme 6: Assembled from camp and transported to target site. SA1
members came from a refugee camp and the devices were collected, formed, and brought
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to the target site. “The devices were assembled and transported from the refugee camp to
Jerusalem, Israel.”
Minor Theme 7: Using of explosive devices with other sharp metal objects to
impose the most damage. SA2 was executed using various explosive devices with sharp
metal objects aimed to enforce greater damages and fatalities. It was reported that the use
of explosives with sharp objects is a signature act by the Hamas group.
The bomb used in this attack used nuts, bolts, and nails to create a shrapnel effect
to inflict more damage and create more casualties. The use of sharp objects in
addition to explosives is used in many explosive devices used by Hamas.
Minor Theme 8: Created by a group’s chief bombmaker. SA3 was also
accomplished with the help of Hamas’s chief bombmaker. “The bomb was built by
Abdullah Ghaleb Barghouti, who was Hamas’s chief bombmaker at the time. He had
built other bombs used in attacks during the Second Intifada for Hamas.”
Logistical preparation. The eighth category had one minor theme (this was Minor
Theme 9 in the questionnaire into suicide bombing events of the successful attacks),
which was the finding that the bomb was hidden in a guitar case and using a disguise.
SA2 had a bomb that was hidden by the bombmaker inside a guitar case as a disguise and
to conceal the explosives. “The bomb was made in the West Bank village of Burqa by the
bombmaker and hidden in a guitar case.”
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Operational preparation. The final category was operational preparation. From
the content analysis of the questionnaire, two minor themes were established, each
receiving one occurrence respectively.
Minor Theme 10: Finding a location with minimal security and barriers. SA1 was
executed given that the handler and bomber moved swiftly from one territory to another
because of minimal security barriers while traveling to the target location. “The
movement from the Palestinian territories to the target site was fairly exploitable in that
minimal checkpoints could be bypassed and there was no need to enter the more secure
center city district.”
Minor Theme 11: Finding a crowded location. For SA2, emphasis was placed on
the importance for the terror groups in finding a crowded and packed target location. In
the attack on August 9, 2001, the handler stated that he previously inspected and
observed the location to strategize and plan more effectively.
The site was chosen because it was a crowded location with easy access. The
handler shared that prior to the attack she went to the site and counted how many
people went in and out of the restaurant to determine how crowded the restaurant
would be when attacked.
Unsuccessful Attacks
Terrorist activity data collection worksheet. Under the unsuccessful attacks,
the first data source analyzed was the terrorist activity data collection worksheet. From
the content analysis of the terrorist activity data collection worksheet, no information was
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found about the logistical preparations of the unsuccessful attacks (Phase 8). In addition,
findings indicated that the attackers had very little information about their planning and
attack strategies. There were three major themes and 12 minor themes. Table 7 contains
the breakdown of the findings from the terrorist activity data collection worksheet of the
unsuccessful attacks.
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Table 7
Result Breakdown from the Terrorist Activity Data Collection Worksheet of the
Unsuccessful Attacks
Framework categories
Themes
No. of occurrences
1. Networking and
Fatah organization
1
indoctrination
Unemployed suspect
1
Islamic Jihad network
1
2. Terrorist training
Trained by the Fatah
1
organization
No relevant training known
1
3. General planning
Travel to the target site to
3
detonate themselves and the
locals
4. Recruitment
Fatah organization
1
Unemployed suspect
1
Islamic Jihad network
1
5. Financing
Funded by the Government
1
of Iran through the Islamic
Jihad network
6. Operational planning
Tamper security and attack
1
a populated site
Paying a driver to smuggle
1
the suspect to Israel and
help with the attack
7. Weapons procurement
5 kg explosive
2
9. Operational preparation

Detonating at a populated
site
Paying a driver to smuggle
the suspect to Israel and
help with the attack

2
1
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Networking and indoctrination. The first category under the unsuccessful attacks
had three minor themes: (a) Fatah organization, (b) unemployed suspect, and (c) Islamic
Jihad network. The unsuccessful attacks were organized by diverse groups. One suspect
was identified as an unemployed attacker. Unsuccessful suicide attack 1 (USA1) was
connected to the Fatah organization. In regard to unsuccessful suicide attack 2 (USA2),
there were no other details about the network connected to the terrorist activity, but the
suspect was unemployed. Unsuccessful suicide attack 3 (USA3) had a suicide bomber
with ties to the Islamic Jihad network and other terror groups outside of Israel. “The
would-be suicide bomber was connected to the Islamic Jihad network, which is
connected to other terrorist organizations outside of Israel as well as being connected to
governments that sponsor Islamic terrorism.”
Terrorist training. The second category was the training of the attackers. From
the content analysis of the terrorist activity data collection worksheet, the unsuccessful
attacks had limited details about the training. Two underlying minor themes emerged: (a)
trained by the Fatah organization, where USA1 was reportedly handled, supported, and
trained provided by the same group, which was the Fatah organization; and (b) no
relevant training known, where with USA3, the bomber had no relevant training.
General planning. The third category was the general planning conducted by the
attackers. The terrorist activity data collection worksheet was analyzed and one major
theme was formed, where all three unsuccessful attackers attempted to travel to the target
site to detonate themselves and the residents. For USA1, the bomber planned to travel
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“from Gaza, infiltrate Israel, and head to a central Israeli location to detonate himself.” In
addition, USA2 also had attackers who traveled from the West Bank to the target
location. “Go to Jerusalem from the West Bank, find Yafo St, detonate himself and
others.” Finally, with SA3, the plan was to pay a Palestinian driver to smuggle the
bomber and the explosives into Israel. Once in Israel, it shared that the bomber made his
way to the bus stop near the target area and planned to detonate the device from there.
The would-be suicide bomber’s plan was to pay a Palestinian driver who was a
resident of the Old City that routinely smuggled Palestinians into Israel and to
smuggle him and the explosives he was carrying into Israel. Once in Israel, he
planned to make his way to the bus stop near the Haifa area checkpoint junction
to detonate an explosive device.
Recruitment. Another category was the recruitment performed by the organizers
of the three unsuccessful attacks. Similar to the networking category, three different
minor themes were discovered: (a) Fatah organization, where USA1 was planned by the
Fatah organization; (b) unemployed suspect, where USA2 involved an “unemployed
Palestinian from the northern part of the West Bank;” and (3) Islamic Jihad network,
where USA3 was linked to the Islamic Jihad network and other terror organizations
outside of Israel. “The would-be suicide bomber was connected to the Islamic Jihad
network, which is connected to other terrorist organizations outside of Israel as well as
being connected to governments that sponsor Islamic terrorism.” There was very little
information about the identity and background of the attackers.
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Financing. Another category was the financial aspect of the category. Only one
minor theme emerged, which was the report that one unsuccessful attack was funded by
the Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. It was reported that USA3
was funded by the Iranian Government through the Islamic Jihad network, but the full
transaction did not go through; however, portions of the $1.8 million were still
transferred and used for the attack.
One month before the foiled attempt, the Government of Iran tried to send 1.8
million dollars to the Islamic Jihad network. Israeli authorities were able to stop
some of the money from being transferred into the West Bank, but not all of it.
Operational planning. The sixth category of the preattack phase was operation
planning. From the three analyzed unsuccessful attacks, two minor themes emerged that
received one occurrence each. For the first minor theme, tamper security and attack a
populated site, USA1 involved the plan to “tamper with border security fences to
infiltrate Israel, then proceed to a populated part of central Israel.” For the second minor
theme, paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack, USA3
involved the “bomber paying a driver who was known to smuggle Palestinians from the
West Bank to Israel $200 New Israeli Sheqel (NIS).”
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was planning in terms of weapons
procurement. Under this category, one major theme was formed with two occurrences,
where two unsuccessful attacks employed 5 kg of explosives. USA1 had a “5 kg waistworn explosive from Fatah,” while in USA2, 5 kg of explosives was procured.
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Operational preparation. The eighth category was the operational preparation of
the attempted attacks. The final category as analyzed from the terrorist activity data
collection worksheet had one major theme, detonating at a populated site; and one minor
theme, paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack.
Major Theme 3: Detonating at a populated site. USA1 plan involved executing
the attack at a much populated and crowded area. The plan entailed tampering “with
border security fences to infiltrate Israel from Gaza, then proceed to a populated part of
central Israel and detonate himself in an undisclosed central Israeli location, presumably
Jerusalem.” USA2 involved obtained an explosive to detonate at a commercial or
populated street. “Obtained the explosive from an unknown source, ask local Arabs
where Yafo Street was and if there were police or military forces there, then detonate
somewhere on the street.”
Minor Theme 12: Paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with
the attack. USA3 entailed hired a driver that would smuggle the bomber to Israel at all
costs. “The would-be bomber found a driver who would smuggle him into Israel no
questions asked.”
Site data collection worksheet. The second data source for the unsuccessful
attacks was the site data collection worksheet. From the content analysis of this data
source, only three framework categories emerged. There were one major theme and three
minor themes. Table 8 contains the breakdown of the results from the content analysis of
the site data collection worksheet.
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Table 8
Result Breakdown from the Site Data Collection Worksheet of the Unsuccessful Attacks
Framework categories
1. Networking and
indoctrination
3. General planning

7. Weapons procurement

Themes
Islamic Jihad Movement to
get revenge
Dense location with high
concentration of religious
Jews
5 to 7 kg explosive device

No. of occurrences
1
3

1

Networking and indoctrination. The first category was networking and
indoctrination of the attempted attacks. Only one minor theme emerged, which was the
Islamic Jihad Movement to get revenge. USA3 involved different motives and objectives
for the terror occurrence. The attack on March 21, 2006 was planned and executed by the
Islamic Jihad Movement in order to interrupt the Israeli elections as well as contract
revenge for a young Palestinian girl who was previously killed from a raid.
Police believe that one of the men was an operative from the Islamic Jihad
Movement of Palestine, who planned to detonate a bomb in Tel Aviv, in order to
disrupt the Israeli elections and to get revenge for a 10-year-old Palestinian girl,
who was killed during an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid.
General planning. The third category was general planning of the attempted
attacks. In all three attacks, the bombers searched for a dense location with high
concentration of religious Jews, which was the first major theme in the site data
collection worksheet of the unsuccessful attacks. USA1 was planned in order to affect an
area with a high concentration of religious Jews. “Target city has a high concentration of
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religious Jews, as well as being a location that was contested by the Arab world and
Israel.” USA2 was also planned to cause distress to religious Jews. The attack was
targeted to destroy commercial sites and locations with dense populations.
Target city has a high concentration of religious Jews, as well as being a location
that was contested by the Arab world and Israel. Yafo Street is a highly-trafficked
road and has a dense tourist population.
Dense commercial location with hotels and restaurants, has been a site of
previous attacks, and is a location in Jerusalem, which has been religiously
contested.
USA3’s location was chosen due because it was public and its composition of
innocent individuals. It was reported that if the attack was executed as planned, the Israeli
elections would have been heavily disrupted.
The target site was chosen because it would be a public location with a lot of
innocent people. If the attack did happen, it could have scared people into staying
home on election day. The transportation route was chosen because the driver
knew how to avoid security and smuggle in Palestinians who were working
illegally.
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was the weapons procurement of
the groups who attempted the attacks. Again, only one minor theme emerged, which was
the use of a 5 to 7 kg explosive device. USA3 involved obtaining a 5 to 7 kg explosive
device. “After the men were arrested, the van was searched and an explosive device
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between 5 and 7 kg was discovered.”
Questionnaire into suicide bombing events. The third source was the
questionnaire into suicide bombing events where information about the three
unsuccessful attacks were analyzed. From the content analysis of this source, only six of
the nine categories emerged. There were three major themes and five minor themes.
Table 9 contains the breakdown of the results from the analysis of the questionnaire.
Table 9
Result Breakdown From the Questionnaire of the Unsuccessful Attacks
Framework categories
1. Networking and
indoctrination

3. General planning
4. Recruitment
6. Operational planning
7. Weapons procurement
8. Logistical preparation

Themes
Volunteer from the Gaza
Strip
Islamic Jihad Movement of
Palestine
Densely populated area or
attack site
Fatah organization
None reported
Hiring of a driver to bring
the bomber to the location
Assembled in Israel
Attempted to walk

No. of occurrences
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2

Networking and indoctrination. The first category, networking and
indoctrination, had two minor themes: (a) volunteer from the Gaza Strip and (b) Islamic
Jihad Movement of Palestine. Each of the themes only received one occurrence. For
Minor Theme 1: Volunteer from the Gaza Strip, USA1 had a volunteer bomber from the
Gaza Strip who had previously launched successful attacks. “The thwarted bomber was
from the Gaza strip which has launched rockets and carried out attacks from that location
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before presumably volunteering.” For Minor Theme 2: Islamic Jihad Movement of
Palestine, USA3 was supposedly affiliated with the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine.
“The suspect affiliated himself with the Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine and
assumedly obtained an explosive from them, then boarded a van.”
General planning. The third category was the general planning of the three
unsuccessful attempted attacks. The major theme that emerged was that the plan was to
attack densely populated area or attack site, which received two occurrences. Another
general plan discovered was from the USA2, where the aim was to affect a denselypopulated location or area with many tourists and citizens and cause disruption, “Densely
populated . . . many tourists, residents of various faiths and citizenship. Densely
populated area with high chances of achieving goal, all types of people.” USA3 was also
performed because of the popularity and projected population of the attack site. “The
target site was selected because it was a bus stop near a popular junction and would be
crowded.”
Recruitment. Another category was the recruitment followed by the groups,
where two minor themes emerged. The first minor theme was that the recruitment was
made by the Fatah organization, “Fatah group planned and attempted to execute their
plan.” The second minor theme was that no other details about the recruitment emerged.
USA2 had no actual recruitment details or information reported; however, it was only
known that “he worked in central Israel and may have commuted through and visited
before. If the attempted bombing was by Hezbollah, it would be headquartered in
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Lebanon.”
Operational planning. The sixth category was the operational planning of the
groups. From the content analysis of the questionnaire, only one minor theme emerged,
which was one unsuccessful attack, where a driver was hired to bring the bomber to the
location. Thus, for the USA3, a driver was hired to take the bomber to the actual location
of the attempted attack, “The plan was to pay a driver $200 INS to take him to the
location.”
Weapons procurement. The seventh category was weapons procurement, which
had one major theme. Two unsuccessful attacks had their weapons assembled and
generated in Israel. For USA1, the attackers had their 5 kg explosives assembled in Gaza.
“Explosives were presumably assembled in Gaza. The device itself seemed to follow a
trend of 5 kg explosive systems outfitted for discretion like other bombing events.” On
the other hand, in regard to USA2,“explosives were presumably assembled in the West
Bank or in a site in Jerusalem.”
Logistical preparation. The final category was the logistical preparation, which
had one major theme. Two unsuccessful attackers attempted to reach their target point by
foot. The USA1 logistical preparation was the attacker attempted to only reach the
location by foot, “The bomber attempted to walk, further travel plans unknown.”
Similarly, the bomber for the USA2 also attempted to reach the location by walking:
The bomber attempted to walk. The suspect was caught with the explosive
somewhere outside the Old City by foot. No specifics were said on exactly where,
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but it can be assumed he was fairly close to the destination. Place of origin was
somewhere in the northern part of the West Bank.
Cross-Case Analysis
From the analyses of the three data sources, which include the terrorist activity
data collection worksheet, site data collection worksheet, and questionnaire into suicide
bombing events, the nine preattack phases emerged in the successful and unsuccessful
attacks, but they were more consistently present in the successful bombing cases. Based
on the findings above, the nine preattack phases seemed to have played a vital role in the
actual results of the attacks. For networking and indoctrination, it was found that the
Hamas organization supported two of the three successful attacks examined in the study.
Furthermore, I discovered that two of the successful attacks did not practice or perform
any special training in executing the attack. In general, the successful attacks were
executed by having skilled handlers and bombers who were able to ensure a complete
coordination of factors where all plans were followed accordingly, such as the time of
attack, disguise, and transportation.
For the funding of the successful attacks, it was established that all three attacks
were financially supported by large terror organizations and groups. In addition, the
successful attacks were carefully planned by scouting the sites or location before the
execution. Furthermore, to ensure the damage and destruction, the weapons were created
by the group’s chief bombmaker and used explosive devices with other sharp metal
objects to impose the most damage. Logistically, successful attackers mostly used
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disguises appropriate to the target demographics and location. Finally, the successful
attackers performed thorough research and planning of target sites, which were led by the
handlers. The successful attackers mainly targeted a site that had a high probability of
casualties at a certain time.
As for the unsuccessful attacks, the nine preattack phases were also present;
however, it was very much evident that when compared to the successful attacks, the
details and information of the planning were vague and inadequate. Network and
indoctrination included limited details about the attackers and suspect. Only one attacker
was said to have been trained by the Fatah organization. The general plan of all three
unsuccessful attacks was to travel to the target site to detonate themselves and the locals.
Funding information was also unavailable and only one attack was believed to have been
supported by the Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. The weapons
were 5-kg explosives, which were planned to be detonated in crowded and populated
sites. From the questionnaire into suicide bombing events, analysis indicated that the
weapons were assembled in Israel and attackers attempted to walk by foot to the target
sites. From the themes found from the unsuccessful attacks, the actual and concrete
planning and implementation of strategies by the attackers were deficient. The successful
attackers had handlers and completely secured themselves to travel to the target site
without much barrier. In the unsuccessful attacks, the attackers travelled by foot.
Furthermore, no disguises and explosive cover ups were reported as compared to the
successful attacks.
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Summary
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. Through
content analysis and cross-case analysis, I analyzed data from the terrorist activity data
collection worksheet, site data collection worksheet, and questionnaire into suicide
bombing events of both the successful and unsuccessful attacks in Israel. The summary of
the findings is discussed based on the overall findings from the three data collection
sources at each phase. The multiple-case analysis allowed me to discover the themes that
addressed the use and effectiveness of Freeman et al.’s (2010) preattack phases in three
successful and three unsuccessful attacks. Based on the analyzed data, 13 major themes
and 21 minor themes emerged for the successful attacks, whereas seven major themes
and 20 minor themes emerged for the unsuccessful attacks.
For the three successful attacks, findings indicated that all nine framework phases
were present in the successful attack findings; however, general planning, financing, and
operational preparation had the most occurrences. For the first phase, networking and
indoctrination, attacks were carried out by the Hamas group and the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade, who were affiliated with the Fatah organization. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
carried out a successful attack to condemn the treatment in refugee camps. The military
wing of the Fatah organization and the Hamas organization carried out suicide attacks is
response to the assassinations of their two leaders. For the second phase, terrorist

151
training, two of the three attacks had no special training conducted, while one successful
attack involved excellent training and preparation. For the third phase, general planning,
findings indicated that the successful attacks had complete coordination and the plans
were followed as intended, such as the time of attack, disguise, and transportation. In
addition, the attackers targeted sites that had a high probability for causalities, such as a
synagogue located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood and Downtown Triangle district in
Jerusalem.
The fourth phase was recruitment and results showed that the attackers came from
a refugee camp and an attack was in response to the security attacks and operations
conducted near Bethlehem. In addition, findings indicated that attackers volunteered for
the suicide bombing and the attackers came from one neighborhood, which made
recruitment easier. The fifth phase was financing and all three attacks were reportedly
funded by large organizations, such as Fatah organization, Hamas, and Arab Bank. The
sixth phase was operational planning and findings indicated that for two of the three
attacks, the suicide bombers scouted the attack site prior to the actual implementation. In
addition, the attackers planned for a large number of casualties at a specific time and
location. The attackers also disguised themselves as tourists to stay unnoticed.
Furthermore, the attacker and handler used a car that was going to the target location and
security disruptions were also mitigated.
The seventh phase was weapons procurement where three different successful
attacks had three different methods of weapons procurements: (a) assembled from camp
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and transported to target site, (b) using of explosive devices with other sharp metal
objects to impose the most damage, and (c) created by a group’s chief bombmaker. The
eighth phase was logistic preparation, where in two of the three attacks, the attackers
reportedly used disguises that were appropriate to their target demographics and location
and in another attack, attackers formed a cell within their local target area for easier
mobility. In addition, in an attack, the bomb was hidden in a guitar case. The ninth phase
was operational preparation, where findings indicated thorough research and planning of
target site, which was led by the handlers. One of the attack involved the handler and
bomber moving swiftly from one territory to another because of minimal security barriers
while traveling to the target location. Emphasis was also placed on the importance for the
terror groups in finding a crowded and packed target location.
For the three unsuccessful attacks, findings indicated that all nine framework
phases were present, similar to the successful attack findings; however, the details and
information of the planning were vague and inadequate. For both the first phase,
networking and indoctrination, and fourth phase, recruitment, findings were similar,
where the unsuccessful attacks were organized by diverse groups, specifically the Fatah
organization and the Islamic Jihad network. Furthermore, Islamic Jihad Movement of
Palestine had planned to detonate a bomb in Tel Aviv in order to disrupt the Israeli
elections and to get revenge for a 10-year-old Palestinian girl, who was killed during an
IDF raid. Suspects in the unsuccessful attacks included an individual who was
unemployed and a volunteer bomber from the Gaza Strip who had previously launched
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successful attacks. For the second phase, terrorist training, for an unsuccessful attack, the
Fatah organization handled, supported, and provided training; and for another
unsuccessful attack, the bomber had no relevant training. For the third phase, general
planning, findings indicated that all three unsuccessful attackers attempted to travel to the
target site to detonate themselves and the residents. In addition, in all three unsuccessful
attacks, the bombers searched for a dense location with high concentration of religious
Jews.
Findings for the fifth phase, financing, indicated that one unsuccessful attack was
funded by the Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. The sixth phase
was operational planning and findings indicated the plan to tamper with border security
fences to infiltrate Israel, then proceed to a populated part of central Israel. In addition,
operational planning included paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and the
driver helping with the attack. The seventh phase was weapons procurement where two
unsuccessful attacks involved the weapons being assembled and generated in Israel and
the use of 5 kg explosives. The eighth phase was logistic preparation, where two
unsuccessful attackers attempted to reach their target point by foot. The ninth phase was
operational preparation, where findings indicated the plan to detonate at a populated site,
and paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack.
In Chapter 4, I included the setting, demographics, data collection, data analysis,
evidence of trustworthiness, results, and a summary. In Chapter 5, I include the
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interpretation of findings, limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a
conclusion.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
In this multiple case study, I explored specific patterns within each of Freeman et
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases in Israel. I collected
data using a researcher-created terrorist activity data collection worksheet where I
collected archival data from a private intelligence company’s database in Israel on the six
cases, a researcher-created site data collection worksheet where I collected data at each
site of the three successful and three failed suicide bombing attack locations, and a
researcher-created questionnaire into suicide bombing events where I collected open
source information or public data that was written or on the Internet about the six cases.
In this study, I answered one central research question, which was the specific patterns
within each of Freeman et al.’s nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases
in Israel.
Using single-case analysis and cross-case analysis, I found 13 major themes and
21 minor themes for the successful attacks and seven major themes and 20 minor themes
for the unsuccessful attacks. Findings indicated that all nine Freeman et al. (2010) phases
were present in the successful attack findings; however, general planning, financing, and
operational preparation had the most occurrences. On the other hand, for the three
unsuccessful attacks, findings indicated that all nine framework phases were present,
similar to the successful attack findings; however, the details and information of the
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planning were vague and inadequate. The findings are discussed in more detail in the
interpretation of the findings section. In Chapter 5, I present the interpretation of findings,
limitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a conclusion.
Interpretation of the Findings
One central research question was answered: What are the specific patterns within
each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerge in the
adversary planning process for each of the six successful or failed suicide bombing cases
in Israel? The findings for this study are interpreted in the context of Medby and Glenn’s
(2002) IPB analytic framework, Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB framework, and
Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases, as well as the literature review. The themes
or patterns that emerged from the analysis are categorized as major and minor themes,
based on the number of occurrences. Some of the aspects that were taken into
consideration when comparing the six case studies were the year of attack, attack
outcome, city of attack, bomber casualty, civilian casualty, and target type. The most
discernable themes that emerged from the analysis are discussed, first in terms of the
successful attacks, then in terms of unsuccessful attacks, and finally, in terms of overall
findings across all the attacks that were under investigation.
Successful Attacks
The patterns and the major and minor themes that evolved from the analysis of the
three case studies that pertained to the successful attacks are discussed. The first data
source, the terrorist activity data collection worksheet, revealed that all nine categories of
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Freeman et al.’s (2010) preattack phases were present in the successful attacks. The
second data source, site data collection worksheet, revealed only the following two
categories: networking and indoctrination; and general planning. The third data source,
the questionnaire into suicide bombing events, showed important patterns within eight of
the nine phases postulated by Freeman et al., except the terrorist training phase.
Networking and indoctrination. This phase pertains to cell members being
introduced and exposed to radical doctrine through various events, such as religious
instruction, meeting, cohabitation, and social activities (Freeman et al., 2010). In this
study, findings indicated that all three successful attacks revealed networking and
indoctrination as prevalent patterns. In this phase, attacks were carried out by the Hamas
group and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who were affiliated with the Fatah organization.
The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade carried out a successful attack to condemn the treatment in
refugee camps. The military wing of the Fatah organization and the Hamas organization
carried out suicide attacks is response to the assassinations of their two leaders.
Findings pertaining to condemning the treatment in refugee camps and response
to the assassination of two leaders are consistent with what has been reported in the
literature. Perry et al. (2013) examined suicide bombings in four Israeli cities: Jerusalem,
Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Netanya, and focused on three terrorist groups: Hamas, al-Asqa
Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which are terrorist groups noted in
this multiple case study findings. Perry et al. related that attacks following IDF operations
were more of a revenge tactic from terrorists due to an arrest or assassination of a known
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terrorist. Similarly, Kennedy (2006) noted that suicide terrorists have certain personality
traits that may lead them to kill themselves and murder others, such as the desire for
revenge for prior perceived injustices perpetrated by government entities or other rivaling
groups. Hassan (2009) argued that although religion may play a key role in recruiting and
motivating potential future suicide bombers, the driving force is mainly attributed to
revenge, retaliation, humiliation, politics, and altruism. Findings that the attacks were
carried out by the Hamas group and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who were affiliated
with the Fatah organization, are consistent with Pape’s (2008) findings that almost all of
the suicide attacks occurred as part of organized campaigns and not as isolated incidents.
Pape found that based on 315 separate attacks, 301 had roots traced to large, coherent
political or military campaigns (p. 130).
Terrorist training. This phase often overlaps with phase one and include cell
members’ participation in organized terrorist activities (Freeman et al., 2010). In this
study, findings indicated that two of the three attacks had no special training conducted,
while one successful attack involved excellent training and preparation. The finding that
two of the three attacks had no special training conducted does not conform to the
prevalent trend that shows terrorists get highly specialized trainings to maximize success
in their operations (Atran, 2006; Cummings & Cummings, 2012). However, the finding
that the successful attack involved excellent training and preparation lends support to the
predominant trend, which illustrates that most suspects associated with terrorist groups
usually get specialized training before carrying out their attacks (Atran, 2006; Cummings
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& Cummings, 2012). Altran related that that rarely are suicide attacks unmethodical or
the targets unsystematically selected as individuals interested in carrying out a suicide
terrorist attack perform hours of preoperational surveillance, tactical training, firearms
and explosives training, as well as detailed planning of the clothing they will wear for the
attack. Similarly, Cummings and Cummings (2012) emphasized that terrorism requires a
great deal of planning such as 9/11, which required flight school training for at least eight
individuals. When Fox (2014) used the AHP to assess Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
phases from a quantitative perspective, findings indicated that terrorist training, along
with networking, planning, and operational prep composed over 65% of the ranking
weights.
General planning. This phase pertains to making the decision to conduct a
terrorist attack as well as the choice of a general target area or target set, such as ships,
bars, U.S. citizens, and soldiers (Freeman et al., 2010). In addition, general shopping for
potential targets is performed (Freeman et al., 2010). This was one of the phases that had
the most number of occurrences as this phase was present in all three successful attacks.
Findings in this study indicated that the successful attacks had complete coordination and
the plans were followed as intended, such as the time of attack, disguise, and
transportation. In addition, the attackers targeted sites that had a high probability for
causalities, such as a synagogue located in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood and
Downtown Triangle district in Jerusalem.

160
These findings were consistent with the literature as Paul and Landree (2008)
discussed these aspects of planning involving ease of access to target location; target
features such as exact location to launch attack, times to launch and window of
opportunity, as well as mobility of target; security issues like security measures, and
presence of other population groups; and threats or barriers to the terrorist operation. In
this study, the successful attackers chose accessible locations with minimum security and
executed their attack plans when the places were heavily crowded. Perry et al. (2013)
noted that the terrorist attacks are planned to hit target locations at times when they are
most crowded. Due to the difficulty in knowing when the next attack will take place in
Israel, Shaked (2016) related that counterterrorism actions involved increasing security
personnel such as police officers, border police, and military personnel at major
junctions, crowded places, and near Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria.
However, despite the underlying commonality of characteristics in these three
successful attacks, the plans and executions reflect the differences in the terror attackers’
approach and strategies. Paul and Landree (2008) also pointed out that the methodologies
and strategies adopted by the terrorist groups might vary to suit their individual needs and
goals. As results indicated, for SA1, attackers targeted civilian population at a Jewish
Orthodox community at the end of religious class conducted on Jewish Sabbath. In this
attack, the bomber used a disguise to blend in with the Jewish population at the venue,
thus, avoided being suspected or detected. On the other hand, SA2 was executed at a
restaurant during the evening hours when the site was heavily populated. The attack was
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very well-planned and even included an efficient escape plan for the handler. For SA3,
cell members who were permanent residents and had the ability to travel to the targeted
area of Jerusalem were used. The cell members also had the knowledge and skills to
navigate the target area.
Recruitment. This phase pertains to senior terrorist elements selecting and
activating cell members for a certain terrorist operation (Freeman et al., 2010). Results in
this study showed that the attackers came from a refugee camp and an attack was in
response to the security attacks and operations conducted near Bethlehem. In addition,
findings indicated that attackers volunteered for the suicide bombing and the attackers
came from one neighborhood, which made recruitment easier. The finding that a suicide
attack was in response to security attacks and operations conducted near Bethlehem is
consistent with Hassan’s (2009) argument that a key role in recruiting and motivating
potential future suicide bombers is mainly attributed to revenge, retaliation, politics,
humiliation, and altruism. The finding that attackers volunteered for the suicide bombing
is in line with Freeman et al.’s discussion of the radicalization process that results in a
group committed to an attack.
Financing. This phase pertains to funds being collected and allocated for a certain
terrorist attack (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings in this study indicated that large
organizations funded all three attacks, such as the Fatah organization, Hamas, and Arab
Bank. This finding is in consistent with Pearl and O’Rourke’s (2001) discussion of how
money gets allocated for specific operations prior to the actual attacks to ensure proper
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implementation of the plan. They provided the example of how money was allocated for
the attack by al-Qa’ida on the U.S. Navy ship Cole on October 12, 2000. Bob (2017)
reported that the IDF Chief of Military Intelligence, Major General Halevi, reported
Iran’s massive funding of terrorist groups that endanger Israel, sharing that Iran is
funding Hezbollah $75 million a year, while paying $50 million of Hamas’s budget, and
approximately $70 million to Islamic Jihad (para. 1).
Operational planning. This phase pertains to selecting the specific target,
conducting detail reconnaissance of the target, and conducting specific operation
planning such as the delivery and procurement methods (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings
in this study indicated that for two of the three attacks, the suicide bombers scouted the
attack site prior to the actual implementation. In addition, the attackers planned for a
large number of casualties at a specific time and location. The attackers also disguised
themselves as tourists to stay unnoticed. Furthermore, the attacker and handler used a car
that was going to the target location and security disruptions were also mitigated.
Overall, findings are consistent with Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB first and
second categories, approach avenues and ease of access, and target features, respectively.
In regard to approach avenues and ease of access, Landree et al. related that well planned
terrorist attacks require planning about how attackers will reach the target such as the use
of scenarios about how attackers will be at a certain place at an exact time in order to
carry out a coordinated attack or multiple attacks, or an attack against a moving target. In
addition, Landree et al. noted that terrorists do not want to be identified; thus, planning
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includes the exact paths they will take. The researchers noted that terrorists who plan
overt attacks may be concerned about whether they will be seen, the presence of physical
obstacles, and time and place of the greatest risk where they may be seen by security
forces or pedestrians. In regard to target features, Landree et al. noted that elements of
target features include attack and target, where attack pertains to the possible locations
from which to launch an attack and possible times to launch an attack, whereas target
includes the mobility and variability of the target.
The finding that the suicide attackers scouted the attack site is consistent with
Berman and Laitin’s (2005) theory of how adversaries select hard and soft targets. The
authors described soft targets as those places with minimum military security or
protection but frequented by visitors, such as nightclubs, schools, malls, and movie
theaters. The finding of suicide attackers targeting a large number of casualties at a
definite time and location is consistent with Ganor’s (2015) reporting that terrorists
choose their target areas based on the potential for damage in terms of casualties,
physical or property, economic, and related costs. Perry et al. (2013) also examined
terrorist groups’ spatial preference patterns, which emphasized how suicide attackers
chose accessible crowds. Perry et al. also found that several attacks correlated with
Jewish holidays.
Weapons procurement. This phase pertains to obtaining and receiving the
materials for the construction of explosives or weapons that will be used in the attack,
such as accelerants, detonators, fertilizers, and rockets (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings in
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this study indicated that three different successful attacks had three different methods of
weapons procurements: (a) assembled from camp and transported to target site, (b) using
of explosive devices with other sharp metal objects to impose the most damage, and (c)
created by a group’s chief bombmaker. The overall findings confirm researchers’
arguments that terrorist groups need access to essential weaponry and they need to have
the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies in order to carry out their
attacks (Bennie & LeMiere, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010). The findings lend support to
Dolnik’s (2007) argument, which emphasized that terror organizations often carefully
analyze the potential targets to identify the vulnerabilities and exploit those to their
advantage for terror operations. Pape (2008) argued that what renders suicide bombing
more lethal than other forms of terror attacks is that the attackers are ready to die on the
mission. As such, their unique methods of attack are hard to detect and require them to
die in order to achieve their goals. Findings are also in line with the third IPO step, which
refers to identifying and evaluating threatening groups or people in relation to weapons
that they may use, such as chemical weapons, small arms, and explosives; as well as the
tactics they may use in their planned activities, such as suicide bombing (Sullivan &
Wirtz, 2008).
Logistical preparation. This phase pertains to logistical actions that are taken to
prepare for the terrorist attack, including safe house rental, vehicle and document
procurement, and electronics purchase (Freeman et al., 2010). Findings in this study
indicated that in two of the three attacks, the attackers reportedly used disguises that were
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appropriate to their target demographics and location and in another attack, attackers
formed a cell within their local target area for easier mobility. In addition, in one attack,
the bomb was hidden in a guitar case. These findings are in line with Rudee’s (2014)
reporting that terrorists will use disguises to carry out attacks, for example, in a foiled
terror attack in Tel Aviv, a woman hid an explosive belt in her clothes while she was
disguised as a pregnant Jewish woman. Hoffman (2003) reported that suicide bombers
are middle-aged, young, married, unmarried, some of them have children, some are
women, and even children are being trained for martyrdom. As a result, Hoffman shared
that there is no clear profile of suicide bombers, who sometimes disguise themselves.
Hoffman noted that as male shaheed or martyrs have worn green IDF fatigues, have
dressed as haredim or ultra-Orthodox Jews, and have worn long-haired wigs to look like
hip Israelis rather than threatening Arabs. Similar to Rudee, Hoffman noted that a few
women tried to camouflage bombs by strapping them to their stomachs to fake
pregnancy. Rudee related that addressing these lethal trends within counterterrorism is
challenging.
Operational preparation. This phase pertains to physical preparations for the
imminent terrorist attack, including explosive construction, vehicle alteration, specific
explosives training, and multimedia preparation and creation (Freeman et al., 2010).
Findings in this study indicated thorough research and planning of target site, which was
led by the handlers. One of the attack involved the handler and bomber moving from one
territory to another because of minimal security barriers while traveling to the target
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location. Emphasis was also placed on the importance for the terror groups in finding a
crowded and packed target location. These findings are similar to those found for
operational planning and are also consistent with Landree et al.’s (2007) ModIPB
approach avenues and ease of access, and target features categories. Thus, well planned
terrorist attacks require planning about how attackers will reach the target. In addition,
findings pertaining to the selection of crowded and packed locations confirm Berman and
Laitin (2005) discussion on soft target selection due little or no military protection or
security.
Unsuccessful Attacks
The patterns and the major and minor themes that evolved from the three-case
study analysis that pertained to the unsuccessful attacks are discussed. Data analysis of
the same three sources revealed that the terrorists had very little information and lacked
proper planning and attack strategies. The first data source, the terrorist activity data
collection worksheet, had no information on logistical preparation. Data analysis of the
second source, site data collection worksheet, only showed three patterns: (a) networking
and indoctrination, (b) general planning, and (c) weapons procurement. Data analysis of
the third source revealed only six of the categories under Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
phases of preattack phases.
Networking and indoctrination. Findings for this phase were similar to the
findings for the recruitment phase, where the unsuccessful attacks were organized by
diverse groups, specifically the Fatah organization and the Islamic Jihad network.
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Furthermore, Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine had planned to detonate a bomb in Tel
Aviv in order to disrupt the Israeli elections and to get revenge for a 10-year-old
Palestinian girl, who was killed during an IDF raid. Suspects in the unsuccessful attacks
included an individual who was unemployed and a volunteer bomber from the Gaza Strip
who had previously launched successful attacks. The findings lend support to Hassan’s
(2009) argument that often politics, revenge, retaliation, humiliation, or altruism act as
driving forces behind terrorist attacks rather than religious fanaticism.
Terrorist training. Findings indicated that for an unsuccessful attack, the Fatah
organization handled, supported, and provided training; and for another unsuccessful
attack, the bomber had no relevant training. The finding pertaining to the lack of training
is unlike conventional terrorist practices that show terrorists to be very methodical and
meticulous in selecting their target locations after spending rigorous hours in
preoperational surveillance, training, and detailed planning of every aspect of the attack,
including the clothes they will wear (Atran, 2006; Freeman et al., 2010). Compared with
the three successful attacks investigated in this study, where the bombers received
extensive training, the lack of training may have contributed to the bomber’s failure to
successfully execute the mission.
General planning. Findings indicated that all three unsuccessful attackers
attempted to travel to the target site to detonate themselves and the residents. This finding
support Pape’s (2008) reporting that the attackers do not expect to survive and often
employ lethal methods of attack. Similarly, Paz (2005) noted that because the death of the
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perpetrator is a desirable or acceptable outcome of the attack, more complex missions can
be attempted than would otherwise be the case if an escape route was needed. Thus, Paz
(2005) related that the most difficult aspect of any type of terror attack is the escape,
which is unnecessary in a suicide attack. With no need for an escape plan, route, or
means of transportation, terrorists can plan and execute missions that otherwise might be
too difficult. In addition, in all three unsuccessful attacks, the bombers searched for a
dense location with high concentration of religious Jews. This finding reiterates Atran’s
(2003) argument that suicide bombers utilize terrorism and target civilians to “effect
political change” (p. 1534). The attacks may have been unsuccessful as results showed a
general lack of proper planning, training, or preparation for the attacks.
Recruitment. Findings in this phase were similar to findings in the networking
and indoctrination phase, where the unsuccessful attacks were organized by the Fatah
organization and the Islamic Jihad network. Islamic Jihad Movement of Palestine had
planned to detonate a bomb in Tel Aviv in order to disrupt the Israeli elections and to get
revenge for the death of a 10-year-old Palestinian girl, a suspect was unemployed, and a
volunteer bomber had previously launched successful attacks. In regard to these findings,
while researchers have found that “poverty and economic conditions are not directly
correlated with the occurrence of terrorism” (Benmelech, Berrebi, & Klor, 2012, p. 113;
Deloughery et al., 2013). Benmelech et al. (2013) found that “high levels of
unemployment enable terror organizations to recruit better educated, more mature, and
more experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important Israeli targets” (p.
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113). Findings are also consistent with Hassan’s (2009) reporting about revenge being a
main reason for terrorist attacks.
Financing. Findings indicated that one unsuccessful attack was funded by the
Government of Iran through the Islamic Jihad network. However, 1 month before the
foiled attempt, Israeli authorities were able to stop some of the money from being
transferred into the West Bank, but not all of it. Freeman et al. (2010) discussed the
importance of financing before a final suicide attack. The suicide attack may have been
unsuccessful due to authorities being able to stop some of the money and possibly
anticipating that an attack was likely to occur, which may have allowed them to use
counterterrorism strategies.
Operational planning. Findings indicated the plan to tamper with border security
fences to infiltrate Israel then proceed to a populated part of central Israel. In addition,
operational planning included paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and the
driver helping with the attack. These themes have parallels to some of the successful
attacks that were investigated in this study. For example, for SA1, the bomber used a car
to reach the destination and the handler assisted the bomber to circumvent the security
checkpoints for leaving Bethlehem. It is unclear whether paying the driver to help with
the attack contributed to the foiled attack. However, parallels between successful and
failed suicide attacks show the presence of certain characteristics irrespective of the
outcomes. This might have important implications for counterterrorism officials who can
look at these overall cases and identify the factors that terrorists resort to or utilize for
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their operations. Fox (2014) emphasized the need for law enforcement officials to learn
about adversary planning so that they can predict their moves to some extent and prevent
the attacks by adopting necessary security measures. Weinstein et al. (2009) also
emphasized the urgency for developing tools and techniques for detecting and tracking
terrorist organizations and networks and recognizing their potentials for terror attacks.
Weapons procurement. Findings indicated that two unsuccessful attacks
involved the weapons being assembled and generated in Israel and the use of 5 kg
explosives. Even though the attacks were unsuccessful, the use of explosives is in line
with the literature as terrorist groups need access to essential weaponry and they need to
have the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies in order to carry out
attacks (Bennie & LeMiere, 2008; O’Rourke, 2010).
Logistical preparation. Results showed two unsuccessful attackers attempted to
reach their target point by foot. Dzikansky, Kleiman, and Slater (2012) noted that the
bulkiness of explosives makes it more challenging for suicide bombers to walk normally,
so they might arouse suspicion. Dzikansky et al. noted that due to this constraint, suicide
bombers tend to focus on soft targets or civilian targets. To reduce the likelihood of being
caught, suicide bombings are sometimes replaced with suicide car bombings as a larger
amount of explosives can be placed in the vehicles.
Operational preparation. Findings indicated the plan to detonate at a populated
site, and paying a driver to smuggle the suspect to Israel and help with the attack. Using a
populated site is consistent with Perry et al.’s (2013) findings of suicide attacks in Israel
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where terrorists targeted accessible crowds, which did not have to be large. Perry et al.
noted that suicide bombers were content to target groups of dozens or even smaller. In
addition, the researchers noted that suicide attackers were also very repetitive in target
decisions, for example, more than 1 in 3 attacks were repeat strikes on locations
previously targeted.
Cross-Case Analysis
Based on content analysis, the above sections provided a comprehensive
exploration of the differences within and between the cases. In this section, I will identify
some of the parallels across all the cases to provide overall patterns that are discernable in
the nine phases of preattack adversary planning and how it relates to the conceptual
framework and the literature. A comparison between the successful and failed attack
cases revealed that the successful attackers’ adversary planning process more readily
emerged in Freeman et al. (2010) nine preattack phases than those of their failed
counterparts’. In addition, the unsuccessful attackers failed to show similar consistency
and many of the categories from the nine phases were absent across the three data sources
for the unsuccessful cases.
Within the networking and indoctrination phase, the successful cases showed the
support of Hamas group for two of the attacks and Fatah group for one of the attacks.
Researchers have shown how large terror organizations provide funding and support for
suicide attacks (Pape, 2008; Kennedy, 2006). Tal (2002) discussed indoctrination, where
some suicide bombers are put through religious indoctrination, where it is stressed that
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their act of self-sacrifice is an act of supreme sacrifice in the name of jihad. However, Tal
pointed out that indoctrination has become less common because the ongoing
confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, which has resulted in causalities, severe
economic decline, closures, curfews, and roadblock. These factors have resulted in
increased despair and frustration, most of which is directed at Israel (Tal, 2002). As a
result, Tal noted that this has increased people’s desire to volunteer for and carry out
suicide attacks, thus, rendering indoctrination unnecessary. In this study, the unsuccessful
attacks lacked information on networking and support groups who financed the attacks.
Contrary to conventional practices amongst terrorists, two of the attacks that were
financed by the Hamas group did not involve any training. One successful attack revealed
that the bomber received extensive training for the suicide mission. However, the attacks,
in general, were coordinated by skilled handlers who helped the bombers in completing
their attacks. The successful cases also indicated that the handlers carefully scouted the
sites prior to the attack to ensure maximum casualty. Hoffman (2003) discussed the use
of handlers. According to Hoffman, terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the Palestine
Islamic Jihad, or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, recruited the bomber, conducted
reconnaissance, prepared the explosive device, and identified a target. Hoffman explained
that if the target is guarded or protected, any crowded place nearby will do. Thus, suicide
bombers most often have a handler and in some cases, a handler has used a cell phone or
other device to trigger the blast from a distance (Hoffman, 2003).
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Although general planning was present in all six studies, the successful attacks
showed more detailed planning that involved multiple factors. For instance, for SA1, the
bomber wore a disguise to blend in with the teen students who were attending religious
classes and who congregated at the target site at the end of their classes, SA2 bomber hid
his explosives inside a guitar case, and SA3 attackers were deliberately chosen from a
particular cell where the members held permanent resident cards and could access the
target site without any hindrances. General Planning was present in all the unsuccessful
cases, which showed important trends like how the attackers planned to arrive at their
destinations and how they wanted to target densely populated areas with high
concentration of Jews. One of the important themes that became evident across most of
the studies was that the attackers targeted sites at specific times when maximum number
of civilians were present at the locations. Coupled with the intension to inflict maximum
damage, another theme evolved, which showed that the attackers used bombs made by
chief bombmakers that were loaded with sharp metals to have a greater effect when they
were detonated. Benmelech et al. (2012) claimed that in designing efﬁcient
counterterrorism policies, the most common counterterrorism policies aim to incapacitate
terror organizations by cracking down on their members and enacting security measures
that decrease the probability of success of a planned attack.
Another theme that emerged from the analysis revealed a significant difference in
approach between the successful and the unsuccessful case studies. The successful
attacks demonstrated thorough planning and research, for instance, for SA1, suicide
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bombers used a car to arrive to the location and for SA2, attackers had an escape plan for
the handler. In comparison, two of the attackers from the unsuccessful attacks chose to
travel to the destinations by foot. Hoffman (2013) reporting is in line with these findings
as the author noted that the human weapons system can effect last-minute changes based
on the ease of approach, the paucity or density of people, and the security measures that
are in place.
Results showed some of the motives behind the attacks. The attacks were
conducted for drawing government’s attention to generate political changes, disrupting
elections, or for taking revenge for atrocities that the attackers thought were inflected by
Israelis. For example, SA2 was planned to avenge the assassination of two of the Hamas
leaders and USA1 was planned to avenge the death of a Palestinian girl who became a
victim of a raid in her camp. Consistent with the literature, a strong motive for suicide
attacks is revenge, such as revenge for the deaths of friends, fellow cadres, or relatives at
the hands of Israeli forces (Hassan, 2009; Tal, 2002).
Limitations of the Study
Factors that I considered in relation to the trustworthiness that arose from the
execution of this multiple case study include the type of study, the chosen case studies,
types of data sources, assumptions, and analysis of the results. There were several
limitations of this study. Even though I used different kinds of cases, one possible
limitation was generalizing the results since a maximum variation sampling and
purposeful random sampling of only six Israel suicide bombing cases were used and the
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results of the study were limited to suicide attacks cases in Israel. Therefore, the results of
the study may not be generalizable to other forms of terrorist attacks or to terrorist attacks
in other countries as the majority of the cases were targeted towards locations in and
around Jerusalem. Yin (2012) related that a single or small set of cases cannot be
statistically generalized as that is not the aim of such studies. Instead, Yin noted that case
studies tend to generalize to other situations based on analytic claims. Yin discussed a
conceptual claim where researchers show how the findings from their study have
informed the relationship among a particular set of concepts, theoretical constructs, or
sequence of events. Yin related that the second step pertains to researchers applying the
same theoretical propositions to implicate other situations outside the completed case
study where similar concepts, constructs, or sequences might be relevant. Hence,
although the findings from this multiple case study cannot be statistically generalized,
they could have implications for other situations based on analytical claims.
A second possible limitation was issues of missing or incomplete data on the
suicide bombing cases. However, this possible limitation was addressed by only
including cases that had sufficient data available from multiple sources so that I was able
to gather data on Freeman et al. (2010) nine phases. A third limitation pertained to bias in
the selection of the suicide bombing cases. I am CEO of the private intelligence company
in Israel where the case study data were obtained. I addressed this limitation by obtaining
the community partner’s cooperation and data use agreement. I used purposeful random
sampling in selecting the three successful and three failed suicide attacks. I also used
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specific strategies such as reflexivity where I revealed any experiences, biases, and values
pertaining to the adversary planning process for each adversary success or failure in the
Israel suicide bombing cases.
A fourth limitation was the difference in timeframe for successful suicide attacks
and unsuccessful suicide attacks. As noted in Chapter 4, the successful attacks occurred
in 2001 and 2002, whereas the unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. The
differences in years might be attributed to counterterrorist decision makers and operators
having a better understanding of the nine preattack phases; thus, improving their
counterterrorism strategies. In additions, the timeframe differences between the
successful and unsuccessful attacks might also be attributed to environmental changes,
such as suicide attacks originating from the Gaza Strip or other Palestinian territories, but
a barrier or wall was built beginning in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, when
major rioting and civil unrest took place from 2000 to 2006 (Butterworth et al., 2012;
Zonszein, 2014). Zonszein (2014) reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered it as
a measure to protect Israelis from Palestinian suicide bombers. Thus, future research
could focus on factors that may have affected the behavior of terrorists in the intervening
years that may explain the differences found in the successful versus unsuccessful cases.
A fifth limitation was related to the assumption that the adversary was targeting
only civilians and not the property. As such, the results only focused on the casualties and
did not discuss damages to property. Hence, future research could focus on the aftermath
of terror attacks to gain a better understanding of how to prepare against serious damages.
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Recommendations
Seven recommendations for future research arise based on the strengths and
limitations of the study as well as the literature review. First, in this study, I focused on
six suicide bombing cases in Israel; thus, filling in a gap in the literature by exploring
specific patterns that consistently emerged within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine
preattack phases. However, the scope of this study is limited to suicide bombing attacks
in Israel. Thus, in future studies, researchers could expand the cases by exploring other
suicide bombing cases in other countries while using Freeman et al. nine preattack
phases. Findings could be compared to those found in this study and the results could be
used to assist counterterrorism and COIN professionals in their efforts to prevent suicide
attacks from taking place and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks.
Second, in this study, I explored the specific patterns within each of Freeman et
al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases that consistently emerged in the adversary planning
process for each of the suicide bombing cases; however, I did not specially focus on the
timing of these specific patterns, such as the months or years between the different phases
before the attacks or attempted attacks occurred. Freeman et al. investigated whether
terrorist attackers follow an observable pattern in their preattack activities, whether the
patterns could be used as an indicator or warning of imminent terrorist activity, and
whether the indicators and warnings could be used to predict the timing of a future
terrorist attack. Based on the findings from the Freeman et al. study, they found that the
nine phases fell into three stages and these stages took place at a specific time.
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Specifically, the researchers found that Stage 1 consisted of the first three phases and
took place a year or more in advance of the attack. Stage 2 included the fourth and fifth
phases and took place 6 months to a year in advance of an attack. Stage 3 consisted of
Phases 6 through 9 and took place a few months before the attack. Thus, future research
on suicide attacks could also add to the literature by focusing on the specific timing of
when each phase takes place before an attack and results could be compared to Freeman
et al.’s findings; thus, adding more knowledge in this area. Freeman et al. reported that
understanding the general pattern of preparation before a terrorist attack is helpful, but it
is most valuable if it could be used as an indicator of an upcoming attack. Thus,
counterterrorism and COIN professionals could use the results to predict the specific
timeframe when the actual suicide attack may occur.
Third, the suicide bombing cases in this study focused on terrorists who were part
of a terrorist organization and had support from other people. Zeirhoffer (2014) presented
the difficulty of tracking lone wolf attackers who operate without any supporting
organization. The researcher noted the lack of research on lone attackers because most
researchers focus only on terrorist organizations. Shaked (2016) reported that the recent
terrorist attacks in Israel have been mostly carried out by lone wolves who are not
affiliated with any terror groups. Thus, future research could focus on using Borum et al.
(1999) threat assessment model to examine the demographics or characteristics of
potential lone wolf terrorists, behaviors that could indicate the movement of individuals
toward achieving a goal, and how the model could be used to prevent lone wolf terrorism.
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Fourth, as noted in the limitation of the study section, this study was limited in its
focus on civilian casualties and not property damage. Therefore, future research could
focus on the aftermath of terror attacks to gain a better understanding of how to prepare
against serious damages.
Fifth, Shalev et al. (2006) evaluated the effects of continuous terror by examining
the prevalence of PTSD, PTSD symptoms, and symptoms of general distress in
individuals who lived in two different suburbs in Jerusalem, Israel, a directly exposed
community and an indirectly exposed community. The researchers found that disruption
of daily living significantly contributed to PTSD symptoms. Future research could further
delve into the effects on people after suicide attacks, which might further help emergency
management groups or first responders, health care providers, and law enforcement
officers in their response and treatment of suicide attack victims.
Sixth, Greenhill and Staniland (2007) recommended that individuals conducting
counterterrorist activities should consider an underlying premise, namely the in-depth
study of the nature and results yielded by COIN operations as such detailed research is
indispensable for possibly preventing future incidents involving suicide terrorism. Thus,
future research could add to this effort by focusing on how to decrease heightened
extremist ideals and prevent future terrorist attacks. Seventh, as noted in the limitations of
the study section, the successful attacks occurred in 2001 and 2002, whereas the
unsuccessful attacks occurred in 2005 and 2006. Future research could focus on factors
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that may have affected the behavior of terrorists in the intervening years that may explain
the differences found in the successful versus unsuccessful cases.
Implications
Israel is one of 13 countries at risk for increased terrorist activity (IEP, 2014). The
biggest threat to peace in Israel and other countries is terrorist groups such as ISIS, Boko
Haram, Hezbollah, Taliban, and al-Qa’ida (Fox, 2014; IEP, 2014). Tal (2002) reported
that suicide attacks result in casualties, fear, and anxiety for the public and present
difficult challenges to State of Israel officials (Tal, 2002). Fox (2014) emphasized that the
detection of terrorist attacks before they occur is critical, but difficult when efforts are
unfocused and misaligned. Fox related that law enforcement officials should increase
their knowledge about adversary planning so that they can predict suicide attackers’
moves to some extent and prevent the attacks by adopting necessary security measures.
Similarly, Paul and Landree (2008) argued that it is imperative to study the planning
process involved in an attack because it will provide insights into various segments of the
attack such as selecting a target, selecting the mode of attack, choosing specific terrorist
operatives, and developing an operational plan. Weinstein et al. (2009) emphasized the
urgency for developing tools and techniques for detecting and tracking terrorist
organizations and networks and recognizing their potentials for terror attacks. Freeman et
al. (2010) postulated that focusing on the early phases of adversary preattack planning
could provide valuable information about how terrorists prepare to execute an attack.
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The patterns that evolved through content analysis have important implications
for law enforcement, military, counterterrorism, and COIN officials as understanding the
general pattern of preparation before a terrorist attack is useful in preventing future
suicide attacks (Freeman et al., 2010; Tal, 2002). Thus, the findings from this study may
assist CTOs to further focus on patterns that are helpful in detecting suicide attacks prior
to execution. In addition, findings in this study could be used to assist counterterrorism
decision makers in creating policies to arrest those suspected of plotting an attack as soon
as their activity is noticed. Paul and Landree (2008) noted that the more individuals
involved in counterterrorism strategies are able to understand adversary strategies, the
better equipped they are to identify risks and execute defensive strategies.
The investigation of the suicide cases with respect to Freeman et al. (2010) nine
preattack phases revealed interesting patterns of terrorist behavior that could be used to
predict their actions, such as general planning, financing, and operational preparation,
which received the most occurrences in the successful attack cases. Paul and Landree
(2008) related that when defenders control the attack planning process by protecting
essential information concerning the infrastructure or the target, individuals and
governments combating terror attacks can gather a more concrete set of parameters
regarding what terrorists are likely to search for; hence, they are better able to identify
targets that may be at risk and adjust their defenses accordingly.
The implications for positive social change stemming from this study are directed
at counterterrorist decision makers and operators, such as Israel Security Agency and
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defense establishments, as focusing on the early planning phases of a terrorist attack will
help them to better identify essential opportunities to prevent suicide attacks from
occurring and better mitigate the effects of suicide attacks. This knowledge and action
will save the lives of citizens, first responders, and law enforcement officials. Findings
from this research study added further knowledge to the public policy and administration
literature on patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases prior to
suicide attacks. Along with the public policy and administration field, a wide array of
other fields might be interested in the study’s findings, to include the fields of criminal
justice, public safety, and emergency management. The findings from the study are also
applicable to many public and private agencies and organizations to include Israel
Homeland Security; federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and intelligence
centers. By better understanding patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s nine preattack
phases, counterintelligence and COIN professionals can implement COIN measures that
may be able to detect and combat terrorism threats.
Conclusion
To help CTOs narrow the field of options while filling the operational need to
detect terrorist attacks before they occur, I added new knowledge to the literature by
exploring specific patterns within each of Freeman et al.’s (2010) nine preattack phases
that consistently emerged in the adversary planning process for each successful or failed
suicide bombing cases in Israel. Wigle (2010) explained that compared to other types of
terror attacks, suicide attacks are fewer, but results in a higher casualty rate. Kaplan et al.
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(2006) noted that suicide bombings were the leading cause of death from terrorism in
Israel. Ganor (2015) noted that although terrorists often choose symbolic targets, they
target high trafficked areas when the opportunity arises. Ganor argued that terrorists often
select their targets based on their assessment of potential attack consequences in terms of
loss of life, injuries, economic, and other costs.
Data analysis showed consistent patterns emerging across Freeman et al. (2010)
nine phases that revealed how terrorists selected target locations, recruited and provided
training to bombers and other members, developed a plan, and prepared for the actual
attack. Some of the major patterns that emerged revealed that large terror organizations
such as Fatah organization and Hamas supported and funded terrorist attacks, suicide
bombers targeted locations that had large number of people at specific times to get a high
number of casualties, attackers disguised themselves so that they could avoid being
suspected among the target population, and they develop efficient plans for traveling to
the site as well as plans for handlers to escape from the target location. Based on these
findings, it is important that decision makers and CTOs focus on the early planning
phases of a terrorist attack so that they are better able to identify essential opportunities to
prevent suicide attacks from occurring (see Fox, 2014). Paul and Landree (2008) related
that the more individuals involved in counterterrorism strategies are able to understand
adversary strategies, the better equipped they are to identify risks and execute defensive
strategies. This in turn will save the lives of Israeli citizens, first responders, and law
enforcement officials.
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Appendix A: Case Study Selection Worksheet

Categories

Year of attack

Attack outcome

City of attack

Bomber casualty
Civilian causality

Target type
Data sufficiency on each
of Freeman et al. (2010)
nine phases:
Networking and
indoctrination
Terrorist training

General planning

Recruitment

Selection Criteria Details
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Financing

Operational planning

Weapons procurement

Logistical preparation

Operational
preparation
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Appendix B: Terrorist Activity Data Collection Worksheet

Phases

Phase 1: Networking and
indoctrination

Phase 2: Terrorist training

Phase 3: General planning

Phase 4: Recruitment
Phase 5: Financing

Phase 6: Operational
planning
Phase 7: Weapons
procurement

Phase 8: Logistical
preparation

Phase 9: Operational
preparation

Descriptive narrative data related to this phase
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Appendix C: Site Data Collection Worksheet

SITE NO.
____________
COLLECTION
QUESTION(S)

NARRATIVE l ADDITIONAL DETAILS

SPATIAL
CONSDIERATIONS
How many blocks can
you see along each
street? If no streets
visible, use cardinal
directions and meter
estimates.

Street name/direction:
No. of blocks / meters:
Street name/direction:
No. of blocks / meters:
Street name/direction:
No. of blocks / meters:
Street name/direction:
No. of blocks / meters:

Were stationary police
and or security guards
visibly present? (Y/N)
Were there routine
security patrols? (Y/N)
Were there personnel
restricting access?
(Y/N)

Notes:
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Was a handler present
(Y/N)

Notes:

How difficult was it to
approach the target on
foot? Were there
significant obstacles?

1 - direct, no obstacles 2 – some barriers, not direct
3 – significant obstructions
Notes:

Is the site located on a
1-way street?

How close is the site to
the West Bank and
major thoroughfares?

Proximity to West Bank:

How can the site be
accessed?

By bus (Y/N)
By foot (Y/N)
By Private car (Y/N)

Proximity to major thoroughfare:

SITE & IMMEDIATE
SURROUNDINGS
SME opinion: What is
the primary reason the
target site (or
transportation route)
was selected?
What are immediate
surroundings of the
detonation site?
Consider the same
block or complex.

Is location in a mall? Street filled with other bus stops?
Etc.

Is there anything
notable about the key

Core constituency: e.g., university students,
businessmen, blue collar workers.

206
population that
frequents the site and its
immediate surroundings
(or rides the bus)?
What are the local
points of interest (POIs)
in the immediate area?
For example, religious
sites, political figures’
residences, business
centers?
Rate and explain the
political, religious,
commercial or other
significance (symbolic
or strategic) of the site,
immediate
surroundings, and local
POIs (1-5)

1 – none 2 – possible /low impact 3 – likely 4 –
high likelihood 5 – definite / high impact

Political _____ Religious ______
Commercial _____ Other ______

Notes:

NEIGHBORHOOD
COMPOSITION
(SEVERAL BLOCKS
l 2000+ PEOPLE)
What is the
neighborhood called?
What are the local
socioeconomic
conditions and class
composition of the
neighborhood?

1 – working class 2 – middle class 3 – upper class
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What is the religious
composition of the
neighborhood (e.g.,
Muslim, Jewish,
Orthodox)?

Residents:
Visitors:

What is the ethnic
composition of the
neighborhood?
What is the daily influx
of Palestinians into the
site and surrounding
neighborhood for
employment or other
purposes (1-5)?
TIMING
CONSIDERATIONS
OF DETONATION
Daily and weekly
schedules of religious
observance and
preparation for
observance in
immediate area
Daily and weekly
schedules of leisure
patterns, including
shopping, dining, etc.
Daily and weekly
schedules of transit as
related to school, work,
religious observance,

1 – none / 2 – low / 3 – medium / 4 – high / 5 –
extremely high
Notes:
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leisure etc.
Did bombing co-occur
with religious
observance or holiday
(Muslim or Jewish)?
(Y/N)

Is observance related to the site? I.e., major
synagogues, shopping areas for Sabbath?

Did bombing co-occur
with date of political
commemorations or
negotiations? (Y/N)

Were they related to the site? Proximity of
negotiations, public statements, government buildings?

Did bombing co-occur
with significant changes
in security situation, or
with armed operations
in territories? (Y/N)

Include IDF activities, political infighting in territories.
Did these take place close to the site?
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Appendix D: Questionnaire Into Suicide Bombing Events
Target Code

Site Specific

Target site
selection

Neighborhood Regional

Why was the
What is
target site
special about
selected (see
the site?
next section of
questions on site
selection)?

Was it a group
decision or
individual
decision on the
site selection?
What was the
process of
making the
decision?

What is
special about
the
neighborhood
? Business,
residential,
tourist?

Is there any
significance to
the order or
simply to
appear it
could happen
anywhere at
any time?

What planning
(preparation and
staging) went
into the attack?

Was the site
or bus known
for tourists or
locals?
Workers or
students?
Soldiers?

What were the
considerations
of site
selection? Were
there any
regional factors
or
social/political
factors involved
in the decision?

What do they
think was the
neighborhood
social
composition?
Primarily
Israelis or
other
ethnicity?
Did it border
similar areas?

Was there a
trigger event
to the first
bombing?
Where any
bombings in
response to
actions by
security
officials?

What triggered
the attack to
take place? Was
there a political
or social
trigger? Was
timing
significant?

What time
was the event
to as much
detail as
possible?

How far did one
travel to the site
at the day of the
event, and did
the person
choose a
particular route
to get to the
site?

Is there any
info on the
bomber's
residence?
Where
multiple
bombers from
the same area,
same school,
same church?

How were
bombers
recruited? Did
most
volunteer?

In what ways
can the target
site be
characterized

How did the
bomber arrive
at the site
(e.g., walk

Did one scout
the site prior to
the event? If so,
how far ago

Did any
bombers live
and bomb in
the same area?

Were the
devices
assembled in
Israel?
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(e.g., many
people/gatherin
g site, political
area, financial
area, religious,
monuments,
etc.)?

from a local
apartment,
take the bus,
from a taxi)?

before the
event? How
many times?
What did the
person look for
at the site? Did
one look for
different things
each time when
one scouted the
site? What was
the site scouting
strategy? Were
there any sites
dropped after
scouting and
considerations?
If so, what were
these sites and
what were the
reasons or
rationale?

It what ways did
the attack fit a
pattern?
Location of
attack? How
attack was
carried out?
Characteristics
of bomb?

Get a
description of
the site if it
was not a bus.
Was it a bus
stop, inside a
building, a
common area
between shops
or cafés, at a
checkpoint
(checkpoint
was around
what)?

How did the
person decide a
particular spot
at the site to
trigger the
event?

Any info to
suggest
bombers
scouted
multiple sites?

What was
happening
prior to the
suicide
bombings?
Other types
for organized
violence?

What has been
done to mitigate
risk of attacks?
Where are they

If it was a bus,
did the
bomber get on
the bus and

How important
is choosing the
time of
triggering the

Any info to
suggest the
bomber was
familiar with

At the time,
how was
terror
organization
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adding
protection
measures?
Where do they
expect future
attacks and
why?

detonate
quickly or ride
the bus for an
amount of
time. Do they
think the
intention was
the bus or the
location of the
bus or both?

event? How is
the time factor
considered?
How was the
site selection
influenced by
recent news or
political
situations?

We would like
to better
understand any
specific tactics
(e.g., attacking
public
transportation)?
What has been
learned? What
has been done
to protect? What
is expected in
the future?

Anything
special about
the site related
to time of
year? Holiday
shoppers,
sports events,
local festivals

How did one
travel to the
site? Did one
detour en route
to the site? If so,
where did the
person stop?
How far was the
site from one's
origin location
(i.e., where did
the person start
the journey to
the site on the
day of the
event?)?

If the event
was on a bus,
what are the
details of the
bus line? To
and from what
areas and
what is special
about the
areas. The bus
was taking
people to
work,
shopping,

What did the
person see on
the way to the
site?

the area?

organized?
Once central
group or a few
dispersed
cells/cliques?
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tourist areas?
Any info on
where the
bomber was
outfitted with
the device?
Was site
chosen for a
specific
reason? Did
the site
symbolize
something?
Cultural
insight
relating to bus
attacks:
Is there a
demographic
divide in who
typically rides
particular bus
routes?
Was there
anything
unique about
the suicide
bombings that
occurred on
buses, aside
from the
assumed
desire to
maximize
casualties
(i.e., certain
bus-routes,
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time of day,
passengers,
choice of
targeting a
moving bus in
terms of a
tactic)
What
measures were
taken by the
transit
authorities or
companies to
counter
bombers
targeting
buses? Were
they effective?
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